

- e. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, pp 36 and 37.
 - f. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 4 and 5.
85. Fact 6:
- a. 15 Jan 06 incident AAR, Ex 031.
 - b. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 110 - 112.
 - c. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 43 and 44.
86. Fact 7: Route security planning responded to the evolving threat of
. This resulted in changes to friendly force TTPs for optimizing
route security.
- a. 15 Jan 06 incident AAR, Ex 031.
 - b. PRT Ptl Coy SOPs, Ex 044.
 - c. Intelligence Perspective and Significant Incident Tracker, Ex 046.
 - d. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 75 – 75, 80 – 81 and 84 - 89.
 - e. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 21 - 23.
 - f. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, pp 42 and 43.
 - g. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 59 and 60.
 - h. Testimony of Sgt Côté, Ex 060, pp 12 – 13, 17 and 28.
87. Fact 8:
- a. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 104 - 107.
 - b. Testimony of Maj Zilkalns, Ex 058, pp 38 – 39 and 54.
 - c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 60.
 - d. Testimony of Cpl Wood, Ex 055, pp 17 and 18.

ANALYSIS

88. A wide variety of testimony revealed that there was a deliberate effort by the PRT to constantly maximize the safety of convoys and the security of the routes within the AOR despite the severe limitation of These routes were heavily traveled by Coalition forces, however, this movement was 1

On initial deployment route security was primarily based on the land mine threat. As the threat evolved, the risk posed by various As a result, the mission instituted a deliberate process of training all personnel in recognition of the danger of (i.e. change in mindset). This action increased the awareness of convoy and patrol personnel of the threat indicators and improved actions to mitigate an attack.

FINDING H

89. Required Finding: The adequacy of the procedures for optimizing the security of the route upon which members were traveling at the time of the incident (TOR para 8h).

90. Finding: The procedures for optimizing the security of route upon which members were travelling at the time of the incident were adequate.

SUPPORTING FACTS

91. Fact 1: The convoy commander confirmed that the route was secure by verifying on the master route designation trace.

- a. 15 Jan 06, Ptl orders, Ex 044.
- b. 15 Jan 06 incident AAR, Ex 031.
- c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 4 - 7.

92. Fact 2: The convoy commander ensured he was briefed on the threat situation by the PRT intelligence team.

- a. 15 Jan 06, Ptl orders, Ex 044.
- b. 15 Jan 06 incident AAR, Ex 031.
- c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 8.
- d. Testimony of Maj Zilkalns, Ex 058, p 17.

- e. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 4 and 5.

93. Fact 3: PRT leadership enforced, and patrol members adhered to, SOPs and ROEs to ensure route security. For example,

_____ and updates on the intelligence picture was constantly sought by the convoy commander to ensure situational awareness.

- a. PRT Ptl Coy SOPs, Ex 044.
 - b. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 75 – 76, 80 – 81, 84, 89 and 100.
 - c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 3 – 8, 31 and 32.
 - d. Testimony of MCpl Anthony, Ex 050, pp 12 – 15, 17,18 and 21 - 23.
 - e. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 9 - 12.
94. Fact 4: There was appropriate consideration to the
- a. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 32 - 34.
 - b. Testimony of MCpl Anthony, Ex 050, pp 22 and 23.
 - c. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 20 – 21, 26 – 29, 84 and 88.
 - d. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 9 - 12.

ANALYSIS

95. The convoy and its members adhered to SOPs with no deviations. Testimony revealed that personnel had a comprehensive understanding of all procedures and how to execute them. This included the use of ROEs as a route security measure. In considering alternative routes, the convoy commander made a deliberate analysis of _____ using available information and intelligence. Due to his consideration of this data, he made an appropriate decision to select

_____ The patrol commander briefed all convoy members to ensure they had a high level of situational awareness to maximize the security of the convoy.

FINDING I

96. Required Finding: The adequacy of the coalition and CF response to the incident (TOR para 8i).

97. Finding: The CF and coalition response to the incident was exceptional.

SUPPORTING FACTS

98. Fact 1: The QRF
- a. PRT Ptl Coy SOPs, Ex 044.
 - b. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 023, p 28.
99. Fact 2: The reinforced QRF after the contact report.
- a. PRT TOC Radio Logbook, Ex 029.
100. Fact 3: The proximity of the attack (i.e. loud explosion and smoke cloud) provided early warning to PRT personnel in CNS.
- a. Testimony of Sgt Côté, Ex 060, p 3.
 - b. Testimony of Sgt Rude, Ex 059, pp 2 and 14.
 - c. Testimony of Maj Zilkalns, Ex 058, p 4.
 - d. Testimony of Capt Forestier, Ex 064, pp 3 - 4.
101. Fact 4: The initial QRF response vehicles did not have “jaws of life,” which were perceived as necessary to extract an injured person from the damaged vehicle. Therefore, a request was sent to the PRT for the subject tool to be sent with the next responding convoy.
- a. Testimony of Sgt Côté, Ex 060, p 17.
 - b. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, p 9.
 - c. PRT TOC Radio Logbook, Ex 029.
102. Fact 5: The first casualty was evacuated from the scene at approximately
- a. PRT TOC Radio Logbook, Ex 029.
 - b. Testimony of MCpl Kotuk, Ex 051, pp 12 - 13.
 - b. Testimony of Maj Zilkalns, Ex 058, pp 3 – 10 and 52.
 - c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 22.
103. Fact 6: All NIS investigators were located at KAF. They did not respond because the one remaining escort section available was held in reserve as QRF. Moreover, the NIS could

not launch by themselves because

Sgt MacDougall (PRT MP) and Cpl Hart (RCMP)

were used to investigate the site in lieu.

- a. Testimony of Sgt Bolduc, Ex 015, pp 2 -12.
- b. Testimony of Capt Gilchrist, Ex 062, pp 43 - 49.
- c. Testimony of Capt Murray, Ex 072, pp 13 - 15 and 26 - 27.
- d. Testimony of Maj Malejczuk, Ex 021, p 17.
- e. Testimony of Sgt MacDougall, Ex 068, pp 19 -20.

104. Fact 7: NIS received blast site evidence from responding EOD assets, convoy members, as well as Sgt MacDougall and Cpl Hart, who were dispatched from the PRT.

- a. Testimony of Sgt Bolduc, Ex 015, pp 2 -12.
- b. Testimony of Capt Gilchrist, Ex 062, pp 46 and 47.
- c. Testimony of Capt Murray, Ex 072, pp 5 - 10.
- d. Testimony of Sgt MacDougall, Ex 068, pp 20 - 22.

105. Fact 8:

- a. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, p 47.
- b. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, pp 12 - 14.
- c. Testimony of Sgt Côté, Ex 060, p 23.
- d. PRT Establishment (TO&E), Ex 084.

106. Fact 9: The effectiveness of the medical treatment and evacuation chain had a significant impact on the outcome of all three seriously injured personnel. This was reflected at all levels, starting with “buddy care” (e.g. application of tourniquet at scene), through

at the PRT UMS prior to aerial medical evacuation (i.e. all three casualties were evacuated within at KAF “Charlie Med” facilities, to

Landstuhl Germany through to at the University of Alberta. In short, the ability to stabilize, intubate and receive intensive care (i.e. within 24 hrs) was due to the efficiency of the medical evacuation process.

- a. Medical records and Exs 075, 076 and 077
- b. Testimony of LCdr Nesbitt, Ex 096, pp

- c. Testimony of Maj Withers, Ex 094, pp
 - d. Testimony of Capt Patterson, Ex 063, p13.
 - e. Testimony of Capt Forestier, Ex 064, p 15.
 - f. AAR of AIRMEDEVAC team, Ex 078.
107. Fact 10: Mortuary affairs were conducted through American facilities.
- a. Testimony of Capt Patterson, Ex 063, pp 10 -11.
 - b. Testimony of Cpl Laton, Ex 067, pp 2 - 4.
 - c. Testimony of Maj Goodman, Ex 082, pp 54 – 55.
108. Fact 11: The remains of Mr. Glyn Berry were evacuated
- a. Testimony of Capt Patterson, Ex 063, pp 10 - 11.
 - b. Testimony of Cpl Laton, Ex 067, pp 9 - 11.
109. Fact 12: The section involved in the attack was removed from the PRT soon after and deployed out of theatre to perform escort duties They remained in London for 10 days until this mission was complete and they were then repatriated to Canada.
- a. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 72 - 74.
 - b. Testimony of MCpl Kotuk, Ex 051 pp 30 - 32.
 - c. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 82 - 86.
 - d. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 118 - 121.

ANALYSIS

110. Overall, the response to the incident was exceptional. The proximity of the attack to the PRT clearly assisted the response. Upon hearing the explosion and seeing the plume of smoke, all responders immediately sought direction from the tactical operations centre and readied the necessary assets. The QRF departed within of the contact report . Notwithstanding the exceptional response, the immediate actions of the patrol members were instrumental in saving the lives of the seriously injured personnel. Their courageous, professional and rapid response was impressive. All members reflected the highest standards of soldiering.

111. The need for multi-disciplined investigative capability (e.g. MP, NIS, EOD) is unquestioned in this incident. However, the approach was fragmented and lacked a common purpose. Each investigative body conducted an independent investigation, and the NIS was unable to dispatch its personnel to the scene to investigate the blast site. Instead they had to rely on proxy investigators. As a result, they were not able to ensure the collection, care and preservation of evidence according to NIS SOPs.

112.

113. The medical response and evacuation chain was extremely effective. Medical personnel credited immediate care and rapid evacuation at the site for saving the lives of the seriously injured. Transport and follow on care from the PRT UMS through to evacuation and treatment in Canada was efficient and effective. In fact, it impacted directly on positive prognosis of recovery for all three seriously injured service personnel.

FINDING J

114. Required Finding: The cause(s) of the injuries and death (medical causes) (TOR para 8j).

115. Finding: The mechanism of injuries and cause of death are consistent with the described incident.

SUPPORTING FACTS

116. Fact 1: _____ was involved in a VBIED incident on 15 Jan 2006. He was transported to the PRT UMS and subsequently evacuated to the American "Charlie Med" medical facility at KAF.

- a. Testimony of Capt Patterson, Ex 063, pp 8 - 9.
- b. Testimony of Capt Forestier, Ex 064, p 5.
- c. Testimony of _____ Ex 066, pp 45 and 54 - 57.
- d. Medical Records – _____ Ex 075.

117. Fact 2: _____ was involved in a VBIED incident on 15 Jan 06. He was transported to the PRT UMS and subsequently evacuated to the “Charlie Med” medical facility.

- a. Testimony of Capt Patterson, Ex 063, pp 8 - 9.
- b. Testimony of Capt Forestier, Ex 064, pp 6 - 7.
- c. Medical Records – _____, Ex 076.

118. Fact 3: _____ was involved in a VBIED incident on 15 Jan 06. He was transported to the PRT UMS and subsequently evacuated to the “Charlie Med” medical facility.

- a. Testimony of Capt Patterson, Ex 063, pp 8 - 9.
- b. Testimony of Capt Forestier, Ex 064, pp 6 - 7.
- c. Medical Records – _____, Ex 077.

119. Fact 4: Mr. Berry was involved in a VBIED incident on 15 Jan 06.

- a. Autopsy Report – Berry, Ex 081.
- b. Testimony of Capt Patterson, Ex 063, p 4.

ANALYSIS

120. The pattern of injuries described by the witnesses, medical records and report of autopsy are consistent with those expected of personnel involved in this type of incident. The forcible ejection from the vehicle was of sufficient energy to have caused extensive injury. Similarly, personnel trapped in the vehicle would have sustained substantial injury.

FINDING K

121. Required Finding: Whether the injured Foreign Affairs Canada and CF members were on duty at the time of the injuries and death (TOR para 8k).

122. Finding: All injured and deceased members of the CF and FAC were on duty at the time of injuries and death.

SUPPORTING FACTS

123. Fact 1: The CF members were on a Leadership Engagement patrol at the time of the attack under the lawful authority of the PRT Commander and by orders given by OC Ptl Coy.

- a. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 12 – 17 and 23 - 25.
- b. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 023, pp 5 – 6 and 9.
- c. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 21 – 25, 51 – 54 and 75 – 76.
- d. 15 Jan 06 Ptl Orders, Ex 044.

124. Fact 2: Mr Berry was participating in this patrol as part of his mandate as a member of the PRT under the written direction of the Director General Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force Secretariat FAC.

- a. Mr Berry's Employment Letter, dated 21 Nov 05, Ex 012.
- b. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 4 – 11, 12 – 17 and 22 - 25.
- c. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 21 – 25 and 75 – 76.

125. Fact 3: None of the members of the CF or FAC was on leave or "off duty" at the time of the attack.

- a. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 4-11, 12 – 17 and 22 – 25.
- b. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 21 – 25 and 75 - 76.

- c. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 023, pp 5 – 6 and 9.
- d. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, pp 1 - 2.

ANALYSIS

126. Paragraph 28 of CFAO 24-6 does not define “on duty”. The determination of duty status is a conclusion based on several factors and must have a wide interpretation. In the suicide VBIED attack of 15 Jan 06, all members of that patrol were engaged in a clearly defined, routine military task under the lawful authority of the Commander’s orders and direction of the Government of Canada to engage local Afghan officials as part of the PRT mandate. They were not on leave and were not “off duty”. In light of the circumstances, it can be readily concluded that the members were on duty at the time of the injuries and death.

FINDING L

127. Required Finding: Whether the deceased or injured personnel or any other person was to blame for the injuries and death (TOR para 81).

128. Finding: None of the deceased or injured personnel was to blame for the injuries and death. The injuries and death to members of the CF and FAC are directly attributable to the actions of the suicide bomber.

SUPPORTING FACTS

129. Fact 1: This incident was an opportunistic and deliberate attack on a coalition military patrol by an unidentified suicide bomber.

- a. Intelligence Assessment, Ex 014.
- b. Testimony of Maj Roach, Ex 022, p 35.
- c. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 21 and 22.
- d. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 86 - 89.

130. Fact 2: The suicide bomber maintained complete control over the time, place and target selection.

- a. Testimony of Maj Heron, Ex 006, pp 34 and 35.
- b. CEXC Report, Ex 037.
- c. Testimony of Maj Roach, Ex 022, pp 35 and 36.
- d. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 21 - 24.

- e. Testimony of WO2 Slater, Ex 008, pp 15 - 17.

131. Fact 3: The suicide VBIED that was the weapon used in this attack was detonated by the driver of the suicide vehicle.

- a. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, pp 10 - 12.
- b. Cdn EOD Post Blast Report, Ex 037, p 5.
- c. CEXC Report, Ex 037.

132. Fact 4: The injuries and death were caused by the explosion of the suicide VBIED and consequent secondary effects to the vehicle and occupants.

- a. Medical records – Exs 075, 076, 077.
- b. Autopsy Report – Berry, Ex 081.

ANALYSIS

133. This attack was a hostile and criminal act committed by an unidentified terrorist who had complete control over the time and place of the attack and also the selection of the target. The members of the patrol were operating under the established SOPs for convoy and patrol operations. They had no explicit warning of the attack; neither did they contribute to the attack. As such, the members of the patrol cannot be found at blame for the incident.

FINDING M

134. Required Finding: Whether the injuries and death were attributable to military service or service to the Government of Canada (TOR para 8m).

135. Finding: The injuries to and death of the members of the CF and FAC were attributable to military service and service to the Government of Canada.

SUPPORTING FACTS

136. Fact 1: On 15 Jan 06, all members were participating in a Leadership Engagement patrol on the lawful authority of Task Force Commander and the Government of Canada under the OP ARCHER mandate.

- a. See Finding A, Fact 1 above.
- b. See Finding D, Fact 1 above.

137. Fact 2: The attack on the patrol took place in Kandahar Afghanistan and such was situated in the OP ARCHER theatre of operations.

- a. Map of Kandahar, Ex 002.

138. Fact 3. OP ARCHER was conducted within the Special Duty Area established by the Governor in Council in the Order Amending the Special Duty Area Pension Order, P.C. 2003-690 dated 15 May 03.

- a. Special Duty Area Pension Order, P.C. 2003-690, Ex 001.

139. Fact 4. The Special Duty Area Pension Order was made pursuant to the *Pension Act*.

- a. *Pension Act*, s. 91.1(1).

140. Fact 5. S. 21 of the *Pension Act*, S.C. 2000, c.34, s.40 attributes injury and death to military service if those injuries or death occur in a Special Duty Area.

- a. *Pension Act*, s. 21.

ANALYSIS

141. The Leadership Engagement patrol of 15 Jan 06 was lawfully operating in a part of Afghanistan within the authorised Canadian area of operations for OP ARCHER and a designated Special Duty Area for pension purposes. By virtue of their duties on that date under the OP ARCHER mandate and the lawful orders of the PRT Commander, the patrol was engaging military service. In addition, under the terms of the Special Duty Pension Order, the patrol's activities were brought within the meaning of military service in a special duty area as laid out in the *Pension Act*.

FINDING N

142. Required Finding: The circumstances surrounding the injuries and death including the cause, date, time and location of the incident (TOR para 8n).

143. Finding: The injuries and death of the patrol members was caused by a suicide VBIED, which was detonated by the unidentified vehicle driver beside the second vehicle in a four-vehicle convoy at 1325 hrs at _____ just to the WEST of the gates to the City of Kandahar, in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. At the time of the attack, the members were returning to Kandahar after completing a Leadership Engagement patrol to the village of Takh teh Pol, which is 20 km SOUTH EAST of KAF and within the PRT Area of Operations.

SUPPORTING FACTS

144. Fact 1: The attack to occurred at 1325 hrs 15 Jan 06, at _____ in the City of Kandahar.

- a. _____) Significant Incident Report, dated 15 Jan 06, Ex 043.

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b. PRT Command Net Logbook, Ex 029.

145. Fact 2: The injuries and death were caused by a suicide VBIED

1 of the second "G" Wagon in the four-vehicle
patrol.

a. CEXC Report, Ex 037.

b. Cdn EOD Post Blast Report, Ex 037, pp 1 - 3 and 5.

c. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, pp 23 - 24.

146. Fact 3: The blast and fragmentation of the device and the secondary effects of the vehicle rolling over caused the injuries to the three CF members.

a. Medical records – , Exs 075, 076, 077.

b. Autopsy Report – Berry, Ex 081

ANALYSIS

147. At approximately 1325 hrs, a Toyota Van (1989-1992 vintage) laden with approximately

was hidden amongst numerous taxi cabs which normally congregated in this area along Highway 1. As the lead vehicle of the convoy passed the taxi stand, the suicide bomber quickly pulled out, merged abreast with the second vehicle of the convoy and detonated. The detonation hit the second vehicle; the up-armoured "G" Wagon at its a

and the explosion itself combined with the forward momentum and the raised median caused the "G" Wagon to flip into the air, where it did a number of rolls, and landed on its side approximately 20 metres away on the opposite side of the road.

FINDING O

148. Required Finding: Whether the incident was preventable (TOR para 8o).

149. Finding: The incident was not preventable.

SUPPORTING FACTS

150. Fact 1: The anti-coalition forces were largely invisible and blended in with the local population.

- a. Intelligence Assessment, Ex 014.
151. Fact 2: Suicide bombers maintained the initiative and conviction to attack coalition forces. They could decide when, where, how and who to attack.
- a. Testimony of WO2 Slater, Ex 008, pp 4 and 6 - 10.
 - b. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 21 - 24.
152. Fact 3: Highway 1 is a target rich environment for suicide VBIED attacks. The heavy congestion of vehicle traffic along with the numerous pedestrians, bicycles and fruit carts
- a. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, p 21.
 - b. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 30.
 - c. Testimony of Maj Roach, Ex 022, pp 35 and 36.
 - d. Testimony of Maj Zilkalns, Ex 058, pp 48 - 50.
 - e. CEXC Report, Ex 037.
 - f. Intelligence Perspective and Intelligence Tracker, Ex 046.
153. Fact 4: All Patrol commanders
- a. See Finding B Fact 2 above.
154. Fact 5: The PRT conducted over 1,800 patrols up to the time of the incident.
- a. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 023, pp 31-32.
 - b. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 86-89.
155. Fact 6: As a minimum, up-armoured vehicles were utilized for all patrols / convoys.
- a. PRT Ptl Coy SOPs, Ex 044.
 - b. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 023, p 14.
 - c. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 4 - 9.
 - d. Testimony of Maj Malejczuk, Ex 021, p 7.
 - e. Testimony of Maj Zilkalns, Ex 058, pp 18 - 20.

156. Fact 7: Status of routes even when proven / recce completed become suspect once friendly forces depart. Only constant surveillance can minimize this risk.

- a. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, pp 37 and 38.
- b. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 78 and 79.
- c. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, p 112.

157. Fact 8: There are limited routes available and all are heavily travelled by coalition forces, which creates a target rich environment for hostile forces.

- a. Map of Kandahar, Ex 002.
- b. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 84 – 86 and 111.
- c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 29 and 30.
- d. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, p 21.
- e. Testimony of Maj Zilkalns, Ex 058, p 20.

ANALYSIS

158. (C) The operational security environment in which the PRT must operate is threat laden. during patrols or en route to specific destinations. will inherently expose coalition convoys to attack.

Determining which is a threat and which is simply the reality of an impoverished third world country is extremely difficult to differentiate, particularly by soldiers who have multiple responsibilities within the framework of a convoy.

In the end, suicide bombers who are intent on killing themselves, and who have the initiative of when, where, who and how they will attack pose a formidable challenge to CF and Coalition forces.

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION A

159. Requirement: What changes, if any, are required to the policies and procedures for planning for, and conduct of, this type of operation (TOR para 9a).

160. Recommendation: A standardized concerted pre-deployment training process that tailors requirements to special mission areas and the tasks to be completed should be maintained. It should be developed and managed through the use of specialist working groups tasked with designing the required activities, briefings, and skill requirements.

161. Analysis/Comment: Prior to any new deployment, or particularly any new type of deployment (e.g. 3D, PRT) great effort should be put into the planning of pre-deployment training. Less emphasis must be placed on training plans based on previous rotations or other missions and the personal experiences of those with dated and / or different operational experience. A special working group composed of SMEs, with both theoretical and practical expertise (in regard to the mission, tasks to be conducted, and the operational environment) should supplement the work normally done by the G3 staff of the responsible headquarters for arranging the training. Often existing packages from previous rotations or from current operations are used with little emphasis (often due to time and resource constraints and expertise) on actually conducting in-depth analysis of the new mission. Specifically in cases where entirely new missions are planned, the pre-deployment training process could greatly benefit from an integrated specialist cadre mandated to examine the mission, environment, potential tasks and analogous operations conducted by Allied nations. They should seek out the necessary expertise and design specific training, briefings and practical and realistic scenarios. This system would ensure continuity and standardization of training for deployment. In addition, since success in the new environment requires a totally integrated approach in the operational theatre, all participants in a mission should train together prior to deploying. Though training (or lack of it) was not a contributing factor to Mr Berry's death, every effort should be made to ensure that all participants of a mission (e.g. CF, FAC, RCMP, CIDA, etc) undergo individual and collective training with a strengthened focus on integrated training together.

RECOMMENDATION A1

162. Recommendation: Pre-deployment medical training should include Tactical Combat Casualty courses for increased numbers of personnel deploying overseas to ensure effective response to mass casualty situations on patrols or convoys.

163. Analysis/Comments: Witnesses commented on the lack of sufficiently qualified personnel to react to a mass casualty situation, particularly when medical staff become casualties themselves. Redundancy of adequately medically qualified personnel should not be a luxury in special duty areas. Furthermore, this type of training should be taken by all ranks, regardless of appointment.

RECOMMENDATION A2

164. Recommendation: Armoured (minimum) vehicles and / or helicopters should be used to transport personnel in high-risk areas or during times of elevated threat.

165. Analysis/Comment: The Board recommends that due to the high risk of roadside IEDs, VBIEDs and ambush, that armoured (minimum vehicles such as the Nyala, AVGP Bison and or LAV III be used for patrolling or personnel transport in high-risk areas, specifically in Kandahar. In addition, helicopters should also be used to transport individuals wherever possible. This approach will mitigate the risk since the threat of suicide bombers and IEDs cannot be eliminated. However, the Board recognizes that this may not be possible in some urban settings due to narrow roads, alleys and traffic congestion. In addition, the Board recommends that convoys travelling through high-risk areas, such as the route between KAF and

Kandahar City, be centrally controlled, extremely robust and offensively orientated. Specifically, air cover providing surveillance

capable of quick pursuit and intervention. They would be able to react to any suspicious persons in the area or any ambushers following up on an IED strike. In addition, the convoy should contain the necessary combat power to not only react defensively to an attack but also pursue hostile forces (e.g. ambushers and / or controllers). Constant pressure must be maintained to ensure that hostile forces cannot strike with impunity.

RECOMMENDATION A3

166. Recommendation: As a default position, ANA and/or ANP forces should be an integral element of patrols / convoys unless circumstances dictate otherwise.

167. Analysis/Comments: The use of ANA / ANP forces integral to a convoy serves a number of purposes:

- a. Establishes a “personal” stake in the security of routes and military operations;
- b. Furnishes experience to ANA / ANP forces;
- c. Provides a national presence (i.e. civil jurisdiction);
- d. Provides host nation forces capable of detaining individuals;
- e. Creates an impression of coalition operations in assistance to the ANA / ANP;
- f. Builds cooperation and cohesion with coalition forces;
- g. Provides additional forces for security and follow on operations;
- h. Provides intimate knowledge of terrain, local populace and customs; and
- i. Can provide some additional translation capability.

great value can be derived from their presence and effort should be expended in both using these forces and increasing their ability to be used in such a fashion. In addition, the use of dedicated contracted security forces, such as the contracted PRT Security force should also be investigated.

RECOMMENDATION A4

168. Recommendation: A surveillance plan should be undertaken of high-risk areas

169. Analysis/Comment: Although often the initiative lies with the hostile forces (e.g. suicide bombers and ambushers) the risk can be further mitigated / managed by surveillance. Within the context of the Afghanistan security environment there are specific higher threat areas

resource constraints are always an issue, alternate methodologies should be employed to mitigate high threat areas. Although should be employed to mitigate high threat areas. close to high-threat areas.

Key is the ability to actively observe, identify and react expeditiously to possible threats. It is critical to ensure that a system / process is in place that puts pressure on potential attackers. They should not be able to loiter or have freedom of movement. They must consciously be looking over their shoulders at all times.

RECOMMENDATION A5

170. Recommendation: Increase security and effectiveness of ANA / ANP check points throughout the region. Vehicles should be more effectively searched, coalition forces should take a more active interest and role in check point operations,

171. Analysis/Comments: Effectiveness and efficiency of checkpoints is

Security could be dramatically improved if a more rigorous and cooperative approach was adopted. Joint operations between coalition and Host Nation forces should be undertaken.

RECOMMENDATION A6

172. Recommendation: Increase situational awareness of all patrols in regard to friendly forces (i.e. coordinate patrols, routes, activities through such technology as

173. Analysis/Comments:

A coordinated approach to all activity would enhance route selection, as well as security (i.e. rapid response in event of a crisis).

RECOMMENDATION A7

174. Recommendation: Create and utilize multi-disciplined integrated investigative teams with an inclusive mandate to investigate incidents as required.

175. Analysis/Comment: Several agencies are currently responsible for investigating incidents (e.g. NIS, EOD, RCMP). All respond independently but often lack the mobility or security to deploy. Creation of an integrated team / mechanism would reduce the amount of resources required to mount them, enhance the quality of the investigation, promote a more cooperative and integrative approach, as well as minimize exposure / time on scene. It should also reduce the required time to complete investigations.

RECOMMENDATION B

176. Requirement: what changes, if any, are required to the policies and procedures used in relation to this incident (TOR para 9b).

177. Recommendation: Armoured (minimum Level 3) vehicles and / or helicopters should be used to transport personnel in high-threat areas or during times of elevated threat.

178. Analysis/Comment: See Recommendation A above.

RECOMMENDATION B1

179. Recommendation: A coordinated, layered active route surveillance plan of high risk areas should be undertaken.

180. Analysis/Comment: See Recommendation A3 above. In addition, the use of temporary checkpoints along high threat routes by combined CF and ANA / ANP forces would provide increased security.

RECOMMENDATION B2

181. Recommendation: A multi-disciplinary approach should be taken in deciding whether a repatriation of individuals involved in traumatic incidents should be made. As such, care should be taken to ensure that the benefits often associated with remaining with one's unit are not lost. In addition, when a decision to repatriate is made, there should be no delay in getting the individuals home.

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182. Analysis/Comment: The survivors of the section involved in the attack were given short notice that they would be returning to Canada after accompanying the remains of Mr. Berry to London as the funeral escort and bearer party. However, the funeral arrangements necessitated an unforecasted ten-day stay in England before members could return to Canada. Members of the section, including its leadership, strongly resented the decision to repatriate them to Canada. They felt the separation from their platoon/company deprived them of an important source of emotional support. The long stay in England only exacerbated their frustration. Individuals involved in traumatic incidents should remain in theatre with their units and be evaluated individually. If an individual requires repatriation it should occur quickly.

RECOMMENDATION C

183. Requirement: What changes, if any, are required to the policies and procedures for the use of Personal Protective Equipment (TOR para 9c).

184. Recommendation: All civilians and military personnel in theatre and on temporary duty should be issued with ballistic glasses.

185. Analysis/Comment: Overall the policies and procedures for the use of PPE are excellent. However, witnesses stated that civilian members and personnel on temporary duty within theatre were not issued with ballistic eyewear. Part of this is explained by the lack of the RX (prescription) version that was fielded after the incident. Ballistic glasses are an essential piece of equipment for personal safety reasons. In fact, travel outside camp boundaries is currently prohibited if individuals do not have the ballistic glasses.

RECOMMENDATION D

186. Requirement: What changes, if any, are required to the policies and procedures for optimizing the security of routes (TOR para 9d).

187. Recommendation: A series of initiatives such as the use of armoured vehicles (minimum surveillance plan (, more effective ANA/ANP check points, and cooperative operations with ANA/ANP patrols should be undertaken.

188. Analysis / Comment: See Recommendations A1-A4 above.

RECOMMENDATION D1

189. Recommendation:

190. Analysis/Comment:

RECOMMENDATION E

191. Requirement: What measures, if any, should be taken to reduce the likelihood of a similar occurrence in the future (TOR para 9e).

192. Recommendation: A series of initiatives such as the use of armoured vehicles (minimum), more effective ANA/ANP check points, cooperative operations with ANA/ANP patrols, and a pay for information / munitions / weapons program should be undertaken.

193. Analysis / Comment: See Recommendations A1-A4 and D1.

RECOMMENDATION F

194. Requirement: Any recommendations regarding preventive actions or corrective measures with regard to the use of this type of vehicle (TOR para 9f).

195. Recommendation: Testing of the "G" Wagon against IED blast effects should be undertaken to determine if any modifications are required. Specific areas to investigate are:

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.

196. Analysis / Comment: Suicide bombers appear to be using increasingly large amounts of explosives in their attacks. The "G" Wagon's

Further testing and possible alteration of the vehicles protective capabilities may mitigate the effects of future attacks.

List of Annexes

Annex A	Convening Order/Terms of Reference
Annex B	Not allocated
Annex C	Not allocated
Annex D	Not allocated
Annex E	List of Witnesses and Evidence Register
Annex F	Master Question Matrix

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Annex A

Kandahar Suicide Bombing Board of Inquiry

1080-1 (COS J3)

7 February 2006

Distribution List

CONVENING ORDER – BOARD OF INQUIRY (BOI)

DEATHS AND INJURIES – SUICIDE BOMBER

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN, 15 JAN 2006

- References:
- A. Section 45 National Defence Act (NDA) “Boards of Inquiry”
 - B. Q R & O Chapter 21
 - C. CFAO 24-6, “Investigation of Injuries or Death”
 - D. DAOD 7002 Series, “Boards of Inquiry and Summary Investigations”
 - E. DAOD 7004 Series, “Claims by or against the Crown”
 - F. Policy on Claims and Ex gratia Payments, Treasury Board
 - G. CANFORGEN 175/05 ADM (HR-MIL) 078 101517Z NOV 05

1. A Board of Inquiry (BOI), composed of the Canadian Forces (CF) and Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) members identified below, shall assemble at the call of the President, no later than 15 February 2006, to investigate the death of a FAC member and injuries to CF personnel by an apparent suicide bomber in Kandahar, Afghanistan on 15 January 2006. The Board’s investigation shall consider relevant operational factors that may have contributed to the incident.

- a. President – _____, Col B. Horn, CDA/CFLI;
- b. Member – Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn, Foreign Affairs Canada;
- c. Member – _____ LCol D.U. Perrin, DCPEP;
- d. Member – _____, Maj W. Glenfield, CDI; and
- e. Member – _____, CWO E.J. Gapp, CTC.

2. The following persons have been designated to advise the BOI:

- a. Legal Advisor - _____ Maj C. Waters. The Board shall provide the draft report to the Legal Advisor for review prior to submission to the Convening Authority.
- b. Medical Advisor –] _____ Maj A.B. Currie, DGHS.

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- c. Public Affairs Advisor Maj J.S.Y. Généreux, QG SQFT
- d. Explosives Advisor. CWO D.S. Garrison, J4 Ammo.
- e. Administrative Support. , MCpl J.F.J.M. Fournier, GMS.

3. The BOI shall be conducted in accordance with references A to G and any other relevant orders and directives. The purpose of the Board will be two-fold: to report on and recommend measures to improve general operational readiness and effectiveness, and to make findings about the factors contributing to the death or injury to all personnel.

4. The Board will not commence its work until the President and members have received the appropriate training from the Director of the Administrative Investigation Support Centre (AISC) or his representative. The Board Legal Advisor should be present during this training. The Board may request assistance from the AISC regarding its draft board report and staff action plan prior to submitting its final report to the Convening Authority.

5. The BOI shall investigate the following matters:

- a. The circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Glyn Berry, civilian, Foreign Affairs Canada

- b. The circumstances surrounding the injuries of:

- (1) 1 Fd Amb;

- (2) 1 CER; and

- (3) 3 PPCLI

- c. The BOI shall also obtain the following documentary evidence:

- (1) any autopsy report;

- (2) a copy of the death certificate;

- (3) any medical examiner's or coroner's report, and

- (4) all CF 98 "Report of Injuries or Exposure to Toxic Material".

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6. The BOI shall:
 - a. identify all appropriate individuals who may assist the BOI with its inquiries;
 - b. obtain statements from all witnesses;
 - c. obtain and consider all relevant records and documentary evidence including parallel investigations or analyses of a tactical or technical nature; and
 - d. where an expert witness gives evidence based upon a technical report, attach that technical report to the records of proceedings of the BOI.
7. The BOI may liaise with other Canadian or Coalition investigatory bodies.
8. The BOI shall make findings as to:
 - a. the details of the operation being conducted by the members at the time of the incident;
 - b. the adequacy of the planning of the operation including access to available intelligence;
 - c. the adequacy of the training and other preparation for the operation;
 - d. the orders and direction that were being followed at the time of the incident;
 - e. the type of equipment (including transport equipment and Personal Protective Equipment) that the members were operating with or using at the time of the incident and the adequacy and appropriateness of the use of the equipment at that time;
 - f. whether the equipment was being used in an appropriate manner by the members at the time of the incident;
 - g. the adequacy of the procedures for optimizing the security of routes to be traveled by CF members in the AOR;
 - h. the adequacy of the procedures for optimizing the security of the route upon which members were traveling at the time of the incident;
 - i. the adequacy of the coalition and CF response to the incident;
 - j. the cause(s) of the injuries and death (medical causes);

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- k. whether the injured Foreign Affairs Canada and CF members were on duty at the time of the injuries and death;
 - l. whether the deceased or injured personnel or any other person was to blame for the injuries and death; and
 - m. whether the injuries and death were attributable to military service or service to the Government of Canada;
 - n. the circumstances surrounding the injuries and death including the cause, date, time and location of the incident; and
 - o. whether the incident was preventable.
9. Recommendations shall be made with respect to:
 - a. what changes, if any, are required to the policies and procedures for planning for, and conduct of, this type of operation;
 - b. what changes, if any, are required to the policies and procedures used in relation to this incident;
 - c. what changes, if any, are required to the policies and procedures for the use of Personal Protective Equipment;
 - d. what changes, if any, are required to the policies and procedures for optimizing the security of routes;
 - e. what measures, if any, should be taken to reduce the likelihood of a similar occurrence in the future; and
 - f. any recommendations regarding preventive actions or corrective measures with regard to the use of this type of vehicle.
10. If, at any time during the deliberations of the Board, issues of critical and/or time-sensitive operational importance are revealed, they are to be referred to the Convening Authority at the earliest possible opportunity.
11. Should the BOI receive evidence that it reasonably believes relates to an allegation of a criminal act or a breach of the Code of Service Discipline, the BOI shall adjourn, the Convening Authority shall be notified and the matter will be referred to the Legal Advisor for advice.
12. A BOI must inquire into all matters referred to it for investigation. If, during the course of an investigation, a matter arises which raises issues involving the propriety of a Military Police

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investigation or other Military Police-related conduct, the matter shall be forwarded to the Convening Authority for further disposition.

13. Where a prospective witness:
- a. is currently the subject of a criminal (police) investigation;
 - b. has been or is about to be charged with an offence under the *National Defence Act* or other Canadian Law; or
 - c. has been arrested or detained in respect of an alleged act or omission which could constitute such an offence,

the prospective witness shall not be compelled to give evidence before the BOI in relation to the subject matter of the police investigation, charge, arrest or detention. Where the gathering of such evidence is deemed critical to the successful completion of the investigation, the Convening Authority shall be notified and legal advice sought prior to any action to compel such testimony, recognizing that compelling such testimony in such circumstances could have the effect of jeopardizing subsequent disciplinary proceedings. If it appears to the Board, at any time, that the evidence may justify the laying of a charge, the President shall adjourn, notify the Convening Authority and seek the advice of the Legal Advisor prior to taking any further action.

14. The President shall insure that the proceedings and activities of the BOI are conducted in such a manner as to strike the appropriate balance between the interest of the public's need to be informed of the BOI's progress, and the public's interest in ensuring security, privacy, operational and international relations requirements. This direction is to make available as much information as is appropriate and reasonable. In accordance with QR&O 21.12(c), the President may permit the attendance of persons with a direct and substantial interest in the BOI concerning death or injury.

15. Families. The Convening Authority will be sending each family (coordinated with FAC) a letter informing them that a BOI has been convened and introducing the President. The President shall, henceforth, ensure that families are periodically briefed regarding the inquiry progress either personally or through assisting officers. The President may allow the families to observe the BOI proceedings when, in his opinion, the Law and the circumstances allow him to do so.

16. Should the President require clarification or amendment to this Convening Order, he shall so notify the Convening Authority.

17. The minimum designation of this investigation is PROTECTED B. Should the board gather evidence of a classified nature the report shall assume the classification of the most sensitive evidence gathered. All requests by the public for information concerning the BOI shall

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be referred to the Director of Access to Information and Privacy (DAIP) and National Defence Headquarters.

18. Fund Centre 0150AE, Cost Centre 0150AE, Fund L101, GL 2106, IO 1312360, Commitment A0150AE647.

19. The minutes of proceedings must be delivered in triplicate (a paper copy and two electronic copies, a locked Portable Document Format (pdf) and Microsoft Word (doc) format) to the undersigned, no later than 15 April 2006. Should it prove impossible to complete the proceedings within that time, a written explanation must be submitted before the due date.

//OSB//

M.J. Ward

BGen

DCDS COS J3

COS Ops CEFCOM

992-6191

Distribution List

Action

Col B. Horn, CDA

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Maj A.B. Currie, DGHS

Maj J.S.Y. Généreux, QG SQFT

Maj W. Glenfield, CDI

Maj C.S.M. Waters, JAG

CWO E.J. Gapp, CTC

CWO D.S. Garrison, J4 Ammo

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Annex A

Kandahar Suicide Bombing Board of Inquiry

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Annex E
Kandahar Suicide Bombing Board of Inquiry
Annex E – List of Evidence

Sequence #	Date Received	Received From	Title/Topic	Notes
001	14 Feb 06	Canada Gazette	Order Amending the Special Duty Area Pension Order P.C. 2003-690 15 May 03	Creates Special Duty Area for operations in Afghanistan
002	15 Feb 06	Sgt Warner	Maps and graphics of Kandahar area	CD ROM from CDI (selected maps extracted for the MOP)
003	21 Feb 06	LCdr McCallum and Capt Jobin	Transcript	NDCC Duty Watchkeepers
004	21 Feb 06	Maj MacAulay	Transcript	NDCC OP ARCHER desk officer
005	21 Feb 06	Maj MacAulay	Briefing notes	OP ARCHER briefing
006	21 Feb 06	Maj Heron	Transcript	EOD/IED SME
007	21 Feb 06	Maj Heron	EOD/IED briefing notes	Power Point slides
008	21 Feb 06	WO2 Slater (UK)	Transcript	Suicide Bomber SME
009	21 Feb 06	WO2 Slater (UK)	Suicide Bomber briefing	Lecture notes
010	21 Feb 06	Erin Dorgan	Transcript	PRT FAC field officer
011	22 Feb 06	Ross Hynes	Transcript	Director General START – FAC
012	22 Feb 06	Ross Hynes	Mr Berry's Employment Letter dated 21 Nov 05, FAC PRT Mandate and PRT Political Section Terms of Reference	
013		Not allocated		
014	22 Feb 06	Maj Dowell and Mr Agnew	Briefing notes	Int Assessment
015	23 Feb 06	Sgt Bolduc	Transcript	TFA CFNIS Det (at KAF)
016	23 Feb 06	Maj St-Jean and Mr Trevors	Transcript	G Wagon Project manager

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Sequence #	Date Received	Received From	Title/Topic	Notes
017	23 Feb 06	Maj St-Jean and Mr Trevors	G Wagon Blast Test (GE)	Stamped as Exhibit #1
018	23 Feb 06	Maj St-Jean and Mr Trevors	Evaluation of Ballistic Protection of the LUVW by DRDC Valcartier	Stamped as Exhibit #2
019	23 Feb 06	Maj St-Jean and Mr Trevors	STANAG 4569 Land (Ed 1) Protection Levels for Occupants of Logistic and Light Armoured Vehicles 24 May 2004	Issued by NATO Standardization Agency
020	23 Feb 06	Maj St-Jean and Mr Trevors	Information Briefing -- Project L2349 (LUVW)	Power Point slides
021	1 Mar 06	Maj Malejczuk	Transcript	TFA G3
022	1 Mar 06	Maj Roach	() Transcript	TFA G2/CO ASIC
023	2 Mar 06	Col Noonan	Transcript	Cmd TFA
024	2 Mar 06	LCol Anderson	Transcript	TFA COS
025	2 Mar 06	Sgt Turcotte	Transcript	TFA MP P1
026	2 Mar 06	Pam Isfeld	Transcript	PRT FAC field officer
027	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	e-mail re: 15 Jan 06 SVBIED for period 151351Z Jan 06 to 160117L Jan 06	Stamped as TFA# 1
028	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	Land Line Logs for PRT for period 140645L Jan 06 to 152126L Jan 06.	Stamped as TFA# 2
029	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	PRT Command Net Log for the period 151153L Jan 06 to 151604L Jan 06.	Stamped as TFA# 3
030	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	PRT Command Net Log	Stamped as TFA# 4

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Sequence #	Date Received	Received From	Title/Topic	Notes
			for the period 151607L Jan 06 to 161049L Jan 06.	
031	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	Commander PRT concurrence with AAR on SVBIED strike dated 21 Jan 06.	Stamped as TFA# 5
032	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	PRT AAR of TOC Action for 15 Jan 06	Stamped as TFA# 6
033	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	PRT AAR of patrol and on-scene activities for 15 Jan 06	Stamped as TFA# 7
034	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	CF 98 for	Stamped as TFA# 8
035	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	CF 98 for	Stamped as TFA# 9
036	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	CF 98 for	Stamped as TFA# 10
037	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	EOD Ops Log and Post Blast Report SVBIED against Cdn Ptl 15 Jan 06 and CEXC Report	Stamped as TFA# 11
038	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	Written statements of all members of the convoy	Stamped as TFA# 12
039	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	PRT Public Affairs involvement in incident and media releases	Stamped as TFA# 13
040	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	Committee of adjustment dated 23 Jan 06	Stamped as TFA# 14

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Annex E
Kandahar Suicide Bombing Board of Inquiry

Sequence #	Date Received	Received From	Title/Topic	Notes
041	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	RCMP Cpl Hart Report of VBIED incident of 15 Jan 06	Stamped as TFA# 15
042	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	Mass Casualty SOP PRT Frag O 003, Casualty Evacuation and Duties of the Escort Officer	Stamped as TFA# 16
043	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	Significant Incident Report from	Stamped as TFA# 17
044	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	Ptl Coy SOPS that include: Mission Planning Process for Long Range Patrols, City Patrols, tasking proforma, vehicle snatch, QRF Comd responsibilities, suspected IED, IED strike, attacks against patrols causing casualties, mounted patrol configurations and formations, dismounted patrols, duties and responsibilities of patrol members both mounted and dismounted, patrol calendar effective 9 Jan 06, patrol orders issued for 15 Jan by Coy and convoy, patrol report by OC Ptl Coy and	Stamped as TFA# 18

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Kandahar Suicide Bombing Board of Inquiry

Sequence #	Date Received	Received From	Title/Topic	Notes
045	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	statements of convoy personnel regarding IED incident. Images from SVBIED attack 15 Jan 06 by Sgt G.G. Kean PRT PAO Imagery Tech	Stamped as TFA# 19 1 CD ROM (selected images extracted for inclusion in MOP – see Sets 100 - 110 below)
046	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	..., Kandahar Province – An Intelligence Perspective and Significant Incident Tracker	Stamped as TFA# 20 2 CD ROM
047	2 Mar 06	TFA HQ	PRT email chain 15 Jan 06 SVBIED for period 151334L Jan 06 to 152342L Jan 06	Stamped as TFA# 21
048	3 Mar 06	Supt Martin	Email Q&A	PRT RCMP
049	15 Mar 06	MWO Bolen	Transcript	P1 Coy CSM
050	15 Mar 06	MCpl Anthony	Transcript	Convoy member
051	16 Mar 06	MCpl Kotuk	Transcript	Convoy member
052	16 Mar 06	WO Walsh	Transcript	PRT Int Sect
053	16 Mar 06	Pte Gagnon	Transcript	Convoy member
054	17 Mar 06	Cpl Petten	Transcript	Convoy member
055	17 Mar 06	Cpl Wood	Transcript	Convoy member
056	17 Mar 06	Pte Semple	Transcript	Convoy member
057	17 Mar 06	Sgt Eades	Transcript	PRT EOD Sect
058	20 Mar 06	Maj Zilkalns	Transcript	PRT Ops O
059	20 Mar 06	Sgt Rude	Transcript	QRF
060	20 Mar 06	Sgt Cote	Transcript	QRF
061	20 Mar 06	Cpl Elkey	Transcript	QRF medic
062	21 Mar 06	Capt Gilchrist	Transcript	Log Ops Offr KAF

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Kandahar Suicide Bombing Board of Inquiry

Sequence #	Date Received	Received From	Title/Topic	Notes
063	21 Mar 06	Capt Patterson	Transcript	PRT MO
064	21 Mar 06	Capt Forestier	Transcript	PRT MO
065	21 Mar 06		Transcript	Convoy member
066	21 Mar 06		Transcript	Convoy member
067	22 Mar 06	Cpl Laton	Transcript	TFA CFNIS Det
068	22 Mar 06	Sgt MacDougall	Transcript	PRT MP Sgt
069	22 Mar 06	DCDS Web site	DDIO Chapter 12 Annex J Mortuary Affairs Instruction	
070	22 Mar 06	MCpl Thaxter	Transcript	QRF Engr
071	23 Mar 06	Sgt Brink	Transcript	Convoy Comd
072	23 Mar 06	Capt Murray	Transcript	TFA MP Pl
073	23 Mar 06	Maj Lutes	Transcript	OC Pl Coy
074	23 Mar 06	Capt Bedard	Email Q&A	TFA G1
075	24 Mar 06	Glenrose Centre	Medical docs -	
076	24 Mar 06	Glenrose Centre	Medical docs -	
077	24 Mar 06	Glenrose Centre	Medical docs -	
078	24 Mar 06	LFWA HQ	AAR - PRT CASEVAC Undated Jan 06	
079	24 Mar 06	DCDS Ottawa	SJS 001 011430Z Feb 06 - First Aid Training for Deployed Operations	Directs TCCC for pers engaged in combat operations
080	29 Mar 06	Michael Callan	Email Q&A	PRT CIDA
081	29 Mar 06	HM Coroner UK	Autopsy Report - Berry	
082	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	Transcript	DLFR Afghanistan desk offr
083	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	Mounting Order - LFWA Support to OP ARCHER dated 23 Jun 05	
084	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	OP ATHENA ROTO 4 Mounting Instruction dated	

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Sequence #	Date Received	Received From	Title/Topic	Notes
085	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	21 Jan 05 LFWA Mounting Order TFA dated 28 Jul 05	
086	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	DIFR 3051 CLS Force Generation Order 31 Jul 05	
087	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	OPRED Declaration dated 21 Jul 05	
088	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	PRT OPRED Declaration 30 Jun 05	Includes PRT TO&E
089	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	1 CMBG Mounting Directive – PRT 20 Jun 05	
090	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	DCDS Frag O 007 22 Jul 05	
091	30 Mar 06	Maj Goodman	ROEAUTH CDS 003- 2005 19 Oct 05	PRT ROE
092	31 Mar 06	Col Bowes	Transcript	Comd PRT
093	31 Mar 06	Maj King	Transcript	OC CIMIC PRT
094		Not allocated		
095		Not allocated		
096		Not allocated		
097	22 Mar 06	Cpl Hart	Email Q&A	PRT RCMP
098	31 Mar 06	CWO Garrison	Diagram of incident – Pre-blast	
099	31 Mar 06	CWO Garrison	Diagram of incident – Post-blast	
100	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – Scene facing EAST to extent of cordon	
101	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – G wagon in post blast location	

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Annex E
Kandahar Suicide Bombing Board of Inquiry

Sequence #	Date Received	Received From	Title/Topic	Notes
102	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – Scene facing EAST from seat of explosion	
103	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – G wagon on side from back	
104	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – G wagon righted from right front quadrant	
105	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – Scene facing EAST including crater and suicide vehicle	
106	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – G wagon from front over ditch	
107	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – Scene from crater facing WEST	
108	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – Scene facing WEST	
109	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo – Scene from crater facing SOUTHWEST to G wagon final location	
110	31 Mar 06	Imagery Disk (ser 045)	Photo - G wagon from right rear quadrant	
111	4 Apr 06	HM Coroner London	Death Certificate - Berry	Issued in UK
112	4 Apr 06	Capt Patterson	Death Certificate - Berry	CF issued certificate
113	4 Apr 06	Insp O'Connell	Email Q&A	RCMP Investigator
114	4 Apr 06	FAC	Government of Canada Afghanistan Strategy	