

Board of Inquiry Minutes of Proceedings

Convened By:
DCDS COS J3 COS Ops CEFCOM

Date of Convention:
7 February 2006

Topic of Inquiry:
Deaths and Injuries – Suicide Bomber
Kandahar, Afghanistan, 15 January 2006

Board Members:

Colonel B. Horn, President
Mr. R. Lysyshyn (FAC), Member
Lieutenant-Colonel D.U. Perrin, Member
Major W. Glenfield, Member
Chief Warrant Officer E. J. Gapp, Member

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Executive Summary

1. On 15 Jan 06, a four vehicle Canadian military convoy carrying members of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was returning from Takh teh Pol after having completed a planned leadership engagement patrol. On the return trip they stopped at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) to conduct additional business and have lunch. At 1300 hrs, they departed KAF to return to the PRT base at Camp Nathan Smith (CNS) in Kandahar City. The convoy, consisting of four up-armoured Mercedes Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled (LUVW), (hereinafter "G"-Wagons) travelling , was moving west, on Highway 1, through Kandahar City at approximately 60-65kph and just picking up speed after being delayed by traffic, when it was hit by a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).

2. The explosion killed Mr. Glyn Berry, a diplomat from Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC), and seriously injured three Canadian military personnel:

The blast also destroyed one "G"

Wagon and caused minor damage to another.

3. On 7 Feb 06, COS Ops CEFCOM convened a Board of Inquiry to investigate the death of the FAC member and injuries to the CF personnel by an apparent suicide bomber. The Board was responsible to report on and recommend measures to improve general operational readiness and effectiveness, and to make findings about the factors contributing to the death and injuries.

4. A five-member board consisting of: Col B. Horn (President), Mr. R. Lysyshyn (FAC), LCol D.U. Perrin, Maj W. Glenfield, and CWO E.J. Gapp was assembled. The Board was also provided four specialist advisors: Maj C.S.M. Waters (Legal), Maj A.B. Currie (Medical), Maj J.S.Y. Généreux (PAffO), and CWO D.S. Garrison (Explosive SME). MCpl J.F.J.M. Fournier provided integral administrative support. The Board travelled to Kandahar Afghanistan from 27 Feb to 7 Mar 06; to Edmonton, Alberta from 13-24 Mar 06; and CFB Gagetown from 30-31 Mar 06 to conduct interviews and collect evidence. The Board also conducted planning, interviews and completed its deliberations in Ottawa 14-26 Feb, 26-29 Mar and 3- 7 Apr 06.

5. The Board interviewed 40 primary witnesses and 13 secondary or expert witnesses. The Board also reviewed 18 reports (e.g. National Investigation Service (NIS), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)).

6. The Board found that the death and injuries were incurred as a result of hostile action (i.e. a suicide bomber) in a Special Duty Area. The dead and injured personnel were clearly on duty at the time of the attack. Equally certain, the death and injuries were attributable to military service and service to the Government of Canada. The incident was not preventable.

Summary of Recommendations

7. Based on its findings, the Board recommends:

- a. Maintain a standardized, concerted pre-deployment training process that tailors requirements to special mission areas and the tasks to be completed through the use of specialist working groups tasked with designing the required activities, briefings, and skill requirements.
- b. Include Tactical Combat Casualty Courses in pre-deployment medical training for increased numbers of personnel deploying overseas to ensure effective response to mass casualty situations on patrols or convoys.
- c. Increase situational awareness of all patrols in regard to friendly forces (i.e. coordinate patrols, routes, activities through such technology as the Integrated Vehicle Identification System (IVIS) and the Situational Awareness System (SAS).
- d. Take a multi-disciplinary approach when deciding to repatriate individuals involved in traumatic incidents. As such, care should be taken to ensure that the benefits often associated with remaining with one's unit are not lost. In addition, when a decision to repatriate is made, there should be no delay in getting the individuals home.
- e. Issue all civilians and military personnel in theatre and on temporary duty with ballistic glasses.

- g. Implement a _____ program to assist Coalition forces with creating a secure environment.
- h. Undertake testing of the "G" Wagon against IED blast effects to determine if any modifications are required.
- i. Create and utilize multi-disciplined integrated investigative teams with an inclusive mandate to investigate incidents as required.

Aim of the Minutes of Proceedings (MoP)

8. The aim of the MOP is to report on and recommend measures to improve general operational readiness and effectiveness and to make findings in regard to the factors contributing to the death and injury to FAC and military personnel as a result of the suicide bombing in Kandahar, Afghanistan on 15 Jan 06.

Classification & Designation

9. The MOP are classified SECRET due to information contained in intelligence summaries and procedures, as well as commentary on operational tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

Statement by the Board

10. The Board wishes to highlight the following explanatory comments:

- a. [redacted] was not interviewed because of his ongoing medical condition.

However, this had no impact on the BOI as the necessary information was gathered from other sources.

- b. Many of the recommendations on the policies and procedures for planning and the conduct of convoy operations, particularly between the Kandahar Airport and the PRT in Kandahar City, as well as PRT directed convoys, will have been overtaken by events (i.e. the change in Force structure – Task Force Afghanistan / Multi-National Brigade (MNB)). For example, discussions with the MNB Commander, BGen D. Fraser,

This will entail a number of defensive measures to increase security.

- c. In regard to Findings on the issue of equipment used at the time of the attack, the Board recognizes the need to use the vehicles available at the time consistent with the mission and threat picture. However, the Board endorses the current Commander's decision to use Nyala and / or AVGPs for transport of personnel in high-risk areas due to the threat of IEDs.
- d. In regard to the PRT's integrated / mixed cooperative method of operating (i.e. military / civilian membership), the Board applauds the exemplary cooperation that existed. All members (military and civilian) of the PRT have spoken highly of the professional, cooperative and effective manner in which operations were planned and executed. All understood the importance of the integrated approach to the success of the mission. In fact, not only did the PRT personnel (military and civilian) recognize this, but also personnel at the KAF commented on its importance as well. As such, planning, resource allocation and decision-making followed an inclusive model that allowed all members to make the necessary

contribution. From the civilian perspective, their input was valued and implemented. Similarly, from the military vantage point, civilian participation did not compromise security or detract from military efficiency.

- e. The Board wishes to acknowledge the professionalism and dedication shown by all members of the PRT, particularly those involved in the subject incident. In the course of the deliberations it became evident that the CF personnel were well trained, proactive and conscious of the very complex and lethal environment in which they operated. They continually analyzed ongoing activities and maintained a very active lessons learned attitude. In addition, their reaction to a very unexpected, catastrophic attack was exemplary. It is our judgement that all reacted instantly and effectively, and in so doing saved the lives of those seriously injured. Specifically, the Board recommends that

for their leadership and immediate actions
following the suicide attack.

- f. The Board also wishes to recognize the fact that the witnesses demonstrated a consummate level of professionalism and expertise. They were all very articulate and extremely knowledgeable about their tasks in theatre and the complex operating environment they found themselves in. Their testimony in regard to the incident was consistent and mutually corroborating.
- g. Although not specifically within the Terms of Reference (TORs) the Board also strongly recommends that similar BOIs not be convened in all cases that involve death or injury in special duty areas. In short, casualties that occur in a special duty area due to hostile action or active operations are inevitable. Current practice ensures that in-theatre reports such as Significant Incident Reports, NIS and Military Police (MP) Reports, EOD reports and specific patrol reports are completed. Any one of these reports normally clearly indicates the circumstances and details of the incident and should suffice to fill the administrative requirement of determining cause of the incident, whether service personnel were on duty, whether the cause of the injury / death was due to military service, etc. From the perspective of lessons learned from the incident – higher headquarters in-theatre should be responsible for ensuring the necessary debriefs are conducted and any necessary changes to TTPs are implemented. This same higher headquarters should be responsible for formally reporting to CEFCOM the outcome of subject debriefs and any recommendations for changes to existing TTPs and SOPs. BOIs are resource intensive (costly in both manpower, time, money and infrastructure) and do not, if existing processes are harnessed correctly, add anything new to the knowledge base or administrative process. They are also disruptive to in-theatre elements that are already stressed with activity and resource constraints. Witnesses (who provided escort to a BOI during their tour of duty), as well as soldiers met in theatre during the conduct of this BOI, all commented on the fact that they felt the necessity to escort a BOI into high threat areas to investigate a clearly evident event was in their perception unnecessary risk. The Board

believes that a BOI should be convened only in those exceptional cases where potential negligence, special circumstances or the cause of death or serious injury is unclear.

Contextual Narrative

11. In Aug 05, the Government of Canada established a PRT in Kandahar, Afghanistan to reinforce the authority of the Afghan government in and around Kandahar in order to help local authorities stabilize and rebuild the region. The PRT tasks were to monitor security, promote the policies and priorities of the national government with local authorities and to facilitate reform in the security sector. The PRT was approximately 250 strong and consisted of an infantry company from the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI), an engineer troop from 1 Combat Engineer Regiment (1 CER), a combat support company from 1 Service Battalion and 1 General Support Battalion, health and medical support from 1 Field Ambulance and other specialized elements from various CF units. The PRT also included members from the RCMP, FAC, CIDA and other foreign governments (e.g. USAID, DFID). The PRT operated from CNS in Kandahar City and drew some of its support services from the coalition base at KAF.

12. At an Orders Group on 13 Jan 06, the Officer Commanding (OC) the PRT Patrol Company (Ptl Coy) planned a leadership engagement meeting for 15 Jan 06, in Takh teh Pol to speak with the District Chief, as well as the district Afghan National Police (ANP) chief. On 14 Jan, Ptl Coy headquarters issued a warning order to the assigned patrol section.

13. At 0830 hours (hrs), on 15 Jan 06, the patrol section commander, Sgt Joseph Brink, gave his patrol orders and the convoy, consisting of four up-armoured "G" Wagons departed CNS for Takh teh Pol. Normally, a convoy such as this contains only three vehicles, however, the Ptl Coy OC and Company Sergeant Major (CSM) also participated in the meeting and therefore their vehicle was added to the convoy. The convoy posture followed SOP:

This element led the
convoy.

14. The PRT convoy vehicle order of march and seating plan, which is assigned by the convoy 2IC based on operational requirement and seat availability, was as follows:

G Wagon	
Dvr: Pte (Sig) Wood	Convoy Comd: Sgt Brink
Sect sig	Sect Comd
Passenger: Aktar Mohammed Afghan Interpreter	Gnr : Pte Semple

G Wagon	
Dvr:	Crew Comd:
Sect medic	Sect engr
Security:	Passenger: Mr G. Berry FAC

G Wagon	
Dvr: Cpl Petten	Crew Comd: Maj Lutes OC Ptl Coy
Passenger: MWO Bolen CSM Ptl Coy	Passenger: Supt Martin RCMP

G Wagon	
Dvr: Pte Gagnon	Crew Comd : MCpl Anthony Sect 2I/C
	Gnr: MCpl M. Kotuk

15. The convoy departed CNS at approximately 0900 hrs and had an uneventful trip to Takh teh Pol arriving approximately 45 minutes later. Neither the District Chief, nor the district ANP police chief were available. However, the PRT patrol visited the police station under construction, as well as the local medical clinic. At approximately 1045 hrs, the patrol departed Takh teh Pol. On the return trip, they stopped at KAF at approximately 1130 hrs, which was on the return route, to conduct business and have lunch. continued back to Kandahar City by themselves. At approximately 1240 hrs, the PRT convoy prepared to depart. However, their departure was delayed 20 minutes due to a suspected IED at

the car lot on Highway 4. The suspected IED turned out to be a discarded RPG round, which was picked up by the ANA. The PRT tactical operations centre (TOC) then cleared the convoy to depart. The convoy left at 1300 hrs and took Highway 4, which was the high-speed route, back to Kandahar City. At approximately 1325 hrs, they had just cleared Check Point [redacted] by the Golden Arches and the traffic circle and were picking up speed and changing into "city driving mode" when a VBIED hit the convoy.

16. The VBIED was a Toyota Van (1989-92 vintage) laden with approximately [redacted]. The van was hidden amongst the numerous taxi cabs, which normally congregated in this area along Highway 1, which is [redacted].

The heavy congestion of vehicle traffic along with the numerous pedestrians, bicycles and fruit carts provided anonymity for attackers to hide and move. As the lead vehicle of the convoy passed the taxi stand, the suicide bomber quickly pulled out, merged abreast with the second vehicle of the convoy and detonated. The detonation hit the second vehicle; the up-armoured ECM "G" Wagon at what appears to be its [redacted].

[redacted] and the explosion itself combined with the forward momentum and the raised median caused the "G" Wagon to flip into the air, where it did a number of rolls, and landed on its side approximately 20 metres away on the opposite side of the road.

17. The suicide driver initiated the explosion. Based upon evidence found at the scene and common methods of initiation for such vehicle attacks, the Board believes that the driver had full control over the time and place of the detonation. The bomber would have used his left hand to actuate the electronic switch connected at one end to a power source and at the other to the leads of an initiator. Upon initiation of the projectiles (simultaneous) the rapid chemical transformation within, caused the projectiles to reach the point of rupture releasing the inherent blast, forming the shock wave front, projecting fragmentation and providing tertiary thermal effects. This catastrophic event [redacted]. The aerial flight of the vehicle that followed threw [redacted] from the vehicle and he landed approximately 20 meters from the "G" Wagon. [redacted] was also thrown from the vehicle and landed face down in a shallow ditch close to the overturned LUVW. Due to the explosion and subsequent damage of the "G" Wagon, [redacted] was trapped inside. For safety reasons he was extracted only after EOD personnel removed a damaged 66mm HEAT M72A5 C1 (M72) rocket that had delayed his safe extraction.

18. The remainder of the convoy reacted immediately. They implemented the immediate action drill for VBIED attack. The convoy commander called in a contact report without delay and requested assistance. Concurrently, patrol members provided immediate first aid, extracted casualties from the wreckage and provided site security. The first ANP elements arrived on scene by 1327 hrs. At approximately 1333 hrs, MCpl Kotuk and Pte Gagnon evacuated the first seriously injured casualty, [redacted] to the PRT camp in the convoy's rear "G" Wagon [redacted].

Minutes later, at 1345 hrs, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) arrived to assist with scene security and casualty evacuation. By 1355 hrs, the PRT QRF evacuated [redacted] and [redacted].

in a Bison ambulance. Within approximately 50 minutes of the attack, the three seriously injured casualties were evacuated from CNS to KAF where they underwent medical treatment.

. All members of the patrol were back in CNS by 1647 hrs.

19. Once stabilized the three severely injured soldiers were evacuated to Landstuhl, Germany for more advanced medical care on 16 Jan 06. A week later, they were returned to Canada for definitive medical care and rehabilitation. Mr Berry's remains were evacuated to London, UK He was laid to rest seven days later.

20. The following is a summary of the critical timings:

	PLACE	EVENT	SOURCE
	PRT	Orders for next day	Maj Lutes
	PRT	Convoy mustered	MCpl Anthony
	PRT	Convoy briefing	Sgt Brink
	PRT	Convoy departs PRT	All
	Takh te Pol	Leadership Engagement Visit	All
	Takh te Pol	Depart for KAF	All
	KAF	Visit KAF	All
	KAF	Delay in KAF – UXO	Sgt Brink
	KAF	Depart KAF for CNS	Sgt Brink
	Kan City	Passing Arches	Sgt Brink
	Kan City	Convoy at CP 204	All
	Kan City	Convoy clear CP 204	MCpl Anthony
	Site	Bomb blast	Sgt Brink
	Site	SOP reaction by ptl sect	All
	Site	ANP arrived at site	All
	Site	evac	MCpl Kotuk
	Site	QRF arrived at site	MWO Bolen
	Site	evac	All
	Site	Medevac launched from KAF	Log book
	PRT	Medevac arr at PRT	Log book
	PRT	Medevac flt departs PRT	3 cas on board
	Site	Mr Berry evac to PRT	Log book
	KAF	CEXC dispatched to site	Log book
	PRT	Sect debrief	Sgt Brink
	PRT	Mr Berry escorted to KAF	Col Bowes
	PRT	All Cdn c/s back in CNS	Log book
16 Jan	KAF	3 cas evac to Germany	Med docs
19 Jan	Camp Mirage	Mr Berry's remains to London	
24 Jan	Landstuhl	3 cas evac to Edmonton	Med docs
26 Jan	London	Mr Berry's funeral	

Narrative Summary of Evidence

21. The following facts in regards to the incident have been ascertained:
- a. The idea of a visit to Takh teh Pol was raised weeks earlier at a planning coordination meeting and the OC PRT Ptl Coy determined the actual date at an Orders Group (O Gp) 48 hrs in advance.
 - b. No warning was given to those individuals who were to be visited in Takh teh Pol for operational security reasons.
 - c. Patrol planning including route selection, intelligence briefs and manifest listing were completed in the 24 hrs prior to departure.
 - d. The threat level within Afghanistan, specifically the Kandahar region, is normally very high. Within this context, the intelligence received did not indicate a higher threat level than normal. Furthermore, Takh teh Pol was not considered a high-threat area.
 - e. A Convoy briefing was issued to all convoy participants at 0830 hrs, on 15 Jan 06.
 - f. The convoy, consisting of four up-armoured "G" Wagons and one civilian pattern pick-up truck carrying the contracted PRT security force, departed CNS at 0900 hrs, 15 Jan 06.
 - g. The trip to Takh teh Pol was uneventful. They arrived at approximately 0945 hrs.
 - h.

However, the OC, RCMP and FAC representatives met with the deputy chief of police and they visited the new police station under construction, as well as the medical clinic. They departed at 1115 hrs.

- i. The convoy stopped at KAF for administration and lunch at 1130 hrs.
- j. The convoy departed KAF at 1300 hrs after receiving an update on the current situation and contacting the PRT TOC.

- l. The convoy was hit by a suicide VBIED at approximately 1325 hrs just after the last vehicle in the convoy cleared the Golden Arches in Kandahar City.
- m. The VBIED resulted in the death of Mr. Glyn Berry and the serious injuries to _____, as well as the destruction of one "G" Wagon and minor damage to another.
- n. The patrol executed immediate action drills in accordance with their SOPs.
- o. The immediate and professional conduct of the patrol members saved the lives of the three seriously injured soldiers.
- p. PRT and coalition response was immediate. A QRF was on scene within approximately _____. The ANP were also on scene _____. All casualties were evacuated within approximately _____ to advanced medical facilities.
- q. The PRT convoy followed all SOPs.
- r. The death and injuries were the direct result of hostile action.
- s. All casualties were on duty at the time of the incident.
- t. The death and all injuries were attributable to service to the Government of Canada and military service.

Findings and Analysis

FINDING A

22. Required Finding: The details of the operation being conducted by the members at the time of the incident (Ref: 1080-1 (COS J3), 7 February 2006 - Convening Order BOI Deaths And Injuries – Suicide Bomber Kandahar, Afghanistan, 15 Jan 06 (hereinafter "TOR"), para 8a.

23. Finding: The PRT patrol was on a planned Leadership Engagement operation to Takh teh Pol to meet the District Chief, as well the local police chief, at the time of the incident.

SUPPORTING FACTS

24. Fact 1: The leadership engagement meeting was planned at an O Gp on 13 Jan 06, chaired by OC Ptl Coy, based on a need which was identified earlier by himself, the RCMP and FAC representatives.

- a. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 51 - 53.
- b. Testimony of Maj King, Ex 093, pp 7 - 9.

- c. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, pp 1 - 2.
 - d. Patrol Timetable, Ex 044.
25. Fact 2: The leadership engagement meeting necessitated a convoy operation to transport the integrated PRT team to Takh teh Pol.
- a. PRT SOPs, Ex 044.
 - b. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 12 – 17 and 23 - 25.
 - c. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 51 – 54, 75.
26. Fact 3: The convoy adhered to all PRT Ptl Coy SOPs.
- a. PRT SOPs, Ex 044.
 - b. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, p 2.
 - c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 43 and 44.
 - d. Testimony of Cpl Petten, Ex 054, p 3.
 - e. Testimony of MCpl Kotuk, Ex 051, pp 10 - 12.
27. Fact 4: Within the context of the threat in Afghanistan, Takh teh Pol was not considered a high-risk area.
- a. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, p 4.
 - b. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, p 21.
 - c. Testimony of MWO Bolen, Ex 049, pp 4 - 8.

ANALYSIS

28. The operation, specifically the purpose of the convoy, was to conduct a leadership engagement meeting at Takh teh Pol because of the perceived conduct of the District Police Chief. The convoy followed all PRT Ptl Coy SOPs. Within the threat laden Afghanistan security environment, neither the PRT leadership, nor the intelligence cell assessed Takh teh Pol as a high-threat area.

FINDING B

29. Required Finding: The adequacy of the planning of the operation including access to available intelligence (TOR, para 8b)

30. Finding: The Ptl Coy was experienced at the planning and conduct of patrols and followed a proven detailed planning process. The patrol commander of this particular convoy had the necessary access to available intelligence and ensured he was updated prior to departure and during the patrol (i.e. before departing KAF).

SUPPORTING FACTS

31. Fact 1: The leadership engagement meeting was considered as early as two weeks in advance at the weekly integrated planning conference, but was actually scheduled at an Orders Group on 13 January 2006.

- a. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 51 - 53.
- b. Testimony of Maj King, Ex 093, pp 7 - 9.
- c. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, pp 1 - 2.
- d. Patrol timetable, Ex 044.

32. Fact 2: In determining their routes, patrol commanders were conscious of not falling into a template / routine. They continuously varied routes and timings.

- a. PRT Patrol SOPs, Ex 044.
- b. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 75 - 76, 80 - 81, 84 - 86.
- c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 3, 6 and 7, 27 - 29, 31 - 33.
- d. Testimony of MCpl Anthony, Ex 050, p 34.
- e. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 11, 12.

33. Fact 3: An updated route trace was posted in the TOC and accessible to all patrol commanders. All patrol commanders checked this trace prior to every patrol.

- a. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 78, 80, 84 - 86.
- b. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 59.
- c. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 18 - 20.
- d. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, p 36.

- e. Testimony of MCpl Thaxter, Ex 070, pp 20, 21 and 22.
34. Fact 4: Current all source intelligence summaries and briefs were provided and actively consulted prior to departing the PRT.
- a. Testimony of Capt Gilchrist, Ex 062, pp 5, 6, 16 – 18, 40 and 41.
 - b. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 18 - 20.
 - c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 3 –10 and 29.
 - d. Testimony of Maj Roach, Ex 022, pp 6 - 8.
35. Fact 5: Well-known and rigidly enforced SOPs were constantly updated in response to evolving threats.
- a. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 023, p 19.
 - b. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 12 – 17, 23 and 25.
 - c. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, p 2.
 - d. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 39, 46 and 47.
 - e. Testimony of Sgt Côté, Ex 060, pp 12 – 13, 17 and 28.
36. Fact 6: The Patrol commander gave a detailed convoy briefing prior to departing CNS.
- a. Patrol Orders, Ex 044.
 - b. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 20, 21 and 26.
 - c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 7 and 8.
 - d. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, pp 2 - 3.
 - e. Testimony of Pte Gagnon, Ex 053, p 4.

ANALYSIS

37. There was ample time for the Patrol commander to plan the mission and prepare and deliver his orders. The Patrol commander

Strict adherence to patrol SOPs ensured that the mission planning was efficient and thorough. Moreover, access to all available intelligence and the up-to-date Master Ground Designation Trace allowed the patrol commander to prepare his orders with current intelligence and information. This ensured that all members of the patrol,

both military and civilian, received the latest information, as well as a detailed brief of their responsibilities and duties prior to departure.

FINDING C

38. Required Finding: The adequacy of the training and other preparation for the operation (TOR, para 8c).

39. Finding: The training and other preparations for the operations were developed in an appropriate manner and adequately implemented and achieved. In addition, ongoing training was implemented in theatre to respond to an evolving environment and changing threat. In regard to the civilian component of the PRT (i.e. FAC, CIDA and RCMP), they had minimal to no preparatory training integrated with the Battle Group prior to coming into theatre.

SUPPORTING FACTS

40. Fact 1: There was a well-developed pre-deployment training plan that addressed individual battle task standards, team battle task standards and theatre mission specific tasks.

- a. 1 CMBG Mounting Directive Provincial Reconstruction Team 2005, Ex 089.
- b. PRT Op Ready Declaration, Ex 088.
- c. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 44 - 48.
- d. Testimony of Maj Goodman, Ex 082, pp 30 - 32

41. Fact 2: Members deployed on the operation believed that the pre-deployment training received was pertinent and useful. Most witnesses recommended that in the future training should be enhanced to achieve greater realism and to better reflect the specific mission and environment.

- a. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 35 and 36.
- b. Testimony of MCpl Anthony, Ex 050, pp 25 and 26.
- c. Testimony of Ex 066, pp 28 and 29.
- d. Testimony of Pte Gagnon, Ex 053, p 14.
- e. Testimony of Pte Semple, Ex 056, pp 9 and 10.

42. Fact 3: The PRT conducted in-theatre training to address the evolving environment and changing threat for individuals and teams.

- a. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 39.
 - b. Testimony of MCpl Anthony, Ex 050, pp 26 and 27.
 - c. Testimony of Ex 066, pp 36 and 37.
 - d. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 97 - 100.
 - e. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 51 - 53.
 - f. Testimony of Maj Malejczuk, Ex 021, pp 8 - 9.
 - g. Testimony of Maj Goodman, Ex 082, pp 33 - 35.
43. Fact 4: None of the civilian members participated in any pre-deployment training with the CF. Most received their initiation to military culture, equipment and SOPs once in theatre.
- a. Testimony of Erin Dorgan, Ex 010, pp 20 - 21.
 - b. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, p 2.
 - c. Testimony of Mr. Callan, Ex 080, pp 2 - 3.
 - d. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 23 - 25.
 - e. Testimony of Maj Goodman, Ex 082, pp 39 - 41.

ANALYSIS

44. All personnel felt they were adequately prepared for the mission. Not surprisingly, virtually all commented that the greatest training benefit was derived during the first weeks of operating in theatre as they became aware of the specific in theatre developments, tasks and environment. As a result, the board heard numerous recommendations for improving pre-deployment training for operating within this region of Afghanistan. For example, operational driving (e.g. evasive, offensive and speed manoeuvres), vehicle patrolling, crowd control, more emphasis on chaos and stress during mass casualty drills (particularly realism in dealing with serious casualties such as dismemberment, heavy bleeding and severe trauma) as additional training that should be incorporated in the pre-deployment phase.

FINDING D

45. Required Finding: The orders and direction that were being followed at the time of the incident (TOR, para 8d).

46. Finding: The PRT convoy was participating in a planned, authorized leadership engagement patrol and it followed all of the authorized PRT Ptl Coy SOPs and Task Force Afghanistan (TFA) rules and regulations.

SUPPORTING FACTS

47. Fact 1: The leadership engagement meeting was in accordance with the PRT mandate.
 - a. DCDS Frag O 077, 22 Jul 05, Ex 090.
 - b. Mr. Berry's Employment Letter, 21 Nov 05, Ex 012.
 - c. FAC - PRT Mandate, Ex 012.
 - d. Testimony Mr. Hynes, Ex 011, pp 3 - 6.
48. Fact 2: OC Ptl Coy was authorized to initiate patrol activity and determine destinations.
 - a. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 23 - 25.
 - b. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 8 and 51 - 53.
 - c. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, p 2.
 - d. Testimony of Maj Zilkalns, Ex 058, pp 2 and 35.
 - e. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 023, p 4.
49. Fact 3: Ptl Coy SOPs were in accordance with TFA rules and regulations (i.e. PPE posture, convoy makeup and discipline, and TTPs).
 - a. PRT Patrol SOPs, Ex 044.
 - b. Testimony Col Noonan, Ex 023, pp 5, 12 - 13 and 20.
 - c. Testimony of Maj Malejczuk, Ex 021, p 12.
 - d. Testimony Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 23 - 25.
50. Fact 4: Detailed Patrol Orders (IAW Ptl Coy SOPs) were issued and followed.
 - a. 15 Jan 06 Patrol Orders, Ex 044.
 - b. Testimony Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 8.
 - c. Testimony Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 20 and 21.
 - d. Testimony Supt Martin, Ex 048, pp 2 - 3.
51. Fact 5: Response to the attack was in accordance with TFA / PRT SOPs, rules and regulations.

- a. PRT Patrol SOPs, Ex 044.
 - b. 15 Jan 06 incident AAR, Ex 031.
 - c. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 023, p 32.
 - d. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 64 and 65.
 - e. Testimony of Maj Zikalns, Ex 058, pp 10 and 12 - 14.
52. Fact 6: Implementation of response SOPs was extremely effective and saved the lives of the injured.
- a. Testimony of Capt Forestier, Ex 064, pp 5 and 7 - 8.
 - b. Testimony of _____, Ex 066, p 37.
 - c. Testimony of MCpl Kotuk, Ex 051, pp 10 – 12, 23 and 28.
53. Fact 7: In regards to ROEs, the soldiers believed they were robust enough to provide the necessary flexibility to act if required.
- a. Op ARCHER ROE, Ex 091.
 - b. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 47.
 - c. Testimony of _____ Ex 066, pp 24 and 25.
 - d. Testimony of MCpl Kotuk, Ex 051, pp 25 – 27 and 34.
 - e. Testimony of Pte Semple, Ex 056, p 15.
 - f. Testimony of Sgt Côté, Ex 060, p 13.

ANALYSIS

54. The OC Ptl Coy organized a leadership engagement meeting in Takh teh Pol IAW with the PRT mandate, as well in response to civilian requests. The normal battle procedure was followed (i.e. warning orders, estimate, planning, orders, etc) within the normal timeframe. The patrol leadership had adequate time to plan and all convoy members were clearly briefed. All convoy members (military and civilian) felt they were well briefed and prepared to execute the mission. The convoy planning and conduct fell within the approved TFA / PRT SOPs. In fact, the effective response to the attack by all concerned (e.g. convoy, PRT quick reaction force, coalition forces) was directly responsible for the survival of the seriously injured individuals.

55. Although the convoy did not need to actively employ the ROEs during the mission in response to hostile activity, all members commented on the flexible and robust nature of the

ROE. They felt that the ROE provided them the necessary leeway to do what had to be done to protect themselves and their colleagues.

FINDING E

56. Required Finding: The type of equipment (including transport equipment and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)) that the members were operating with or using at the time of the incident and the adequacy and appropriateness of the use of the equipment at that time (TOR, para 8e).

57. Finding: The PRT utilized the “G” Wagon as the patrol vehicle. In addition, they wore Generation 3 Body Armour, Kevlar helmet and ballistic eyewear. Ballistic blankets, although not mandated by TFA, were required equipment in all PRT Ptl Coy vehicles and considered essential. Virtually all personnel questioned expressed great confidence in the “G” Wagon. They felt it was sturdy, quick, handled well on the road – specifically in urban areas, allowed for good visibility and provided adequate protection based on its size and purpose (i.e. against threats). Nonetheless, in high-risk areas or in more open country, more heavily armoured vehicles (e.g. Nyala) would be preferable. They unequivocally expressed great confidence in their PPE, particularly the ballistic eyewear.

SUPPORTING FACTS

58. Fact 1: The “G” Wagon is designed to withstand Level 1 kinetic munitions, blast and fragmentation.

- a. NATO STANAG 4569 Land, Ex 019.
- b. Testimony of Maj St-Jean, Ex 016, pp 17 - 19.

59. Fact 2: The “G” Wagon has

- a. Testimony of Maj St-Jean, Ex 016, pp 30 and 40.
- b. Testimony of Mr. Trevors, Ex 016, pp 54 - 55.
- c. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, pp 24, 29 and 30.
- d. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 50 - 52.
- e. Testimony of Cpl Wood, Ex 055, pp 15 and 16.

60. Fact 3: () The “G” Wagon basic variant _____ to the up-armoured “G” Wagons.

- a. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, pp 28 and 30.
 - b. Testimony of Maj St-Jean, Ex 016, pp 35 - 38.
61. Fact 4: "G" Wagon C&R variant
- a. Testimony of Maj St -Jean, Ex 016, p 42.
 - b. Testimony of Capt Gilchrist, Ex 062, pp 23 – 25.
 - c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 50 and 51.
 - d. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, p 103.
 - e. Testimony of Pte Semple, Ex 056, pp 11 and 12.
62. Fact 5:
- a. CEXC Report, Ex 037.
 - b. Canadian EOD Post – Blast Report, Ex 037, p 3.
 - c. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, pp 23 and 24.
63. Fact 6: Troops expressed great confidence in their PPE (body armour, helmet, ballistic glasses and blast blankets).
- a. Testimony of _____ Ex 066, pp 22 and 23.
 - b. Testimony of _____ Ex 065, pp 8 and 9.
 - c. Testimony of Capt Forestier, Ex 064, p 8.
 - d. Testimony of Maj Zilkalns, Ex 058, p 38.
64. Fact 7: The standard individual medical equipment carried by each soldier was two field dressings and one tourniquet (rubber tubing).
- a. PRT Patrol SOPs, Ex 044.
 - b. Testimony of _____ Ex 066, pp 58 and 59.
 - c. Testimony of Cpl Elkey, Ex 061, p 12.

ANALYSIS

65. All patrol members highly regarded the "G" Wagon.

66. A criticism raised on the C&R variant of the "G" Wagon version was 1

67. In regard to ballistic blankets, soldiers felt that the protection they provided was worth the extra weight. The blankets provided them with additional confidence. The general belief was that anything that could provide additional protection was worth using.

68. The effectiveness of the PPE enhanced confidence and morale. The soldiers were particularly impressed with the ballistic eyewear.

69. The effective employment of an American style tourniquet was instrumental in saving his life. The American style tourniquet proved to be easier to apply and provided greater pressure than the Canadian issued surgical tubing. Significantly, a casualty can effectively apply it as a self-help instrument.

FINDING F

70. Required Finding: Whether the equipment was being used in an appropriate manner by the members at the time of the incident (TOR para 8f).

71. Finding: The PRT Patrol was following all SOPs and regulations in regards to PPE, weapons, equipment and vehicles.

SUPPORTING FACTS

72. Fact 1: Well-known and rigidly enforced SOPs regarding the wearing of PPE were adhered to.

- a. Testimony of MWO Bolen, Ex 049, pp 20 and 26.
- b. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 73 and 74.
- c. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, p 2.

d. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 48.

e. Testimony of Cpl Wood, Ex 055, p 13.

73. Fact 2: All personnel were wearing the required PPE in the appropriate manner at the time of the incident.

a. Testimony of MWO Bolen, Ex 049, pp 26 - 27.

b. Testimony of Cpl Petten, Ex 054, p 20.

c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 48.

d. Testimony of Supt Martin, Ex 048, p 2.

74. Fact 3: The Patrol 2IC verified that all personnel and vehicles, IAW Ptl Coy checklists, were mission-ready.

a. PRT Ptl Coy SOPs, Ex 044.

b. Patrol Equipment Considerations (Mtd and Dismtd) Checklist, Ex 044.

c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 50.

75. Fact 4: All "G" Wagons were equipped with blast blankets even though this practice was not mandated by TF Afghanistan.

a. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 073, pp 20 - 21.

b. Testimony of Sgt Côté, Ex 060, p 17.

c. Testimony of MWO Bolen, Ex 049, pp 27 - 28 and 49 - 50.

d. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 52 and 53.

76. Fact 5: Convoy drills for urban and country driving were being followed.

a. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 20 - 21, 26 - 29 and 88.

b. Testimony of MWO Bolen, Ex 049, pp 32 and 51 - 53.

c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, p 28.

ANALYSIS

77. _____ caused catastrophic damage to the "G" Wagon and resulted in one death and the serious injuries of the remaining three passengers despite the fact that all personnel followed the TFA / PRT SOPs, as well as ensuring the proper employment of their PPE. The proper use of PPE reduced the severity of injuries suffered by the wounded personnel. Although the exact effectiveness of the blast blankets cannot be confirmed, its employment certainly enhanced the confidence of troops. They believed it added another level of protection.

FINDING G

78. Required Finding: The adequacy of the procedures for optimizing the security of routes to be traveled by CF members in the AOR (TOR para 8g).

79. Finding: Within the PRT's equipment and personnel capabilities, the procedures for optimizing the security of routes travelled by CF members in the AOR were adequate.

SUPPORTING FACTS

80. Fact 1: There was a well-developed master route designation trace based on data from all coalition members.

- a. Copy of map with routes marked, Ex 002.
- b. PRT Ptl Coy SOPs, Ex 044.
- c. Testimony of Sgt Eades, Ex 057, p 36.
- d. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 3 – 4 and 59.
- e. Testimony of Maj Zikalns, Ex 058, pp 17 – 20 and 35 - 38.
- f. Testimony of Sgt Côté, Ex 060, p 19.

81. Fact 2:

- a. Copy of map with routes marked, Ex 002.
- b. PRT Ptl Coy SOPs, Ex 044.
- c. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 25 - 28.
- d. Testimony of Maj Zikalns, Ex 058, pp 17, 35 - 38.

- e. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 84 - 85.
- f. Testimony of MCpl Thaxter, Ex 070, pp 10, 16 and 17.

82. Fact 3: SOPs were developed and rigidly implemented to ensure route security was optimized. For example,

Patrol commanders also updated themselves with current intelligence prior to departing the PRT and en route during convoys and patrols.

- a. (PRT Ptl Coy SOPs, Ex 044.
- b. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 75 - 76, 80 - 81 and 84 - 89.
- c. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 3 - 8, 28 and 31.
- d. Testimony of MCpl Anthony, Ex 050, pp 12, 14 - 15 and 18.
- e. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 5, 11 and 12.

83. Fact 4: A due to the urban AOR and the geography / infrastructure of the region.

- a. Copy of map with routes marked, Ex 002.
- b. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 11 - 12.
- c. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 85 - 87.
- d. Testimony of Col Noonan, Ex 023, p 7.
- e. Testimony of Sgt Brink, Ex 071, pp 8 - 10.
- f. Testimony of Col Bowes, Ex 092, pp 25 - 28.

84. Fact 5: (There were certain high-risk areas and attack patterns particular care was taken to minimize the potential)

- a. Testimony of WO Walsh, Ex 052, pp 9 - 12.
- b. Intelligence Perspective and Significant Incident Tracker, Ex 046.
- c. Testimony of Maj Roach, Ex 022, pp 17 and 18.
- d. Testimony of Maj Lutes, Ex 073, pp 75 - 77 and 84 - 86.