IDEAS
The Newsletter of Pashtun Peace Forum

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Pashtun Peace Forum is advocating peace and development of Pashtun and smaller nations in South Asia

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The Pashtun Peace Forum (PPF): The PPF has initiated various activities, including this Newsletter, to start a deliberation on the rising extremism and violence in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that are inhabited by the Pakhtuns. The ultimate aim, which may seem Quixotic under the circumstances, is to foster peace in the violence-prone area. We believe that peace will not only benefit the Pakhtuns, but is generically a desirable. With the involvement of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, the troubles that ordinary Pakhtuns face have a global context, and the manner in which they resolve will also have widespread implications. It is of course a truism that the people living in that area are most affected, and other affects are in the nature of concentric circles, diminishing as we move further away from the eye of the storm.

Members of the PPF are mostly Pakhtun, though the forum is open to all regardless of ethnicity, nationality, or religious inclination. However, at this time most members are Pakhtuns from the Pakistan side of the border, so the perspective is likely to be biased by that. The PPF has evolved somewhat organically and we personally feel and empathise with the sufferings of our fellows. We could not remain bystanders while the Pakhtuns and others inhabiting that region continue facing horrors in the form of death and destruction.

We do not pretend to have solutions, but will endeavour to function as facilitators for bringing about arrangements that lead towards peace. The actual solutions will finally have to come from the protagonists who have to deal with the realities on the ground on a daily basis. We are providing a forum on which different voices can be tolerantly heard and the process of evolving a common voice engendered. Ideally, there would be inputs from various sources, but especially

from those who are facing the endless cycle of violence and deceit.

We hope to play a bridging role, receiving inputs, integrating them, developing possible peace-fostering scenarios, and openly sharing those with the actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We also believe that to tackle a complex situation like the one that prevails in those areas; one has to be non-partisan, not ideologically driven, pragmatic, and humane in approach. Our founding assumption is that ordinary people, Pakhtun or otherwise, want to live in peace, so that they may progress and prosper. Our attempt is therefore to connect with and strengthen such longings and thereby work towards reducing and eliminating the forces of extremism, violence, and destruction.

A Historical Snapshot: We will in summary telescope the context within which the current violence and extremism has emerged. Primarily because of their geographical location, the Pakhtun people of the North West region of South Asia seem fated to live in blood and fire. They found themselves sandwiched between the two imperial powers of Russia and Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as the so-called 'Great Game' was played out. However, their real travails started in the late 70s of the 20th century, as the USA and USSR, the inheritor imperial powers continued carrying the baton of fighting in places where human life did not have the same value as in their own lands: The 'Cold War' was searing hot for the Pakhtuns. Notwithstanding the geopolitics of that face-off, it set into motion an escalating vortex of blood and fire, which continues unabated.

During the 1980s Peshawar, the capital city of the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan was the camp to the largest overseas CIA concentration in history. But that was just the tip, all manner of people from alien lands were coming and going through the city at that time: Arabs of various nationalities, Egyptians, Europeans, and assorted others. These were the mostly the erstwhile trainers of the Mujahideen, though some also received training and were part of the destructive incursions into Afghanistan, especially along the border with Pakistan. Most of the leaders of this Jihad lived in palatial houses in Peshawar and moved around conspicuously guarded by dozens of lethally armed men. There were also the almost endless lines of big trucks moving round-the-clock towards the tribal areas (officially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA]) with canvas covers emblazoned with UN markings. The official word was that these carried

food and other aid for the refugees from the war. But everyone knew that the refugee camps were well within the Province and not in FATA. So, where were the trucks headed and what were they carrying? The gossip on the street, which proved largely quite accurate, was that there were trucks carrying arms for the fight in Afghanistan. Overall, life in Peshawar during the period roughly between 1980 and 1992 was somewhat surrealistic, though its impact was very real, deep, and widespread.

Later events included the death of the Pakistani military dictator, who was fully supported by the US and the rest of the 'Free World' as an ally in the proxy war against the Soviets; the 'conquest' of Afghanistan by the Mujahideen; the destruction of the major cities of Afghanistan, especially Kabul, by the Mujahideen as they fought each other for power; and finally the take-over of most of the country by the Pakistan supported Taliban.

We fast forward to the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Listening to the Western, especially US, centred media, it would be easy to conclude that the attack was the worst outcome of the Taliban regime and the horrible seeds of violence that had been sown in Afghanistan, primarily by the US through its main agent, the Pakistan army. The affects of the prolonged violence, the grip of narrow and intolerant religiosity, and the UN sanctioned attack of Afghanistan, on the people of the region didn't, and still don't, seem to matter.

Consequences: At the macro level we signpost three notable consequences of the manner in which affairs were conducted. One, being a mercenary was hugely profitable. Two, the state of Pakistan, with not so hidden cheerleading by the US, was the biggest sponsor of violence and violation of the rule of law by the 'right' side. This dovetailed with the failure of governance, which created a huge space for the emergence of warlords and recruitment to their ranks. Three, and most importantly, the social fabric of the country in general, but the Pakhtuns in particular, was shred and the old values, especially trust, irredeemably damaged.

Current Scenario: (A more topical description follows in an article by Naeem Khan). The blood and tears of the Pakhtun population, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, seem to be largely un-noticed. While we get almost daily counts of how many US and NATO troops have been killed or wounded in Afghanistan since October 2001, it seems that no one is even bothering to estimate the Afghans who have been killed and wounded since that time. We know that there have been deaths of civilians, the erstwhile Taliban, and members of the Afghan security and Police forces. But we don't know how many. Further, we also need to consider that on the Pakistan side, in FATA and other places, there also have been deaths of civilians, the Taliban, and the Pakistani security forces. Analogous to the accurate counts of US and NATO deaths, we also know the numbers of Pakistani military who have lost their lives in FATA and other places, but we have no count of the death of 'others'.

The suffering of the Pakhtuns is by no means limited to those directly in the line of fire. According to reports, on the Pakistan side, ordinary citizens have been compelled to move in very large numbers from their homes to get away from ongoing fighting. Internal displacement has occurred from most of the Agencies of FATA, but also from many parts of Swat and the Malakand Districts. All of those displaced are Pakhtuns and are moving to towns and cities that have yet escaped the violence and extremism (However, like an unstoppable scourge, the extremism and violence seems to be spreading fast). Consequently their lives have been totally disrupted and one hears heartrending stories of fear, suffering, and uncertainty. These real-life heartrending stories need to be documented.

The government has been trying, largely unsuccessfully, to contain this large scale disruption and turmoil. A number of questions emerge, which we feel need to be addressed before any credible and effective steps can be instituted to start moving towards peace for the unfortunate Pakhtuns, and by implication for other people living in the region and further afield. What are the numbers of non-military people who have lost their lives on both sides of the Durand Line since October 2001? Why are the Pakistan government steps to contain rising extremism and warlordism failing? What are the reasons for the recruitment successes of the warlords? What are the links between the breakdown in Pakhtun areas with misgovernance and other systemic issues? What are the interests and goals of US regarding this region? Etc. We realise that there can be many more questions, and each requires a study in its own right, but we need to take a start.

The PPF will endeavour to facilitate and leverage such efforts. **Now we invite you to join us** in trying to understand the current turmoil Pakhtuns are facing and contribute to the movement towards peace and progress amongst a people who have been suffering long and deeply.

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Countering Militancy in Pakistan-Afghanistan: A Pashtun Perspective

Naeem Khan

According to recent news, the government of Pakistan has launched a military operation against militants in the Khyber Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This typically belated response to the rising tide of militancy from the government of Pakistan has come after a strong local, regional, and international reaction to its deal with the militants leading to an alarming rise in the insurgency on either side of the Durand line between Afghanistan and Pakistan and deterioration of security situation in and around Peshawar – the provincial capital of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan (Pukhtunkwa) near Afghanistan. Articulating this reaction were the events like the destruction of a Pakistani border post in a

missile attack by the NATO, warning by the Afghan government to hit the sanctuaries of the militants in FATA, the claims by Afghan intelligence officials of the culpability of Pakistani intelligence agency in the assassination attempt on President Karzai of Afghanistan in April this year, and the publication of an increasing number of media reports about the imminent fall of Peshawar to militants.

The move has also coincided with a three week deadline by the government of the United Sates (US) to Pakistan to cooperate in war against terror or else face suspension of US aid and subsequently, the approval of 150 millions dollars by the US House of Representatives in economic assistance for the next fiscal year and the delivery of a number of F-16 combat planes to Pakistan bolstering its security. According to the news, the US administration has already requested a total of $901 million for Pakistan in the year 2009.

The US State Department in a statement has welcomed the decision by the Pakistan to act against militancy. The US media has given it wide coverage. But there are apprehensions in Pashtun people and the Pashtun intelligentsia with regard to whether the move will yield the desired results or end in yet further escalation of the problem. There are a number of reasons for such apprehensions.

First, the Pakistan's decision to act against the militancy within its own borders doesn't stem from any change in the regional strategic and security situation, which is the fundamental driver of its foreign and domestic policy. The decision has rather been elicited through pressure and economic incentives, which is a constant feature of bilateral arrangement between the US and Pakistan regarding the war on terror since 9/11. It is probably due to the absence of a comprehensive plan addressing Islamabad's security concerns, including the Indian factor and nuclear anxieties, that no visible signs of the re-orientation or reversal of its policy towards the issue of regional stability has been observed. (It is another matter whether if such plans come about, would it be sufficient to persuade Islamabad to change its domestic and foreign policy directions)

That is perhaps also why Islamabad has lacked a comprehensive and multi-pronged strategy involving economic measures, administrative and political reforms, and indigenous mechanisms of maintaining peace and order, together with an effective military plan, for the affected areas to deal with the issue of Islamic militancy on a durable basis. When this lack of interest is compared with the agility and resourcefulness with which Islamabad dealt with the Baluch insurgency, it brings the contradiction in its approach to the two problems into further light. The perception of Islam being a factor that bolsters Islamabad's security position and serving as deterrence is probably what forms a constant in its strategic thinking.

It is in this context that at political level, Islamabad promotes the idea of a rapprochement with the moderate sections of Taleban movement as a way to engage the broader Pashtun community in the plans for peace and stability, which somehow, is based on the premise that the movement can be de-linked from the global

extremist network and moulded into a local political faction representing Pashtuns. Linking Pashtun Culture with Deobandi ideology is another effort that serves this purpose.

The lack of will-power to disentangle from religion as a way to gain strategic influence in the neighbouring country is evidenced by the fact that despite the adverse impact of the militant activity in FATA and NWFP, the federal government hasn't assisted Pakhtunkhwa in any substantial way in bolstering its security. According to news, a recent request by the provincial government for Frontier Constabulary (FC) contingents to defend Peshawar was turned down by the federal government. Similarly, the federal government hasn't involved the province in its stabilization efforts and the numerous deals it made with the militants in FATA so far.

The second reason for scepticism by the Pashtuns about the success of the anti-militant effort is the strategy adopted by the International coalition, which is more based on the unidirectional approach to defeat the insurgents militarily and less on reconstruction and political reconciliation. More importantly, the explicit admission of the complex nature of the militant-networks in some recent think-tank reports notwithstanding, the thinking at the basis of the coalition strategy seems to be the rather simplistic premise that the insurgency is "logistically and professionally" a localised and Pashtun-centric phenomenon.

Consequently, in the absence of a comprehensive stabilization plan on the part of the coalition leaders for the broader region based on multi-dimensional approaches to the problem of extremism and taking into account the concerns of different states (e.g. Pakistan) and other stakeholders, including Pashtuns, there are grim chances of success. This contention is supported by the fact that in the seven years since 9/11, little progress has been achieved as far as peace and stability is concerned although billions of dollars in economic and military aid has been doled out.

The situation on the contrary has deteriorated alarmingly threatening peace on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. The militancy that previously was confined to Afghanistan and Waziristan now has spilled over into large swathes of the settled districts of NWFP.

This shape of the things after seven years of war on terror have put Pashtun intelligentsia in a confusing and cautious state as how the International coalition, Afghanistan, or Pakistani state want to achieve stability and peace and at what further cost to Pashtuns.

As for the common Pashtun masses are concerned, they also view the anti-militancy measures with scepticism. And their suspicion is not misplaced looking at the way militant movements have grown and been handled in Pashtun areas in the past seven years, phenomena which hitherto have followed a visible and predictable pattern. Even a common Pashtun can summarise the broad outline of this process.

To begin with, the birth of a brand new militant movement usually begins with the emergence of an individual, from obscurity, who starts preaching his ideology from a popular platform like a mosque or seminary and via a popular medium like an FM radio station. After enough number of adherents has been won, the foundations of a “proto-khilafath” are laid down through the establishment of a “department of vice and virtue”. Soon a hardcore militant cadre is raised that embarks on enforcing the proclamations of the supreme leader of the movement and extending the geographical domain of the newly established spiritual order.

Although this process takes a long time, a mysterious inaction/silence on the part of the official administration prevails that is only broken when the public outcry over the impingement on their rights is widely reported in the national, regional and international media. Awakened to the situation, the administration takes action by bombarding militant basis indiscriminately in which much collateral damage occurs but the core of militant leadership escapes. After some “partial success” has been achieved, a new order emerges in which the official administration of the state and parallel administration of the militants co-exist and engage with each other in many ways from their respective domains.

Public, however, is subjected to immense difficulties in the whole process both at the hands of the militants and the official administration. Disruption of the social and economic life due to insecurity, displacement, and a constant fear of the breaking out of a new wave of violence make the life of ordinary Pashtun people miserable. This is how the things happened in Swat valley (known as the Switzerland of Asia). And if past is any indicator, this is what likely to happen in Khyber Agency of FATA. There is already news that Mangal Bagh had fled from his base in Sipah to Tirah along with his men one day before the operation started.

In these circumstances, many Pashtuns feel that the process of fragmentation, Islamaization, and dilution of Pashtun culture and society that began with the ‘Great Game’, the ‘Cold War’, and partition of the Subcontinent has now taken a very grave and dangerous turn. And that the policies of all the players whether regional or extra-regional who influenced events on Pashtun land have contributed to this trend. It is, therefore, natural for many Pashtuns to think that their society is being pushed towards a situation where there is a risk of its further destabilization and destruction.

Instead of associating unrealistic hopes with the current government action in Khyber Agency and exclusive reliance on some foreign powers for brining peace and stability to their region, a number of Pashtuns think that Pashtun political leadership, intelligentsia, and mainstream should work together for rather greater cohesion and understanding among themselves to tackle the problem from within. Further, they feel that Pashtuns should try to engage a broader International community for a just and effective approach to the issue of stability in their region.

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New strategies for peace in Pukhtunkhwa

Jahan Zeb Khan

In the recent history of sub-content and Pakistan whenever the leaders of the people have tried to take initiatives to bring independence, peace, democracy and prosperity to their people and area, they were dubbed as traitors first by the British and then by the successive governments in Pakistan. However, the situation and conditions are constantly changing. Due to the strong awareness among the masses, the use of mass media and the information technology, it is not easy to dub peoples and their leaders as traitors any more.

The people of Pakistan have rejected the totalitarian policy of war on terror of General Musharraf and army. It is as simple as that this policy has failed because people knew that it had become a lucrative business for the Pakistan Army and some of its supporters. They were first creating the war monster and then presenting them to the America as part of a business plan to earn billions of dollars. Therefore, the people of Pakistan in general and Pashtuns in Peshawar and Quetta in particular wiped out the Army backed groups Q auid-e-Azam League in February 2008 general elections.
As an example, recent poll showed that 47% of Canadians wanted their soldiers to leave Afghanistan immediately, and only 17% supported maintaining a combat role. The Afghan war had broad public support in Canada in 2002, but people now see it as a front in George W. Bush's unpopular "war on terror." NATO suffered 868 fatalities so far i.e. the US 537, the UK, 110, Canada 85 and the rest of the of the 17 allies suffered 136 fatalities. The American, British and the Canadian people are standing up against their governments to bring troops back.

In Pukhtunkhwa, the balance in the equation of daily bomb blasts and suicide attacks has shifted towards the Pashtun belt on the eastern side of the Durand line. Pashtun people are the victim of massive migration, bomb blasts and suicide attacks for more than three decades. However, due to the changing scenarios and conditions there is last chance of hope that the present Awami National Party (ANP) government in Peshawar can bring peace and stability to their own people, Afghanistan, the region and the global security if given time and open support.

It is a good omen that the Pashtun leadership is trying to demonstrate to the West that the latter should try new approaches and strategies of peace, reconciliation, reconstruction and development in Pashtun belt both in Pakistan and Afghanistan against the backdrop of total failure of the past policy of “War on Terror”.

Pashtun leaders should also initiate peace dialogue with the regional players such as India, China, Russia and Saudi Arabia to make the peace and developmental process viable and sustainable.

Both the regional and world player should learn that the world has changed and they need to change their priorities to bring sustainable peace to Pashtun land and the world.

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'Pashtunistan': The Challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan

Selig S. Harrison

Theme: The increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi domination could lead to the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the emergence of a new national entity: an 'Islamic Pashtunistan'.

Summary: The alarming growth of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan is usually attributed to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam and to covert help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous, reason also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, an 'Islamic Pashtunistan'.

This ARI examines the Pashtun claim for an independent territory, the historical and political roots of the Pashtun identity, the implications for the NATO- or Pakistani-led military operations in the area, the increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi domination and the reasons why the Pashtunistan movement, long dormant, is slowly coming to life.

Analysis: The alarming growth of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan is usually attributed to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam and to covert help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous reason also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, 'Pashtunistan,' under radical Islamist leadership.

Pakistan and Afghanistan are fragile, multiethnic states. Ironically, by ignoring ethnic factors and defining the struggle with the jihadists mainly in military terms, the US is inadvertently helping al-Qaeda and the Taliban to capture the leadership of Pashtun nationalism. The central political problem facing Pakistan, largely shielded from international attention by the 'war on terror', is how to deal with the deep ethnic tensions between the Punjabi majority, which controls the armed forces, and Baluchi, Sindhi and Pashtun minorities that have been denied a fair share of economic and political power.

If history is a reliable guide, the prospects for the survival of the Pakistani state in its present form, with its existing configuration of constituent ethno-linguistic groups, cannot be taken for granted. There is no precedent in the history of South Asia for a state consisting of the five ethno-linguistic regions that made up Pakistan as originally constituted in 1947, or even for the truncated Pakistan consisting of the four regions that remained after Bangladesh seceded in 1971. The ideologues of Pakistani nationalism exalt the historical memory of Akbar and Aurangzeb as the symbols of a lost Islamic grandeur in South Asia. By contrast, for the Baluchis, Sindhis and Pashtuns, the Moghuls are remembered primarily as the symbols of past oppression.

In Afghanistan, where the Pashtuns are the largest single ethnic group, they bitterly resent the disproportionate influence enjoyed by the Tajik ethnic minority in the regime of Hamid Karzai, a legacy of US collaboration with Tajik militias in overthrowing the Taliban. More importantly, it is the Pashtuns who have been the main victims of US-NATO bombing attacks on the Taliban, who are largely Pashtuns and operate almost entirely in Pashtun territory. In one authoritative estimate, civilian casualties in Afghanistan have numbered nearly 5,000 since 2001.

The Lost Empire - The size of the Pashtun population in Afghanistan is disputed and no definitive census data exist in Afghanistan. The *CIA World Factbook* estimates that Afghanistan's population was 31.05 million in 2006, of which 13 million were Pashtuns. In Pakistan, census data indicate 25.6 million Pashtu speakers. To this must be added some 2.5 million Pashtun refugees in Pakistan. These figures suggest a total Pashtun population in both countries of 41 million.

In Pashtun eyes, British colonialism robbed them of their birthright. Until the Raj, the Pashtuns were politically united for nearly a century under the banner of an Afghan empire that stretched eastwards as far as the Indus River. It was traumatic for the Pashtuns when the British seized 40,000 square miles of ancestral Pashtun territory between the Indus and the Khyber Pass, embracing half of the Pashtun population, and then imposed the Durand Line, formalising their conquest. When they subsequently handed over this territory to the new, Punjabi-dominated government of Pakistan in 1947, the British bequeathed an explosive, irredentist issue that has perennially marked the rhetoric of Pashtun-dominated Afghan regimes and has poisoned the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. At various times, Zahir Shah's monarchy, Muhammad Daoud's republic and post-1978 Communist governments in Kabul have all challenged Pakistan's right to rule over its Pashtun areas, alternatively espousing the goal of an autonomous Pashtun state to be created within Pakistan, an independent Pashtunistan to be carved out of Pakistan or a 'Greater Afghanistan', directly annexing the lost territories.

Pakistan has worked single-mindedly to stifle Pashtun impulses for an independent Pashtunistan both during and after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. During the occupation, the Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) channelled US aid to the Islamist resistance groups under its tutelage, denying significant aid and weaponry to resistance groups oriented to the former King Zahir Shah, who had supported the

Pashtunistan movement during the monarchy. When the Soviet forces left, the ISI initially sought to install Afghan surrogates considered to be opposed to the Pashtunistan concept. When these groups proved unable to consolidate their power, Islamabad turned to the Taliban, who had a Pashtun base but were dominated by clerical leaders with a pan-Islamic ideology who had no previous identification with the Pashtunistan movement. Significantly, however, when the Taliban came to power, they did not recognise the Durand Line despite Pakistani pressures to do so.

The Pashtuns today gloss over the internecine strife within the Afghan monarchy which opened the way for the intervention of the British and their allies in the early 19th century. Surveying the broad picture, however, there is more than enough evidence in the historical record to account for the emotive power of Pashtun nationalism. Long before the British arrived on the scene, the Pashtuns were struggling to preserve their identity against the onslaught of advancing Moghul emperors, who ruled tenuously over the areas west of the Indus from their capital in Delhi.

The Roots of Pashtun Identity - Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line share an ancient social and cultural identity dating back at least to the Pakti kingdom mentioned in the writings of Herodotus and possibly earlier. When a Punjabi critic asked him in 1975 whether he was 'a Muslim, a Pakistani or a Pashtun first', Wali Khan, The National Awami Party leader, gave a much-quoted reply that he was 'a six-thousand-year-old Pashtun, a thousand-year-old Muslim and a 27 year old Pakistani'. Inscriptions from the 8th century AD have been found in a precursor of the Pashtu language. By the 11th and 12th centuries, Rahman Baba and other poets were writing Pashtu folk ballads that are still popular today and, by the mid-17th century, Khushal Khan Khattak had begun to develop what is now treasured as the classic style of Pashtun poetry.

There are from two to three dozen Pushtun tribes, depending on how one classifies them, generally divided into four major groupings: the Durranis and Ghilzais, concentrated in Afghanistan; the so-called independent tribes, straddling the Durand Line; and several tribes, such as the Khattaks and Bannuchis, centred on the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. As Richard Tapper wrote:

'In spite of the endemic conflict among different Pashtun groups, the notion of the ethnic and cultural unity of all Pashtuns has long been familiar to them as a symbolic complex of great potential for political unity. Of all tribal groups in Iran or Afghanistan, the Pashtuns have had perhaps the most pervasive and explicit segmentary lineage ideology on the classic pattern expressed not only in written genealogies but in territorial distribution.'[1]

However, in contrast to Baluch society, with its hierarchical structures and its all-powerful *sardars*, Pashtun culture has an egalitarian mystique epitomised by the role of the *jirgah* (assembly). Moreover, although the tribal *malik* (village headman) is the most powerful single figure in tribal affairs *per se*, the *malik* shares local power with the *mullah* in a complex, symbiotic relationship.

The Afghan state that Ahmad Shah Durrani forged in 1747 was frankly Pashtun in character. It was a

Pashtun tribal confederacy, established for the purpose of uniting the Pashtuns and shielding their interests and integrity against non-Pashtun rivals. To be sure, even at its inception, the new state was not entirely homogenous ethnically, but Afghanistan had an overwhelming Pashtun majority in the early 19th century. By contrast, the loss of the trans-Durand territories in 1823 and the consequent division of the Pashtuns left a truncated Afghanistan with a more tenuous ethnic balance. As the 'great game' between Britain and Russia developed during the 19th century, the British egged on successive Afghan rulers, who gradually pushed the border of Afghanistan northwards to the Oxus River. The British goal was to make Afghanistan a buffer state, and the Pashtun rulers in Kabul had imperialist ambitions of their own. Extensive areas populated by Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and other non-Pashtun ethnic groups were annexed by Kabul after long and costly struggles that left a legacy of built-in ethnic conflict.

The Emergence of Nationalism - Non-Pashtuns constituted at least 35% –possibly as much as 45%– of the population of Afghanistan during the decades preceding the Soviet occupation, and their relative strength has grown in the wake of the large-scale Pashtun refugee movement to Pakistan. As the ethnic balance has changed, the Pashtuns in Afghanistan have intermittently attempted to forge some form of political unity with the Pashtuns in Pakistan that would make possible a restoration of unchallenged Pashtun dominance in Kabul. By the same token, given the responsibility of the British for the division of the Pashtuns, it is not surprising that anti-British sentiment during the 1920s and 1930s sparked the emergence of a Pashtun nationalist movement on what was to become the Pakistan side of the Durand Line, Ghaffar Khan's 'Red Shirts', which called explicitly on the eve of partition for an independent Pashtunistan. In Ghaffar Khan's Bannu Declaration of 22 June 1947 he demanded that the Pashtuns be given a choice between joining Pakistan and establishing an independent Pashtunistan, rather than a choice limited to Pakistan or India.

The 'Red Shirts' boycotted the referendum that was used by the departing British as their legal rationale for handing over the North-West Frontier Province and the adjacent tribal areas, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), to the new Pakistani state. As a consequence, when it fit their purposes, Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan were able to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the incorporation of these Pashtun-majority areas into Pakistan. For their part, Pakistani leaders, questioning the protestations of loyalty to Pakistan by Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan, have frequently cited the Bannu Declaration.

Even though the National Awami Party has reformulated the Pashtunistan demand since 1947 as a demand for provincial autonomy within Pakistan, Islamabad has continued to doubt its allegiance to Pakistan. This distrust is rooted not only in suspicions of collusion with Afghanistan but also in the fact that Ghaffar Khan was openly opposed to the very idea of Pakistan and was actively identified with the Indian National Congress in its struggle against the British. Driven by its fear of Pashtun demands for provincial autonomy or, worse still, for Pashtunistan, the Punjabi-dominated regime in Islamabad has been seeking to resettle as many Afghan refugees and other Pashtuns as possible in Baluchistan, hoping to vitiate the strength of Baluchi and Pashtun separatism at one stroke.

With Pashtuns outnumbering Baluchis in parts of northern Baluchistan, Pashtun nationalists now propose restructuring the Pakistani state to unite all Pashtun regions in FATA, Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and northern Baluchistan in a new province of Pakhtoonkhwa that would seek greater autonomy than Pakistani provinces now have.

The inclusion of FATA in the Pashtun nationalist vision is a significant development that conflicts directly with US-backed Pakistani development plans designed to bring the vast, hitherto autonomous tribal tract under central government control. Until recently, there was little popular political consciousness in FATA. But the use of the areas as a sanctuary and staging area by al-Qaeda and Taliban forces since 9/11, leading to Pakistani military incursions in response to US pressure, has led to unprecedented inter-tribal contacts and to a polarisation of increasingly well-organised Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces.

In July, 2002, the Pakistan army sent a division of troops into FATA, focusing on areas believed to be transit points for al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in and out of Afghanistan. Pressed by Washington for action, Pakistani forces, using helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, launched operations in October 2003 and the first three months of 2004 that displaced some 50,000 people, according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, inflicting heavy civilian casualties. 'The use of indiscriminate, excessive force undermined the military's local standing and alienated the locals', reported the International Crisis Group. A Pashtun former Federal Law Minister reported 'seething anger' throughout FATA. Musharraf concluded that further military pressure would make FATA ungovernable and authorised peace agreements with tribal leaders in Waziristan, bitterly criticised by the US, in which Pakistani forces suspended military operations in return for efforts by tribal leaders to prevent the use of FATA by the Taliban as a staging area for Afghanistan. But the damage was already done, and the FATA populace is now politicised and radicalised as never before.

The architect of the peace deal was a retired Pashtun Army Lieutenant General, Jan Orakzai, Governor of the NWFP. In October 2006 General Orakzai was quietly negotiating a similar deal in the Bajaur area of FATA, but many Pakistanis suspect that US intelligence got wind of it. Precisely what happened next has not been clearly established, but on 30 October 2006, 83 students at a *madrasa* in the Bajaur village of Chenagai were killed in a missile attack. *The News* of Karachi reported eyewitnesses saying that the missiles were fired from a pilotless US Predator drone aircraft that had circled overhead for hours. However, the Pakistan Army claimed credit for the attack, and US and Pakistani spokesmen said that the seminary was an al-Qaeda training facility. Whatever the truth, the raid led to massive protests, especially in FATA, and retaliatory suicide bombings in the Malakand tribal district.

The radicalisation of the Pashtun areas straddling the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has intensified both Islamist zealotry and Pashtun nationalism. In the conventional wisdom, one or the other, either Islamist or Pashtun identity, will eventually triumph, but an equally plausible possibility is that the result could be what Hussain Haqqani has called an 'Islamic Pashtunistan'. At a Washington seminar on 1 March 2007, at the Pakistani Embassy, the Pakistani Ambassador, Major General (Ret.) Mahmud Ali Durrani, a Pashtun,

commented that 'I hope the Taliban and Pashtun nationalism don't merge. If that happens, we've had it, and we're on the verge of that'.

Islamabad and the Pashtuns - Sceptics who question the potential of Pashtun nationalism point to the fact that the Pashtuns are better integrated into Pakistan than the more openly rebellious Baluchi minority. During British rule, Pashtuns from the more aristocratic, urbanised families were given powerful posts in the army and bureaucracy. Pashtun officers constituted a significant bloc in the upper ranks of the army following partition, until many of them were pushed out in the late 1950s, when the Punjabis increased their power. Even today, however, there is still a significant number of Pashtuns in high places in Pakistan.

Geographically, the Pashtun areas are not as cut off from other parts of Pakistan as the Baluchi areas, which partly explains why the Pashtun areas are better integrated with the overall Pakistani economy than the Baluchi areas are. But in Pashtun eyes, this integration has serious disadvantages, since it brings what is seen as an excessive dependence on Punjab province and makes the Pashtun areas vulnerable to exploitation by big-business interests centred in Karachi and Lahore. Pashtun antagonism towards Punjabi domination focuses, in large part, on alleged economic discrimination against the North-West Frontier Province in allocations of development expenditure both in industry and agriculture.

Among the standard charges levelled by Pashtun leaders is that Islamabad deliberately holds back on electrification of the Pashtun areas because it does not want them to become industrialised –that even the electricity produced there goes primarily to Punjab province, and that most of the tobacco and cotton grown in the North-West Frontier Province is used to supply cigarette and textile factories located in other provinces–. Islamabad even discriminates against the Pashtuns in agricultural development, Pashtun spokesmen argue, channelling funds for the expansion of irrigation primarily to Punjab or to areas in other provinces where Punjabi settlers will benefit most.

Pashtun dissatisfaction also focuses on the role of Punjabi civil servants in the provincial administration and on Islamabad's resistance to the use of the Pashtu language as the medium of instruction in education. At present, Urdu is the medium in state schools, with Pashtu taught as an optional subject up to the eighth grade. Pashtun children not only must attend classes conducted in Urdu but must also use textbooks written in Urdu, though English is permitted in civil service examinations and in university and graduate school entrance examinations. The language issue is important in Baluchistan, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province alike, but it is more important in the Sindhi and Pashtun areas than in Baluchistan, because Sindhi and Pashtu are more standardised and better developed as literary languages than Baluchi and thus more readily adaptable for educational purposes.

If Islamabad were to offer significant economic and political concessions to the ethnic minorities, such as the provincial autonomy envisaged in the defunct 1973 Constitution, the possibility of a compromise would be greater with the Pashtuns than with the Baluchis and the Sindhis. But successive Punjabi-dominated military governments, including the Musharraf regime, have shown no disposition for compromise. Moreover, the

turmoil in the Pashtun areas on both sides of the Durand Line, generated by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and more recently by 9/11, have kept the fires of Pashtun separatism simmering.

The Pashtun refugees who poured into the North-West Frontier Province from Afghanistan after the departure of the Soviet forces, uprooted from their tribal moorings, have provided a fertile recruiting ground for the Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam and other Islamist groups. Strengthened by its 2004 alliance with Musharraf, the Islamist forces eclipsed secular Pashtun political forces in the NWFP, centred in the National Awami Party (NAP), founded by the late Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, which does not subordinate ethnic Pashtun identity to Islamic identity. But in the 2008 National Assembly election, with Musharraf weakened, the ANP won all 10 seats in the NWFP.

Both Islamist and secular Pashtuns share a common desire to escape from the domination of Islamabad. Both share Pashtun traditions and historical memories with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. The Pashtunistan movement, long dormant, is slowly coming to life and its re-emergence appears increasingly possible during the years ahead in the context of the overall growth of instability and political disintegration in Pakistan and Afghanistan alike.

Conclusions: What should the US, NATO and the EU do to defuse the 'Pashtunistan' time bomb? First, in both Afghanistan and the FATA, minimise air strikes that risk civilian casualties, like the 12 March attack in North Waziristan on a suspected Taliban hide-out in FATA that killed nine civilians. In place of air strikes, greater reliance should be placed on commandos and special forces. In Afghanistan, this de-escalation of air strikes should be accompanied by political probes designed to split off moderate Taliban elements from hard-core factions linked to al-Qaeda. Michael Semple, the British expert on the Pashtun tribes who held high EU, UN and British Embassy posts in Kabul, was expelled from the country by right-wing elements of the Afghan government for conducting such probes. In an interview with the British newspaper *The Guardian* on 16 February, Semple estimated that peace deals are possible with 'two thirds' of the local Taliban factions in Afghanistan. Semple is a well-respected figure and his estimate should be taken seriously.

The Taliban is effectively exploiting Pashtun dissatisfaction with Kabul, recruiting many of its fighters from disaffected tribes in the Ghilzai branch of the Pashtuns, who resent the favouritism President Hamid Karzai has shown to higher-status tribes such as his own Durranis. Mullah Omar, the key Taliban leader, is a Ghilzai. Karzai should be encouraged to put leading Pashtuns from the large Ghilzai tribes into key security posts in Kabul, replacing minority Tajiks.

In Pakistan, the US and the EU should press for a return to the defunct 1973 Constitution, which guarantees provincial autonomy to the ethnic minorities. The return of parliamentary government following the recent elections is a step in the right direction but is not enough to defuse the Pashtunistan movement. As a first step, the new government soon to take office in Islamabad should accede to Pashtun pressures for a consolidated Pashtun Pakhtunkhwa province that would link FATA with the Pashtun-majority areas of the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. The FATA could then participate in Pakistani politics and

secular Pashtun forces led by the National Awami Party would be strengthened. The NAP won all 10 seats in the NWFP in the recent election, and the best way to counter Pashtun separatist sentiment would be to strengthen the NAP by granting its long-standing demands for provincial autonomy.
To be meaningful, in short, democratisation in Pakistan must include provincial autonomy for the ethnic minorities. This is the key precondition not only for combating the *jihadist* forces in Pakistan more effectively but also for the long-term survival of multi-ethnic Pakistan in its present form.
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The Rise of the Rest

Fareed Zakaria
It's true China is booming, Russia is growing more assertive, terrorism is a threat. But if America is losing the ability to dictate to this new world, it has not lost the ability to lead.

Americans are glum at the moment. No, I mean really glum. In April, a new poll revealed that 81 percent of the American people believe that the country is on the "wrong track." In the 25 years that pollsters have asked this question, last month's response was by far the most negative. Other polls, asking similar questions, found levels of gloom that were even more alarming, often at 30- and 40-year highs. There are reasons to be pessimistic—a financial panic and looming recession, a seemingly endless war in Iraq, and the ongoing threat of terrorism. But the facts on the ground—unemployment numbers, foreclosure rates, deaths from terror attacks—are simply not dire enough to explain the present atmosphere of malaise.

American anxiety springs from something much deeper, a sense that large and disruptive forces are coursing through the world. In almost every industry, in every aspect of life, it feels like the patterns of the past are being scrambled. "Whirl is king, having driven out Zeus," wrote Aristophanes 2,400 years ago. And—for the first time in living memory—the United States does not seem to be leading the charge. Americans see that a new world is coming into being, but fear it is one being shaped in distant lands and by foreign people.

Look around. The world's tallest building is in Taipei, and will soon be in Dubai. Its largest publicly traded company is in Beijing. Its biggest refinery is being constructed in India. Its largest passenger airplane is built in Europe. The largest investment fund on the planet is in Abu Dhabi; the biggest movie industry is Bollywood, not Hollywood. Once quintessentially American icons have been usurped by the natives. The largest Ferris wheel is in Singapore. The largest casino is in Macao, which overtook Las Vegas in gambling revenues last year. America no longer dominates even its favorite sport, shopping. The Mall of

America in Minnesota once boasted that it was the largest shopping mall in the world. Today it wouldn't make the top ten. In the most recent rankings, only two of the world's ten richest people are American. These lists are arbitrary and a bit silly, but consider that only ten years ago, the United States would have serenely topped almost every one of these categories.

seismic shift in power and attitudes. It is one that I sense when I travel around the world. In America, we are still debating the nature and extent of anti-Americanism. One side says that the problem is real and worrying and that we must woo the world back. The other says this is the inevitable price of power and that many of these countries are envious—and vaguely French—so we can safely ignore their griping. But while we argue over why they hate us, "they" have moved on, and are now far more interested in other, more dynamic parts of the globe. The world has shifted from anti-Americanism to *post*-Americanism.

I. The End of Pax Americana

During the 1980s, when I would visit India—where I grew up—most Indians were fascinated by the United States. Their interest, I have to confess, was not in the important power players in Washington or the great intellectuals in Cambridge.

People would often ask me about … Donald Trump. He was the very symbol of the United States—brassy, rich, and modern. He symbolized the feeling that if you wanted to find the biggest and largest anything, you had to look to America. Today, outside of entertainment figures, there is no comparable interest in American personalities. If you wonder why, read India's newspapers or watch its television. There are dozens of Indian businessmen who are now wealthier than the Donald. Indians are obsessed by their own vulgar real estate billionaires. And that newfound interest in *their own* story is being replicated across much of the world.

How much? Well, consider this fact. In 2006 and 2007, 124 countries grew their economies at over 4 percent a year. That includes more than 30 countries in Africa. Over the last two decades, lands outside the industrialized West have been growing at rates that were once unthinkable. While there have been booms and busts, the overall trend has been unambiguously upward. Antoine van Agtmael, the fund manager who coined the term "emerging markets," has identified the 25 companies most likely to be the world's next great multinationals. His list includes four companies each from Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan; three from India, two from China, and one each from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and South Africa. This is something much broader than the much-ballyhooed rise of China or even Asia. It is the rise of the rest—the rest of the world.

We are living through the third great power shift in modern history. The first was the rise of the Western world, around the 15th century. It produced the world as we know it now—science and technology,

commerce and capitalism, the industrial and agricultural revolutions. It also led to the prolonged political dominance of the nations of the Western world. The second shift, which took place in the closing years of the 19th century, was the rise of the United States. Once it industrialized, it soon became the most powerful nation in the world, stronger than any likely combination of other nations. For the last 20 years, America's superpower status in every realm has been largely unchallenged—something that's never happened before in history, at least since the Roman Empire dominated the known world 2,000 years ago. During this Pax Americana, the global economy has accelerated dramatically. And that expansion is the driver behind the third great power shift of the modern age—the rise of the rest.

At the military and political level, we still live in a unipolar world. But along every other dimension—industrial, financial, social, cultural—the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from American dominance. In terms of war and peace, economics and business, ideas and art, this will produce a landscape that is quite different from the one we have lived in until now—one defined and directed from many places and by many peoples.

The post-American world is naturally an unsettling prospect for Americans, but it should not be. This will not be a world defined by the decline of America but rather the rise of everyone else. It is the result of a series of positive trends that have been progressing over the last 20 years, trends that have created an international climate of unprecedented peace and prosperity.

I know. That's not the world that people perceive. We are told that we live in dark, dangerous times. Terrorism, rogue states, nuclear proliferation, financial panics, recession, outsourcing, and illegal immigrants all loom large in the national discourse. Al Qaeda, Iran, North Korea, China, Russia are all threats in some way or another. But just how violent is today's world, really?

A team of scholars at the University of Maryland has been tracking deaths caused by organized violence. Their data show that wars of all kinds have been declining since the mid-1980s and that we are now at the lowest levels of global violence since the 1950s. Deaths from terrorism are reported to have risen in recent years. But on closer examination, 80 percent of those casualties come from Afghanistan and Iraq, which are really war zones with ongoing insurgencies—and the overall numbers remain small. Looking at the evidence, Harvard's polymath professor Steven Pinker has ventured to speculate that we are probably living "in the most peaceful time of our species' existence."

Why does it not feel that way? Why do we think we live in scary times? Part of the problem is that as violence has been ebbing, information has been exploding. The last 20 years have produced an information revolution that brings us news and, most crucially, images from around the world all the time. The immediacy of the images and the intensity of the 24-hour news cycle combine to produce constant hype.

Every weather disturbance is the "storm of the decade." Every bomb that explodes is BREAKING NEWS. Because the information revolution is so new, we—reporters, writers, readers, viewers—are all just now figuring out how to put everything in context.

We didn't watch daily footage of the two million people who died in Indochina in the 1970s, or the million who perished in the sands of the Iran-Iraq war ten years later. We saw little of the civil war in the Congo in the 1990s, where millions died. But today any bomb that goes off, any rocket that is fired, any death that results, is documented by someone, somewhere and ricochets instantly across the world. Add to this terrorist attacks, which are random and brutal. "That could have been me," you think. Actually, your chances of being killed in a terrorist attack are tiny—for an American, smaller than drowning in your bathtub. But it doesn't feel like that.

The threats we face are real. Islamic jihadists are a nasty bunch—they do want to attack civilians everywhere. But it is increasingly clear that militants and suicide bombers make up a tiny portion of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. They can do real damage, especially if they get their hands on nuclear weapons. But the combined efforts of the world's governments have effectively put them on the run and continue to track them and their money. Jihad persists, but the jihadists have had to scatter, work in small local cells, and use simple and undetectable weapons. They have not been able to hit big, symbolic targets, especially ones involving Americans. So they blow up bombs in cafés, marketplaces, and subway stations. The problem is that in doing so, they kill locals and alienate ordinary Muslims. Look at the polls. Support for violence of any kind has dropped dramatically over the last five years in all Muslim countries.

Militant groups have reconstituted in certain areas where they exploit a particular local issue or have support from a local ethnic group or sect, most worryingly in Pakistan and Afghanistan where Islamic radicalism has become associated with Pashtun identity politics. But as a result, these groups are becoming more local and less global. Al Qaeda in Iraq, for example, has turned into a group that is more anti-Shiite than anti-American. The bottom line is this: since 9/11, Al Qaeda Central, the gang run by Osama bin Laden, has not been able to launch a single major terror attack in the West or any Arab country—its original targets. They used to do terrorism, now they make videotapes. Of course one day they will get lucky again, but that they have been stymied for almost seven years points out that in this battle between governments and terror groups, the former need not despair.

Some point to the dangers posed by countries like Iran. These rogue states present real problems, but look at them in context. The American economy is 68 times the size of Iran's. Its military budget is 110 times that of the mullahs. Were Iran to attain a nuclear capacity, it would complicate the geopolitics of the Middle East. But none of the problems we face compare with the dangers posed by a rising Germany in the first half of the 20th century or an expansionist Soviet Union in the second half. Those were great

global powers bent on world domination. If this is 1938, as some neoconservatives tell us, then Iran is Romania, not Germany.

Others paint a dark picture of a world in which dictators are on the march. China and Russia and assorted other oil potentates are surging. We must draw the battle lines now, they warn, and engage in a great Manichean struggle that will define the next century. Some of John McCain's rhetoric has suggested that he adheres to this dire, dyspeptic view. But before we all sign on for a new Cold War, let's take a deep breath and gain some perspective. Today's rising great powers are relatively benign by historical measure. In the past, when countries grew rich they've wanted to become great military powers, overturn the existing order, and create their own empires or spheres of influence. But since the rise of Japan and Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, none have done this, choosing instead to get rich within the existing international order. China and India are clearly moving in this direction. Even Russia, the most aggressive and revanchist great power today, has done little that compares with past aggressors. The fact that for the first time in history, the United States can contest Russian influence in Ukraine—a country 4,800 miles away from Washington that Russia has dominated or ruled for 350 years—tells us something about the balance of power between the West and Russia.

Compare Russia and China with where they were 35 years ago. At the time both (particularly Russia) were great power threats, actively conspiring against the United States, arming guerrilla movement across the globe, funding insurgencies and civil wars, blocking every American plan in the United Nations. Now they are more integrated into the global economy and society than at any point in at least 100 years. They occupy an uncomfortable gray zone, neither friends nor foes, cooperating with the United States and the West on some issues, obstructing others. But how large is their potential for trouble? Russia's military spending is $35 billion, or 1/20th of the Pentagon's. China has about 20 nuclear missiles that can reach the United States. We have 830 missiles, most with multiple warheads, that can reach China. Who should be worried about whom? Other rising autocracies like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are close U.S. allies that shelter under America's military protection, buy its weapons, invest in its companies, and follow many of its diktats. With Iran's ambitions growing in the region, these countries are likely to become even closer allies, unless America gratuitously alienates them.

II. The Good News

In July 2006, I spoke with a senior member of the Israeli government, a few days after Israel's war with Hezbollah had ended. He was genuinely worried about his country's physical security. Hezbollah's rockets had reached farther into Israel than people had believed possible. The military response had clearly been ineffectual: Hezbollah launched as many rockets on the last day of the war as on the first. Then I asked him about the economy—the area in which he worked. His response was striking. "That's puzzled all of us," he

said. "The stock market was higher on the last day of the war than on the first! The same with the shekel." The government was spooked, but the market wasn't.

Or consider the Iraq War, which has produced deep, lasting chaos and dysfunction in that country. Over two million refugees have crowded into neighboring lands. That would seem to be the kind of political crisis guaranteed to spill over. But as I've traveled in the Middle East over the last few years, I've been struck by how little Iraq's troubles have destabilized the region. Everywhere you go, people angrily denounce American foreign policy. But most Middle Eastern countries are booming. Iraq's neighbors—Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—are enjoying unprecedented prosperity. The Gulf states are busy modernizing their economies and societies, asking the Louvre, New York University, and Cornell Medical School to set up remote branches in the desert. There's little evidence of chaos, instability, and rampant Islamic fundamentalism.

The underlying reality across the globe is of enormous vitality. For the first time ever, most countries around the world are practicing sensible economics. Consider inflation. Over the past 20 years hyperinflation, a problem that used to bedevil large swaths of the world from Turkey to Brazil to Indonesia, has largely vanished, tamed by successful fiscal and monetary policies. The results are clear and stunning. The share of people living on $1 a day has plummeted from 40 percent in 1981 to 18 percent in 2004 and is estimated to drop to 12 percent by 2015. Poverty is falling in countries that house 80 percent of the world's population. There remains real poverty in the world—most worryingly in 50 basket-case countries that contain 1 billion people—but the overall trend has never been more encouraging. The global economy has more than doubled in size over the last 15 years and is now approaching $54 trillion! Global trade has grown by 133 percent in the same period. The expansion of the global economic pie has been so large, with so many countries participating, that it has become the dominating force of the current era. Wars, terrorism, and civil strife cause disruptions temporarily but eventually they are overwhelmed by the waves of globalization. These circumstances may not last, but it is worth understanding what the world has looked like for the past few decades.

III. A New Nationalism

Of course, global growth is also responsible for some of the biggest problems in the world right now. It has produced tons of money—what businesspeople call liquidity—that moves around the world. The combination of low inflation and lots of cash has meant low interest rates, which in turn have made people act greedily and/or stupidly. So we have witnessed over the last two decades a series of bubbles—in East Asian countries, technology stocks, housing, subprime mortgages, and emerging market equities. Growth also explains one of the signature events of our times—soaring commodity prices. $100 oil is just the tip of the barrel. Almost all commodities are at 200-year highs. Food, only a few decades ago in danger of price

collapse, is now in the midst of a scary rise. None of this is due to dramatic fall-offs in supply. It is demand, growing global demand, that is fueling these prices. The effect of more and more people eating, drinking, washing, driving, and consuming will have seismic effects on the global system. These may be high-quality problems, but they are deep problems nonetheless.

The most immediate effect of global growth is the appearance of new economic powerhouses on the scene. It is an accident of history that for the last several centuries, the richest countries in the world have all been very small in terms of population. Denmark has 5.5 million people, the Netherlands has 16.6 million. The United States is the biggest of the bunch and has dominated the advanced industrial world. But the real giants—China, India, Brazil—have been sleeping, unable or unwilling to join the world of functioning economies. Now they are on the move and naturally, given their size, they will have a large footprint on the map of the future. Even if people in these countries remain relatively poor, as nations their total wealth will be massive. Or to put it another way, any number, no matter how small, when multiplied by 2.5 billion becomes a very big number. (2.5 billion is the population of China plus India.)

The rise of China and India is really just the most obvious manifestation of a rising world. In dozens of big countries, one can see the same set of forces at work—a growing economy, a resurgent society, a vibrant culture, and a rising sense of national pride. That pride can morph into something uglier. For me, this was vividly illustrated a few years ago when I was chatting with a young Chinese executive in an Internet café in Shanghai. He wore Western clothes, spoke fluent English, and was immersed in global pop culture. He was a product of globalization and spoke its language of bridge building and cosmopolitan values. At least, he did so until we began talking about Taiwan, Japan, and even the United States. (We did not discuss Tibet, but I'm sure had we done so, I could have added it to this list.) His responses were filled with passion, bellicosity, and intolerance. I felt as if I were in Germany in 1910, speaking to a young German professional, who would have been equally modern and yet also a staunch nationalist.

As economic fortunes rise, so inevitably does nationalism. Imagine that your country has been poor and marginal for centuries. Finally, things turn around and it becomes a symbol of economic progress and success. You would be proud, and anxious that your people win recognition and respect throughout the world.

In many countries such nationalism arises from a pent-up frustration over having to accept an entirely Western, or American, narrative of world history—one in which they are miscast or remain bit players. Russians have long chafed over the manner in which Western countries remember World War II. The American narrative is one in which the United States and Britain heroically defeat the forces of fascism. The Normandy landings are the climactic highpoint of the war—the beginning of the end. The Russians point out, however, that in fact the entire Western front was a sideshow. Three quarters of all German

forces were engaged on the Eastern front fighting Russian troops, and Germany suffered 70 percent of its casualties there. The Eastern front involved more land combat than all other theaters of World War II put together.

Such divergent national perspectives always existed. But today, thanks to the information revolution, they are amplified, echoed, and disseminated. Where once there were only the narratives laid out by The New York Times, Time, Newsweek, the BBC, and CNN, there are now dozens of indigenous networks and channels—from Al Jazeera to New Delhi's NDTV to Latin America's Telesur. The result is that the "rest" are now dissecting the assumptions and narratives of the West and providing alternative views. A young Chinese diplomat told me in 2006, "When you tell us that we support a dictatorship in Sudan to have access to its oil, what I want to say is, 'And how is that different from your support of a medieval monarchy in Saudi Arabia?' We see the hypocrisy, we just don't say anything—yet."

The fact that newly rising nations are more strongly asserting their ideas and interests is inevitable in a post-American world. This raises a conundrum—how to get a world of many actors to work together. The traditional mechanisms of international cooperation are fraying. The U.N. Security Council has as its permanent members the victors of a war that ended more than 60 years ago. The G8 does not include China, India or Brazil—the three fastest-growing large economies in the world—and yet claims to represent the movers and shakers of the world economy. By tradition, the IMF is always headed by a European and the World Bank by an American. This "tradition," like the segregated customs of an old country club, might be charming to an insider. But to the majority who live outside the West, it seems bigoted. Our challenge is this: Whether the problem is a trade dispute or a human rights tragedy like Darfur or climate change, the only solutions that will work are those involving many nations. But arriving at solutions when more countries and more non-governmental players are feeling empowered will be harder than ever.

IV. The Next American Century

Many look at the vitality of this emerging world and conclude that the United States has had its day. "Globalization is striking back," Gabor Steingart, an editor at Germany's leading news magazine, Der Spiegel, writes in a best-selling book. As others prosper, he argues, the United States has lost key industries, its people have stopped saving money, and its government has become increasingly indebted to Asian central banks. The current financial crisis has only given greater force to such fears.

But take a step back. Over the last 20 years, globalization has been gaining depth and breadth. America has benefited massively from these trends. It has enjoyed unusually robust growth, low unemployment and inflation, and received hundreds of billions of dollars in investment. These are not signs of economic collapse. Its companies have entered new countries and industries with great success, using global supply

chains and technology to stay in the vanguard of efficiency. U.S. exports and manufacturing have actually held their ground and services have boomed.

The United States is currently ranked as the globe's most competitive economy by the World Economic Forum. It remains dominant in many industries of the future like nanotechnology, biotechnology, and dozens of smaller high-tech fields. Its universities are the finest in the world, making up 8 of the top ten and 37 of the top fifty, according to a prominent ranking produced by Shanghai Jiao Tong University. A few years ago the National Science Foundation put out a scary and much-discussed statistic. In 2004, the group said, 950,000 engineers graduated from China and India, while only 70,000 graduated from the United States. But those numbers are wildly off the mark. If you exclude the car mechanics and repairmen—who are all counted as engineers in Chinese and Indian statistics—the numbers look quite different. Per capita, it turns out, the United States trains more engineers than either of the Asian giants.

But America's hidden secret is that most of these engineers are immigrants. Foreign students and immigrants account for almost 50 percent of all science researchers in the country. In 2006 they received 40 percent of all PhDs. By 2010, 75 percent of all science PhDs in this country will be awarded to foreign students. When these graduates settle in the country, they create economic opportunity. Half of all Silicon Valley start-ups have one founder who is an immigrant or first generation American. The potential for a new burst of American productivity depends not on our education system or R&D spending, but on our immigration policies. If these people are allowed and encouraged to stay, then innovation will happen here. If they leave, they'll take it with them.

More broadly, this is America's great—and potentially insurmountable—strength. It remains the most open, flexible society in the world, able to absorb other people, cultures, ideas, goods, and services. The country thrives on the hunger and energy of poor immigrants. Faced with the new technologies of foreign companies, or growing markets overseas, it adapts and adjusts. When you compare this dynamism with the closed and hierarchical nations that were once superpowers, you sense that the United States is different and may not fall into the trap of becoming rich, and fat, and lazy.

American society can adapt to this new world. But can the American government? Washington has gotten used to a world in which all roads led to its doorstep. America has rarely had to worry about benchmarking to the rest of the world—it was always so far ahead. But the natives have gotten good at capitalism and the gap is narrowing. Look at the rise of London. It's now the world's leading financial center—less because of things that the United States did badly than those London did well, like improving regulation and becoming friendlier to foreign capital. Or take the U.S. health care system, which has become a huge liability for American companies. U.S. carmakers now employ more people in Ontario,

Canada, than Michigan because in Canada their health care costs are lower. Twenty years ago, the United States had the lowest corporate taxes in the world. Today they are the second-highest. It's not that ours went up. Those of others went down.

American parochialism is particularly evident in foreign policy. Economically, as other countries grow, for the most part the pie expands and everyone wins. But geopolitics is a struggle for influence: as other nations become more active internationally, they will seek greater freedom of action. This necessarily means that America's unimpeded influence will decline. But if the world that's being created has more power centers, nearly all are invested in order, stability and progress. Rather than narrowly obsessing about our own short-term interests and interest groups, our chief priority should be to bring these rising forces into the global system, to integrate them so that they in turn broaden and deepen global economic, political, and cultural ties. If China, India, Russia, Brazil all feel that they have a stake in the existing global order, there will be less danger of war, depression, panics, and breakdowns. There will be lots of problems, crisis, and tensions, but they will occur against a backdrop of systemic stability. This benefits them but also us. It's the ultimate win-win.

To bring others into this world, the United States needs to make its own commitment to the system clear. So far, America has been able to have it both ways. It is the global rule-maker but doesn't always play by the rules. And forget about standards created by others. Only three countries in the world don't use the metric system—Liberia, Myanmar, and the United States. For America to continue to lead the world, we will have to first join it.

Americans—particularly the American government—have not really understood the rise of the rest. This is one of the most thrilling stories in history. Billions of people are escaping from abject poverty. The world will be enriched and ennobled as they become consumers, producers, inventors, thinkers, dreamers, and doers. This is all happening because of American ideas and actions. For 60 years, the United States has pushed countries to open their markets, free up their politics, and embrace trade and technology. American diplomats, businessmen, and intellectuals have urged people in distant lands to be unafraid of change, to join the advanced world, to learn the secrets of our success. Yet just as they are beginning to do so, we are losing faith in such ideas. We have become suspicious of trade, openness, immigration, and investment because now it's not Americans going abroad but foreigners coming to America. Just as the world is opening up, we are closing down.

Generations from now, when historians write about these times, they might note that by the turn of the 21st century, the United States had succeeded in its great, historical mission—globalizing the world. We don't want them to write that along the way, we forgot to globalize ourselves.

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IDEAS – The Newsletter of Pashtun Peace Forum, Canada

We the editors and members of the Pashtun Peace Forum - Canada are pleased to share with our valued members, associates, supporters and all the Pashtuns, IDEAS – our first newsletter. We invite you to join us in understanding the current turmoil Pashtuns are facing and contribute to the movement towards peace and progress amongst Pashtun people who have been suffering long and deeply. We encourage you to send your articles, opinions and news by July 25, 2008 to be shared with our members and readers through our August 2008 issue of IDEAS.

Thank you,

For more info or share your article, opinion, please contact:

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"Coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working together is success." **Henry Ford**