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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
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DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
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DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Implementation of the DOD Strategic Communication Plan for
Afghanistan

In order to augment our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense has developed the attached DOD Strategic Communication (SC) Plan for Afghanistan. This SC plan supports and complements NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations.

This SC plan directs all DoD organizations to begin execution immediately according to their specified duties and responsibilities. The plan is dynamic, and will continue to be updated and modified as Coalition efforts in Afghanistan evolve. To ensure the successful execution of this plan, DoD leaders are requested to provide the appropriate support to the designated lead organizations. Please review the attached SC plan to identify your responsibilities.

The DoD Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG) Secretariat stands ready to work with you and your staff on this important effort. The Acting Director of the DoD SCIG Secretariat is Captain Hal Pittman, hal.e.pittman@osd.mil, (703) 697-3357.

Attachment:
As stated



Department of Defense Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan

- I. (U) Purpose: The purpose of this Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan is to identify messages and tasks for strategic communication efforts in support of U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. This plan will help identify how SC efforts can help advance USG strategic goals for Afghanistan, including by complementing, shaping, and supporting:
1. the “Afghanistan Strategic Review” Way Ahead;
 2. interagency activities and the State Department Bureau of South and Central Asia’s draft “Afghanistan Strategic Communications Implementation Strategy for 2007;”
 3. the SC component of ISAF’s “Proposed 2007 Action Plan;”
 4. the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and leverage its programs and products to advance USG strategic goals; and
 5. relevant regional and GWOT objectives.
- II. (U) Desired End State: The Afghan people and people in Allied and partner countries recognize and support the efforts of the Afghan government, the U.S., its Allies and partners in stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan. The Afghan people strongly support their government and reject insurgency, terrorism, and the narcotics trade.

Achieving desired effects on audience perceptions are critical to achieving the end state. For supported goals, see Annex A. For desired effects, see “Desired Effects” column of the Execution Matrix in Annex B.

III. (U) Audiences:

- A. Afghan Population
- B. Afghan Government
- C. Government and Military of Pakistan
- D. Pakistani Population
- E. Governments of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs)
- F. Populations of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs)
- G. Enemy Leadership (AQ, AQAM, Taliban, criminal networks)
- H. Taliban Rank-and-File
- I. Governments of Central Asia
- J. Central Asian Populations
- K. IGO and NGO community
- L. U.S. domestic audiences

IV. (U) Background:

1. Obstacles and Constraints are listed in the “Constraints” column of the Execution Matrix at Annex B.
2. The Plan calls for the development and regular updating of Audience Analyses, which are derived from both open source and classified information. These classified Audience Analyses should be used to understand current perceptions and measure progress toward the Desired Effects.

V. (U) Themes: The following themes support USG goals and are consistent with the NATO-ISAF Master Narrative and NC3 top-line messaging. Messaging should be tailored for specific audiences, but because audiences do not exist in isolation, all messages should remain consistent with these themes.

1. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO-ISAF, and the U.S. are committed for the long term to ensuring a democratic, stable, peaceful Afghanistan that is inhospitable to terrorism. The Afghan people can rely on its allies, including the U.S. government and NATO, to stay the course.
2. Success in Afghanistan over insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism, and trafficking in narcotics is critical to the security of the Afghan people, the United States, our NATO allies, its regional neighbors, and the international community.

3. Afghanistan's security, reconstruction, and development needs remain large but the country has come a long way since the overthrow of the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continues to make progress.
4. Success requires a comprehensive approach that includes security and stability as well as reconstruction and development.
5. The Taliban are a destructive force that targets innocent Afghan civilians. They engage in criminal activity and brutal tactics for their own gain and cannot offer long-term security, stability, or development for the people of Afghanistan.

VI. (U) Execution: See Annex B.

VII. (U) Tools and Enablers: Several tools are critical to the success of the strategic communication effort, and may require additional USG resources to support demands on capacity:

1. Senior Afghan Government, USG, and NATO officials as strategic communicators
 - i. Requires coordination of event calendar and public affairs efforts
2. DoD Regional Centers as strategic communicators
 - i. Assess current efforts to determine need for additional guidance and funding
3. NATO Media Operations Center as a strategic enabler
 - i. Assess benefit and availability of U.S. PAOs for assignment to billets
4. State-maintained Internet portal as a strategic enabler to share messaging and a unified calendar of upcoming dates
 - i. Assess need for DoD mechanism based on State's progress
5. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as a strategic communicator and listener
 - i. Assess availability of DoD resources and personnel to support USAID's plans to improve the Government's communication capacity

- ii. Determine plan and requirements for supporting the Afghan Government's strategic communication and public affairs capabilities at the provincial and local levels

6. PRTs as strategic communicators and listeners

- i. Assess benefit and availability of Afghan, U.S., Allied, and coalition PAOs for assignment to PRTs
- ii. Assess requirements to expand PRT Executive Steering Committee into an effective coordinating body
- iii. Assess cost and feasibility of incorporating/adjusting PA/SC pre-deployment training and in-theatre distance learning for basic, tailored public affairs training for U.S. and non-U.S. PRT officers

7. Funding communications infrastructure in Afghanistan

- i. Determine need for equipment to enable the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's strategic communication capacity in the context of overall USG efforts

8. Studying messaging networks and feedback

- i. Fund contracts for polling of target audiences and identifying key Afghans and ideal communications methods
- ii. Increase intelligence community reporting on messaging networks and Afghan perception

VIII. (U) Assessment: The execution of this plan includes an assessment based on Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), listed in the "Measures of Effectiveness" column of the Execution Matrix at Annex B.

Annexes

- A. Supported Goals. This annex restates the goals in several U.S. Government and NATO documents that pertain to strategic communication.
- B. Execution Matrix. The Execution Matrix identifies the audiences with whom we hope to improve our communication efforts, and includes our desired effects, constraints that currently limit the effectiveness of our communication; the efforts designed to inform each audience; assignments of lead and supporting U.S. Government organizations and agencies to execute those tasks; and ways to measure effectiveness of these efforts.

The tasks identified in the Execution Matrix are designed to regularly assess the attitudes of key audiences, synchronize messaging with the governments of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and our NATO-ISAF Allies, provide resources to increase the communication capacity of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and NATO, and enable the Department of Defense to better disseminate information on a timely basis.

- C. Points of Contact. This annex is unclassified.

A. Supported Goals

USG GWOT goals

(National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror, NCTC, 26 June 2006)

1. Protect and defend the homeland and US interests abroad.
2. Deter/mitigate terrorist activity and their capacity to operate effectively in the United States and abroad.
3. Counter violent extremism.
4. Prevent terrorists' acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction.
5. Institutionalize domestically and internationally the strategy for the war on terror and violent extremism.
6. Continue to nurture and expand foreign partnerships and partner capacity to defeat violent extremism.

USG Theater Mission

(US Central Command unclassified website)

1. Attack, disrupt, and defeat terrorism.
2. Deter and defeat adversaries.
3. Strengthen regional stability.
4. Build the self-reliance of partner nations' security forces.

USG Goals for Afghanistan

(Afghanistan Strategic Review for Principals – approved 1 February 2007):

1. A reliable, stable, geo-strategically placed ally in the War on Terror;
2. Moderate, democratic, with a thriving private sector economy;
3. Capable of effectively governing its territory and borders; and
4. Respectful of the rights of all citizens, including minorities and women.

NATO ISAF Goals for Afghanistan

(NATO in Afghanistan: Master Narrative – 08 June 2007)

1. The extension of government authority across Afghanistan;
2. The development of the Afghan government structures necessary to maintain security across the country without the assistance of international forces;
3. The establishment of a stable and secure environment in which sustainable reconstruction and development has taken hold; and
4. The promotion by the Afghan government of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
5. NATO-ISAF provides indirect assistance to the Afghan authorities' counternarcotics operations through training and logistic, and in-extremis support, as appropriate. NATO/ISAF also helps the Afghan government to explain its counter narcotics policy to its people.

USG Counter-narcotics Goals in Afghanistan

(U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan – August 2007)

1. Support the Government of Afghanistan's eight pillar National Drug Control Strategy, with emphasis on the first five pillars: public information, alternative development, elimination/eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement/justice reform.
2. Increase development assistance to incentivize licit development while simultaneously amplifying the scope and intensity of both interdiction and eradication operations.
3. Increase coordination of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency planning and operations.
4. Encourage consistent, sustained political will for the counternarcotics effort among the Afghan government, our Allies, partners, and international organizations.

B. Execution Matrix

AUDIENCE: All Audiences

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accurate understanding of international community's efforts in Afghanistan • Comprehensive understanding of progress country-wide • Comprehensive understanding of the long-term challenges • Recognition of the strategic importance of Afghanistan to international security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple actors means multiple voices • NATO is a consensus-driven body made up of sovereign governments • Media attention tends to be drawn to kinetic operations • Enemy exploits any perceived dissonance among Allies • Difficult to develop a consensus strategic response to crisis events in such a fast-paced media environment • Extremely complex modern media environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Message coordination within USG, with NATO, ISAF, Government of Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create and update quarterly a Master Narrative, synchronized with NATO's Master Narrative and Government of Afghanistan messages, to provide high-level messaging to all levels of command. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • USD(P) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • EUCOM • JS • State • NATO MOC • Government of Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater clarity on OEF and ISAF missions • Greater understanding of progress, and increased appreciation of Afghanistan's strategic importance to international security
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop, coordinate, disseminate, and regularly update talking points and supporting materials/fact sheets on key issues related to Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • SPD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • State • CENTCOM • SOCOM • NATO MOC • Govt of Afghanistan 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quarterly update of Audience Analyses to reflect current attitudes, prioritized list of methods by which audience receives messaging (e.g. TV, traditional communication, etc.), and assessment of shifts in attitudes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JIOWC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • USD(P) • USD(I) • JS • State • Intel Community 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular operational coordination to deconflict and synchronize messages and activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SOCOM • State • USD(P) • PA 	

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actionable SC information and intelligence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a monthly “SC Outlook” with upcoming relevant events and upcoming dates that present strategic communication opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • EUCOM • SOCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • Embassy Kabul • PRT Executive Steering Committee • NATO MOC • Govt of Afghanistan 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Virtual tool to globally track and share information on ongoing activities, assets, calendars, and projects populated by POC at each relevant agency • Integrate with equivalent NATO MOC effort • Incorporate reconstruction update information from USAID, USACE, NGOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(I) • JIOWC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • USAID • JS • PA • CENTCOM • EUCOM • SOCOM • STRATCOM 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish communications structures and processes to enable rapid response capability within the USG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish interagency process to disseminate actionable information to key USG leadership for rapid response • Establish capability to rapidly produce unclassified releasable versions of actionable intelligence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NSC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • DoD • OMB 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish process within DoD to disseminate actionable information up to SecDef 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • JS • CENTCOM • EUCOM 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarify roles of communicators and regularize communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the establishment of a civilian Government of Afghanistan spokesperson 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Govt of Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • Embassy Kabul 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the establishment of a new ISAF military spokesperson to cover military operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • Embassy Kabul 	

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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish a new CJTF-82 deputy to ISAF military spokesperson 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Kabul • SPD 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use the above communicators to support regular briefings in Kabul, led by Govt of Afghanistan officials, to provide regular information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Govt of Afghanistan • ISAF • CENTCOM • Embassy Kabul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • CENTCOM 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make better use of embedded journalists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand and promote embed slots for major news outlets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO MOC • SPD 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate with the Afghan Embassy in Washington, DC to provide embassy briefing (with Embassy concurrence) prior to departure for U.S.-based journalists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy of Afghanistan • NATO MOC 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SC contingency planning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Red team” our operational plans to identify and mitigate points of potential enemy exploitation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • EUCOM • SOCOM 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider how messages and actions will be manipulated by the enemy • Develop follow-on messages to counter enemy propaganda with facts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • PA • CENTCOM • JS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUCOM • SOCOM • State 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SC force training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incorporate strategic communication into commander’s capstone curricula 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JFCOM • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD 	

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AUDIENCE: Afghan Government

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confident of U.S., NATO long-term commitment to Afghanistan • Resolute in countering terrorist influences in the region • Appreciate the importance of strategic communication for promoting regional stability and the Govt of Afghanistan's goals • Able to better communicate with the Afghan people and its international friends and partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tribal, ethnic, and regional dynamics • Neighboring states attempting to influence the free press inside of Afghanistan • Corruption 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leader-to-leader communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USG and DoD civilian and military officials regularly convey the U.S.'s long-term commitment to Afghanistan's leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • JS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Kabul • CENTCOM • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increases in number of statements of confidence and support of U.S. and NATO 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. military support to Congressional-Jirga exchanges, European MP, MEP delegations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • JS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • EUCOM • NATO • OSD LA • State • Embassy Kabul 		
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senior Afghan military leaders and promising mid-level officers receive training in U.S. military academies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JS • CENTCOM • JFCOM • Services 		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intel briefings 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brief provincial governor, president, key ministry officials, key Jirga members regarding circumstances surrounding civilian casualties and/or collateral damage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Kabul
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build ANA and ANP PA/SC capability 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish Afghan ANA and ANP PAOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD • PA
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitate the coordination of Govt of Afghanistan messaging with MoI and MoD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Govt of Afghanistan 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD • CSTC-A
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide embedded trainers with appropriate language and cultural training 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language training in Dari and Pashto • Language courses for non-U.S. ISAF personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defense Language Institute 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSTC-A • CENTCOM

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AUDIENCE: Afghan Population

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognize democracy and reconstruction are advancing in Afghanistan due to the commitment of the Government of Afghanistan, Coalition, international community, and the Afghan population • Recognize that the U.S. and Allies are enabling and assisting in the accelerated growth of Afghan political, civil and military institutions • Acceptance that the U.S. and NATO long-term commitment to Afghanistan is unwavering • Increased belief that the Taliban are only interested in their own agenda, not the Afghan people • Accept the government and the ANSF as the sole providers of long-term security • Belief that allowing the Taliban sanctuary will lead to insecurity and a halt in development • Degrade overall support for the Taliban and AQ among the Afghan people • The Taliban are exposed as drug criminals in violation of the Quran and exploit poor Afghan farmers • Appreciation that the government and its international partners are providing viable alternatives to participation in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited national communications infrastructure • High illiteracy rates • Corruption • Multifaceted audiences with diverse tribal and ethnic backgrounds • Traditional communication is a difficult but critical communication medium • Limited infrastructure to support legal alternative livelihoods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build Afghan capacity to push messaging to the provinces and districts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide expeditionary training for provincial and district level Ministry of Information representatives • Build Ministry of Information capability and capacity to do further training and sustainment on its own 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • MoI • State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID • NATO • JS • SOCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing level of Afghan support for local and national government • Increasing belief that ANP, ANA are improving • Increasing belief that U.S. and NATO are committed to Afghanistan for the long-term • Increasing level of overall level of respect for ANP, ANA • Decreasing level of Afghan support for the Taliban • Increasing level of support for U.S. and Allies and awareness of their mission • Increasing level of local support for PRT mission • Increasing awareness of local population of PRT contributions to development • Increasing awareness of Afghan people about successfully completed projects in their area
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support traditional communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Network, build relationships, and maintain communication with local decision and opinion makers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Govt of Afghanistan • Embassy Kabul 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leverage and synchronize with the Govt of Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analyze USAID assessments to determine how to rapidly build Govt of Afghanistan communication capacity • Support extending government's communication capacity nationwide. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID • State • NATO 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of Govt of Afghanistan products to synchronize NATO, USG communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of Govt of Afghanistan products to synchronize NATO, USG communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • State • Embassy Kabul • NATO MOC • CENTCOM • EUCOM • SOCOM • PRT Executive Steering Committee 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide resources to support Government of Afghanistan TV and radio campaigns to promote Afghan identity, patriotism, awards for service, health and education initiatives, etc. that highlight improvements in livelihood and underscore the message that sacrifices of the current generation for a better Afghanistan will benefit future generations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government of Afghanistan • USAID • State 		

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<p>narcotrafficking</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognize IEDs are the tools of brutal outlaws and murders; they injure and kill innocent Afghans and prevent reconstruction • Counternarcotics messages and public information campaigns are synchronized among USG, ISAF, and our Allies and partners • The risks and dangers associated with poppy cultivation are recognized • Poppy cultivation is not perceived as a viable means of livelihood • Farmers informed and supportive of plans to increase alternative livelihood programs • Community informed and accept stepped-up law enforcement and eradication efforts 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve use of PRTs as communications vehicles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase PA/SC training to PRT officers via distance learning or regional training centers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JS • NATO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD • PRT Executive Steering Committee • Defense Information School • CENTCOM • SOCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing belief that narcotics cultivation and trafficking is unacceptable • Increasing belief the government is working to provide alternatives to poppy growing • Increased participation in alternative livelihood programs 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disseminate key development news from PRT Weekly Update 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO MOC • State • PA • Embassy Kabul • PRT Executive Steering Committee 		
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct U.S.-led to regularly provide information to the PRT Weekly Update 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRT Executive Steering Committee • Embassy Kabul • ISAF • CENTCOM • CJTF-82 		
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support U.S.-led PRT participation in the PRT Executive Steering Committee, PRT conferences, and the sharing of best practices and information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAF • CENTCOM • Theater PSYOP 		
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leverage and coordinate USG information resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disseminate key development news from USAID website 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • PA • Embassy Kabul
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information sharing and dissemination of facts surrounding incidents of reported civilian casualties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular information sharing meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAF • UNAMA
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create a crisis response group that would rapidly move to an alleged Human Rights violation location and ascertain the truth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AIHRC • UNAMA • Govt of Afghanistan

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Kabul • ISAF • Media 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reach out to Afghan population in Dari and Pashto 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language training for U.S. PAOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • Defense Language Institute 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop, coordinate, and support public information campaigns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counter-IED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JIEDDO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SOCOM • CENTCOM 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counternarcotics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State/INL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • GS/GTS • Justice 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-extremist 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect key Afghan communicators (journalists, elected leaders) who espouse positive messages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train and equip Afghan National Police details assigned to those the Govt of Afghanistan deems at high risk of assassination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • State/INL 	

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

AUDIENCE: Afghan-Pakistan Tribal Regions/FATA

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognize the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan • Supportive of the Pakistan government • Recognize development is advancing in the tribal regions due to the commitment of the Government of Pakistan • Confident of the Frontier Corps as an important provider of security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited presence of central government • Traditional communication is a difficult but critical communication medium • High illiteracy rates • Deteriorated security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support joint Afghan-Pakistan efforts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the Joint Jirga 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing support for the Pakistani government • Decreasing hostility toward the Afghan government
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase the population's exposure to anti-extremist messaging 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the installation of radio and television transmitters that reach the FATA population 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broadcasting Board of Governors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • VOA • JS • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing anti-extremist broadcasts

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

AUDIENCE: Government of Pakistan

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convinced that Pakistan and Afghanistan face common problems and a common future together • Recognize that a strong, stable Afghanistan is essential for regional stability • Increased Pakistan support of Allied and Coalition efforts • Increased cooperation against extremist and insurgent forces is in Pakistan's best interest • Acknowledge that development with the help of the U.S. and international community is required to bring peace and stability to the tribal regions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional and territorial security concerns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. • SECDEF • CJCS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct contacts • Visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing frequency of public statements by GoP supporting international mission in Afghanistan • Decreasing number of public criticisms of U.S. policy by GoP • Increase in frequency of statements of commitment to global counterterror efforts • Increasing numbers of operations against terrorists and extremists in tribal regions/FATA
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tripartite Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Speeches • Press conferences • Press releases • Interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the Operational Working Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Kabul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Govt of Afghanistan • ISAF • NATO MOC • RC(East) 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Channel statements about border issues through the Tripartite Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Kabul • CENTCOM • ISAF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RC(East) • ANA • Mol • Govt of Afghanistan 	

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

AUDIENCE: Pakistani Population

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand that U.S. is a long-term partner of Pakistan • Understand that U.S. and Allies are committed to Afghanistan • Degraded support for Taliban and AQ • Recognition that stability in Afghanistan benefits Pakistan • Acceptance that Pakistan and Afghanistan face common problems and have a common future together • Greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan will increase stability, security, and prosperity for the entire Central Asian region • Understand that U.S. military presence will decline with increasing security, but our commitment to development will not waver • People in Pakistan's tribal region believe the Pakistani government, cooperating with the US and the international community, is working to improve the livelihood of their tribes and families, but development can only proceed if they ensure security and eject insurgent and terrorist elements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Important audiences in tribal areas difficult to reach with messaging • Multifaceted audiences with diverse tribal and ethnic backgrounds • Traditional communication is a difficult but critical communication medium • High illiteracy in rural areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Security Development Plan for FATA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide government of Pakistan with technical and financial assistance • Support the Pakistan national government's efforts to reach out to the people of the FATA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • USAID 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD • CENTCOM • PAK MoI • Embassy Islamabad • Embassy Kabul 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing level of support for U.S. and international presence in the region • Increasing level of support for Pakistani government • Increasing awareness of development projects in tribal areas • Increasing rejection of extremist activities and ideology
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make better use of embedded journalists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist Pakistan's Army and Frontier Corps efforts to build capacity for civil-military operations • Support the Pakistan local government's efforts to reach out to the people of the FATA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PAK Army • PAK FC 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reach out to Pakistan population in Urdu, Pashto, Sindhi, Punjabi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand and promote embed slots with troops in Afghanistan for Pakistani journalists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Islamabad 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language training for U.S. PAOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JFCOM • Defense Language Institute 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Get USG officials out to rural areas to speak to the people about OEF and GWOT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Islamabad • PA 		

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

AUDIENCE: Governments of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long term commitment to Afghanistan • Short term military support as necessary • Share common goals of secure and better life for the Afghan people • Do not believe the US is pursuing a unilateralist agenda • ISAF members fulfill commitments for CN support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinating common messages across different governments • Competing domestic political priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the NATO-ISAF Strategic Communications Plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide trained PAOs to meet SHAPE, Brunssum, and ISAF shortfalls 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUCOM • USD(P) • JFCOM • ACT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SHAPE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustained and increasing troop commitments • Reducing or eliminating caveats • Increasing frequency of support for U.S. policy by TCN officials • Decreasing frequency of criticisms of U.S. policy by TCN officials • Increasing frequency of MP and MEP statements of support for U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan • Increasing support for CN efforts
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extend PAO training to Allies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defense Information School • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess needs and provide strategic communication equipment, including audio, photographic, and video capabilities and methods of dissemination, to NATO Allies and non-NATO TCNs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUCOM • ACT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • Services • PA (DVI) 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand NATO expeditionary media capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUCOM • JFCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SHAPE • USD(P) 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support NATO MOC efforts to monitor and analyze broadcast information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(I) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarify roles of communicators and regularize communications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the establishment of a civilian Government of Afghanistan spokesperson 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Govt of Afghanistan 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the establishment of a new ISAF military spokesperson to cover military operations 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • Embassy Kabul 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish a new CJTF-82 deputy to ISAF military 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Kabul 	

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			spokesperson		•SPD
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use the above communicators to support regular briefings in Kabul, led by Govt of Afghanistan officials, to provide regular information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Govt of Afghanistan • ISAF • CENTCOM • Embassy Kabul • PA 	•CENTCOM
		• Senior leadership engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct contacts • Visits with government officials • Meetings with MPs 	• USD(P)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • State
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Speeches • Press conferences • Press releases • Interviews 	• PA	• State
		• Parliamentary exchanges	• Support CODEL, MP, MEP meetings with Afghan government officials	• State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD LA • NATO MOC • EU
		• Educational outreach	• Support U.S. think tanks and academics to participate in European conference circuit	• NESAs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • USD(P) • State • Embassies • EUCOM

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

AUDIENCE: Populations of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs)

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More comprehensive, country-wide view of progress in Afghanistan • Informed of scale of reconstruction • Aware of Allied attempts to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage • Share common goals of secure and better life for the Afghan people • Understand success in Afghanistan is important to European security and health (CN) • Vigilant against violent extremism at home and abroad • Recognize the US is not pursuing a unilateralist agenda • Maintain support and resources for Allied and Coalition goals in Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination with nation's government required before interacting with its population • Crowded, multilayered media environment • Complex audience of differing nationalities and perspectives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the NATO-ISAF Strategic Communications Plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide trained PAOs to meet SHAPE, Brunssum, and ISAF shortfalls 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SHAPE • JFCOM • Defense Information School 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUCOM • USD (P) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing awareness of progress in Afghanistan • Increasing appreciation of the need for security to pursue the Comprehensive Approach • Increasing awareness of Allied efforts to limit civilian casualties • Increasing acceptance of U.S. goals
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extend PAO training to Allies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defense Information School • PA • JFCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess needs and provide strategic communication equipment, including audio, photographic, and video capabilities and methods of dissemination, to NATO Allies and non-NATO TCNs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SHAPE • PA (DVI) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUCOM • USD(P) • Services 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand NATO expeditionary media engagement capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SHAPE • JFCOM • ACT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUCOM • USD(P) 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support NATO MOC efforts to monitor and analyze broadcast information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(I) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make better use of A/V materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand use of combat camera to capture and disseminate compelling video that supports SC messaging, validate care taken to avoid civilian casualties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information sharing and dissemination of facts surrounding incidents of reported civilian casualties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular information sharing meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAF • UNAMA 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create a crisis response group that would rapidly move to an 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AIHRC 	

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			alleged Human Rights violation location and ascertain the truth		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNAMA • Govt of Afghanistan • Embassy Kabul • ISAF • Media
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make better use of embedded journalists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide some U.S. embed slots for NATO MOC to fill with European media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO MOC
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and recruit key journalists for embed slots 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO MOC
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Educational outreach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support U.S. think tanks and academics to participate in European conference circuit • Send USG officials to regions to give talks in local think tanks and universities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marshall Center • State and Embassies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • Marshall Center • EUCOM
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reach out to Maghreb, Turkish, Middle Eastern satellite media • Influence Internet sites, blogs, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrange for interviews with high-level Defense officials in Muslim-oriented media, particularly while they are visiting a European country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassies
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make all relevant DoD and NATO materials available in Arabic, Farsi, Turkish as well as Dari, Pashto, Sindhi, Punjabi, and Urdu 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • Translation services • NATO
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify U.S. Muslims, especially internationally respect clerics, who can speak at European mosques and address European Muslims about our goals in Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • White House Office of Interfaith Initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • Embassies

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AUDIENCE: Enemy Leadership (AQ, AQAM, Taliban, major narcotraffickers, etc.)

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resignation that the U.S. and its Allies and partners are unwaveringly committed to Afghanistan • Resignation that the U.S. and its Allies and partners are a superior fighting force that cannot be defeated • Accept that the Afghan people and government do not support their vision for Afghanistan's future • Belief that significant divisions, rifts, and distrust exist between leaders • Laying down arms and/or reconciling with the government are the only viable alternatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ideologically resistant to most SC messaging 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Synchronize activities and messages with the Govt of Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build Govt of Afghanistan capacity to counter enemy propaganda and ability to develop messages that sew discord among enemy leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD • USAID 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO • CENTCOM • SOCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing frequency of signs of discord between enemy leaders • Increased frequency of enemy messages that are designed to counter Govt of Afghanistan messages • Increased frequency of high-level Taliban leaders who reconcile with the government • Increasing awareness of messages in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common messages from top Govt of Afghanistan officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Underscore ANSF, ISAF, and OEF overwhelming power and the inevitability of victory over the enemy • Underscore that asymmetric tactics like IEDs and hostage-taking demonstrate the enemy's weakness, kill and injure Afghans, and violate Afghan norms. • Promote reconciliation as the only way forward 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PoA • Govt of Afghanistan • MoI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO MOC • Embassy Kabul • ISAF 	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common messages from ISAF and NATO countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Synchronize messages with Govt of Afghanistan, PRTs, ISAF, Tripartite Commission, and NATO MOC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • SPD • State • Embassy Kabul • Embassy Islamabad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO MOC • ISAF • PRT Executive Steering Committee 	

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

AUDIENCE: Taliban Rank-and-File

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand Al Qaeda and its associated are brutal outlaws and murders who attack civilians and use repugnant methods • View the Taliban leadership as foreign and corrupt • Recognize the Taliban have no positive vision for the country • See that only the government of Afghanistan can meet the need for jobs, security, family welfare, health, education and justice that the Afghan people desire • Accept that laying down arms and/or reconciling with the government are the only viable alternatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resistant to foreign messaging • High illiteracy rates • Complex loyalties to tribal and religious leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Synchronize actions and messages with the Govt of Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build Govt of Afghanistan capacity to counter enemy propaganda and ability to develop messages that sew discord among enemy leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DoD • USAID 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO • CENTCOM • SOCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreasing level of support for Taliban in historically pro-Taliban areas • Increasing frequency of Taliban rank-and-file who participate in reconciliation program (Program Takhim-e-Sol, PTS) • Increasing frequency of denunciations by local tribal elders and religious leaders of terrorist tactics as a violation of Afghan norms
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Govt of Afghanistan efforts to disseminate stories of former Taliban who have defected and reconciled 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Govt of Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO MOC • PA • SPD • Theater PSYOP 		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide communications equipment to facilitate ongoing communication between national, provincial, and local/traditional officials. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Govt of Afghanistan • MoI • Embassy Kabul • SOCOM 		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common messages from top Govt of Afghanistan officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Underscore ANSF, ISAF, and OEF overwhelming power and the inevitability of victory over the enemy • Underscore that asymmetric tactics like IEDs and hostage-taking demonstrate the enemy's weakness, kill and injure Afghans, and violate Afghan norms. • Promote reconciliation as the only way forward 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PoA • Govt of Afghanistan • MoI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO MOC • Embassy Kabul • ISAF 	

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

AUDIENCE: Governments of Central Asia

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appreciate that the U.S. goal is a capable, sovereign Afghanistan that effectively governs its territory and controls its borders • Recognize the U.S. shares long-term interests in a stable, prosperous, sovereign Central Asia • See that the Taliban are major contributors to the drug trafficking problem • Recognize that a stable Afghanistan is key to a stable Central Asia • Appreciate how developing economic and trade links to Afghanistan can help grow the Central Asian economy and generate jobs • Recognize that U.S. bases and presence in the region contribute to regional stability and security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some governments restricting media freedoms or harassing journalists and media outlets • Rumors and innuendo may be reported as fact • Significant influence on media from neighboring countries • View the concept of democracy suspiciously • Corruption 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage senior defense and military officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review messaging in read-aheads for DoD officials meeting with Central Asian counterparts to synchronize messaging 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • Embassies • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing frequency of positive public statements by leaders about the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan • Increasing frequency of positive public statements by leaders about the importance of a stable Afghanistan to the region • Increasing tangible contributions to the effort in Afghanistan • Increasing direct support to the government of Afghanistan
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrange interviews with national and key local media while in country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassies • CENTCOM 		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senior leader engagement and parliamentary exchanges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brief government officials and members of parliament on Allied and partner efforts in Afghanistan and the region • Encourage parliamentary exchanges and official visits between U.S. and Central Asian states • Encourage parliamentary exchanges and official visits between Afghan and Central Asian states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • Embassies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) • CENTCOM • PA 	

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

AUDIENCE: Central Asian Populations

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremist rhetoric is questioned and de-legitimized • Informed about the scale of reconstruction • Aware of Allied attempts to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage • Recognize that a stable Afghanistan is key to a stable Central Asia • Appreciate how developing economic and trade links to Afghanistan can help grow the Central Asian economy and generate jobs • Recognize the U.S. shares long-term interests in a stable, prosperous, sovereign Central Asia • Recognize that U.S. bases and presence in the region contribute to regional stability and security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some governments restricting media freedoms or harassing journalists and media outlets • Rumors and innuendo may be reported as fact • Significant influence on media from neighboring countries • View the concept of democracy suspiciously 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reach out to Central Asian populations in their own languages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language training for U.S. PAOs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defense Language Institute 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State • PA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decreasing frequency of extremist rhetoric in Central Asian media • Increased awareness of Afghan reconstruction and U.S. and ISAF efforts to limit casualties and collateral damage • Increased level of support for U.S. access to bases
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Educational and public outreach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Get USG officials out to rural areas to speak to the people about ISAF and OEF missions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USD(P) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassies • PA 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leverage academics in the region through Regional Center outreach activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NESA • State and Embassies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA • CENTCOM • State • Embassies 	

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

AUDIENCE: IGO and NGO Community

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Understand the need for security in order to provide humanitarian assistance and development aid • Willing to rapidly move into areas as they are stabilizing to assist with reconstruction • Recognize the U.S. reconstruction efforts (USAID, Army Corps of Engineers) do not compete with NGO efforts – unilateral efforts are only in areas with special security considerations • Awareness of Taliban disinformation campaign on civilian casualties • Committed to working with the Government of Afghanistan, the U.S., Allied, and partner nations to investigate and report factual information • Aware of Allied attempts to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do not want to be seen as tools of U.S. policy • Do not want to be too closely associated with military operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information sharing and dissemination of facts surrounding incidents of reported civilian casualties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular information sharing meetings • Create a crisis response group that would rapidly move to an alleged Human Rights violation location and ascertain the truth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • CENTCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISAF • UNAMA • AIHRC • UNAMA • Govt of Afghanistan • Embassy Kabul • ISAF • Media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing frequency of positive IGO and NGO reports and public statements about the “Comprehensive Approach” • Decreasing frequency of negative statements about U.S. approach in Afghanistan • Number of IGO and NGO staff in country • Increasing awareness of Allied efforts to limit civilian casualties
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leverage PRTs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assign civil affairs officers to each PRT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • JS • State 	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assign public affairs officers to each PRT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CENTCOM • JS • State • PA 	

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AUDIENCE: American People

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have a more comprehensive, country-wide view of progress in Afghanistan • Informed of scale of reconstruction • Aware of U.S. and Allied procedures to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage • Aware of Taliban brutality and disinformation campaign on civilian casualties • Share common goals of secure and better life for the Afghan people • Understand success in Afghanistan is important to American security and health (CN) • Vigilant against violent extremism at home and abroad • Maintain support and resources for Allied and coalition goals in Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information about Afghanistan overwhelmed by, conflated with information on Iraq • Crowded, multilayered media environment 	• Inform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefings • Press Releases 	• PA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing awareness of progress in Afghanistan • Increasing support for ISAF and OEF missions • Increasing awareness of Allied efforts to limit civilian casualties
		• Outreach	• Make DoD officials available to regional and local press, as well as national media	• PA	

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