Armed Forces & Society

Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: Experiences from the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan

Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens

The online version of this article can be found at:

Published by:

SAGE Publications

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society

Additional services and information for *Armed Forces & Society* can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://afs.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations (this article cites 11 articles hosted on the
SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms):
http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/34/2/173

Managing Civil-Military Cooperation

Experiences from the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan

Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens
Netherlands Defense Academy

From a management perspective, this article presents a process model to analyze cooperation between military and civilian actors in peace support operations. By means of multiple case study research, the article applies the model to eight partnerships between the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team and civilian actors (nongovernmental organizations, district governors, local constructors) in Baghlan, Afghanistan. These partnerships include explosives removal, power plant construction and police training courses. The article shows that civil-military cooperation processes follow six successive steps: decision to cooperate, partner selection, design, implementation, transfer of tasks and responsibilities, and evaluation. It is concluded that there is a lack of unambiguous and useful military guidelines regarding civil-military cooperation; the military are often unaware of other actors operating in the area and their programs, cooperation is frequently supply-based rather than demand-driven, and many military personnel involved in civil-military cooperation have little experience with and training in the subject.

Keywords: *Provincial Reconstruction Team; Afghanistan; civil-military cooperation; reconstruction*

In recent years, the international community (NATO, United Nations [UN] or a coalition of the willing) has responded to a number of complex emergencies by establishing peace support operations.[1] The main objective of multinational peace forces, such as Kosovo Force, International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), and Stabilization Force Iraq is to provide a stable and secure environment. However, these peace support operations take place in environments served by multiple civilian institutions and humanitarian organizations and a challenging array of issues that are not at all military in nature.[2] This has increased the need to manage the civil-military interface, particularly that between the military and the humanitarian organizations. This process of management is frequently described as civil-military cooperation.[3]

173

In most peace support operations, the approach to civil-military cooperation was essentially improvisational, pragmatic and ad hoc.[4] Meeting on the ground, personnel worked out solutions overcoming differences for the common good. As such, cooperation evolved over time in response to specific needs on the ground. There is merit and appeal to this approach. Some argue that every crisis is occasion-specific and circumstance-specific and that its unique characteristics mean that strategies and structures for civil-military relations need to reflect the specific circumstances.[5] However, at a local level, a tremendous responsibility devolved on the battalion commanders and their junior officers in each of these operations as a result of the gap between the assigned mission and the requirement to establish order on the ground. These commanders had to tailor much of their operations to the unexpected challenges they faced, rather than execute the sort of mission they were tasked, organized, and trained to perform.[6] Overall civil-military cooperation depended too much on the personalities involved, rather than on planning and standard operating procedures.[7] As a consequence, many differences occurred within and between rotations and contingents. These differences included priorities, budgets, and involvement of the local population. This approach yields inefficient use of limited aid resources, delayed humanitarian relief efforts, inconsistency between rotations, and conflicting objectives in the postconflict environment.[8]

Although there is no single solution to improve civil-military cooperation at the local level, the logic of structured cooperation should lead to efficiency gains and greater respect for the comparative advantages of civilian and military actors.[9] Bollen and Beeres state that "by no means does civil-military cooperation constitute an exception with regard to other interorganizational alliances."[10] However, as a result of structural fundamental differences between the military and their civilian counterparts, alliances are bound to be fragile. Taken on their own, interdependencies generate too few safeguards to shield the collaborators from hidden agendas, self-interest, or from their partners' opportunistic behavior. Interorganizational alliances, mostly referred to as cooperative arrangements, have been studied in great detail.[11] Based on theories on cooperative arrangements, previous research has developed a model to analyze the process of civil-military cooperation.[12] The objective of this process-based partnership model is to support the execution of cooperation between the military and the civilian actors in a peace support operation at a local level in response to a complex emergency. For involved actors and their leaders, this support expresses itself in the development of checklists, an increased understanding of (potential) conflicts in the process of cooperation, and elements for procedures to increase the performance of the cooperation.

The objective of this article is to analyze the cooperation between civilian actors and military actors through the process-based partnership model. To do this, the article focuses on cooperation between civilian actors and the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (NL PRT) in Baghlan, a northern province of Afghanistan.

The article is structured as follows: at first, the process-based partnership model is discussed; the next section addresses the methodology of the empirical review; in the subsequent sections, the model is applied to eight partnerships of NL PRT and

civilian actors (e.g., nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], district governors, local constructors); and the last section finally draws conclusions.

Process-Based Partnership Model

After a thorough analysis of literature on civil-military cooperation, three fields of research on cooperative arrangements were reviewed to establish to what extent these could offer useful elements to explain the performance of civil-military cooperation. At first, theories on strategic alliances are studied, as these are the main form of cooperative arrangements. Some researchers even argue that virtually all kinds of cooperative arrangements should be called strategic alliances.[13] Theories on strategic alliances identified the phases in a cooperation process. Besides, many factors were identified that influence the process of cooperative arrangements, such as opportunism and information dissemination.

Since theories on strategic alliances mainly focus on bilateral relations between business organizations and many different actors are present in a peace support operation (e.g., NGOs, military, local authorities, and the population), using only theories on strategic alliances was too limited. Many researchers state that their theories on strategic alliances are also valid in case of multiple actors, but to ensure validity for multi-actor cooperation, theories on networks have been reviewed. These theories emphasize the interdependence between the relationships, the governance form, the created value, the flexibility, and the network of an organization, and its position in this network.

Thirdly, theories on strategic alliances and networks usually focus on private actors. In a peace support operation, both private actors (e.g., NGOs) and public actors (e.g., military, international organizations, and local authorities) interact with each other. Theories on public-private partnerships have therefore also been reviewed. They provided several additional motives for cooperation and forms of arrangements, and regarded most public partners as a given part of the cooperation (rather than a partner selected according to its market value).

The input of the model is the revelation of a complex emergency. In response to this, a political decision-making process at an international and national level is initiated. If this results in a mandate, which provides a legal basis for the deployment and actions, military contingents of different nations are deployed to the host nation of the complex emergency. Often parallel to the deployment of military forces, humanitarian organizations attempt to provide assistance (e.g., humanitarian aid; protection of minorities, refugees, and displaced persons; medical care; and reconstruction) in the complex emergency, based on their own charter and mission. Having arrived in the host nation, all actors operate in the same operational environment. Then they have the choice to work separately or to cooperate, which is the starting point of the process-based partnership model.

Many researchers argue that the development of a partnership is similar to a relationship between people: first two people meet, then they fall in love, next they get

engaged, and finally they grow old together or sometimes divorce.[14] Although no partnership travels the same path, a successful partnership generally unfolds in several overlapping phases:[15] the formation phase, the operation phase, and the evolution phase. These phases are adopted in the model.

To make the model operational, the three main phases are divided into six steps. Based on the theories on cooperative arrangements, three steps are identified in the formation phase. At first, the decision whether to cooperate is to be made by each of the actors.[16] Based on its mission, mandate, and domain, each actor can execute an internal as well as an external analysis to make this decision.[17] The purpose of an internal analysis is to get a clear understanding of one's own organization, including strengths and weaknesses for competitive advantage and organizational vulnerabilities to be corrected.[18] A profound view of the external environment is the purpose of an external analysis. This includes a broad view of the complex emergency, but also an examination of the more direct environment including a needs analysis and actor analysis. Based on the internal and external analyses, each actor can determine whether it should initiate cooperation. Possible motives for civil-military cooperation are economies of scale and resource dependency.[19] In the final decision-making process, Porter and Fuller argue that partnerships must always be compared to other forms of transaction (e.g., internal development, merger) to determine if they are the preferred option.[20] If an actor decides to initiate cooperation, a strategic plan can be developed where all targets and objectives of the future partnership are outlined.

If an actor concludes that cooperation is a promising way forward, the second step consists of the selection of an appropriate partner.[21] Geringer states that attempting to identify a universal list of criteria, which organizations should employ when seeking a "complementary" partner, is impossible.[22] He distinguishes task-related and partner-related dimensions of selection criteria. Task-related criteria are associated with the operational skills and resources that a venture requires, such as access to finance, managerial and employee competences, and technology. By contrast, partner-related criteria are associated with the efficiency and effectiveness of partners' cooperation. These include variables that characterize the partners' national or corporate cultures, their size and structure, or the degree of favorable past associations.

Having selected a partner, the third step is to design the partnership.[23] The prospective partners have to negotiate the design of the partnership, which mainly consists of an agreement that binds the partners.[24] In the partnership agreement itself (in military jargon often called Memorandum of Understanding [MoU]) several aspects can be emphasized, such as: (1) precise definition of rights and duties, (2) agreement on clear and realistic objectives, and (3) implementation plan with fixed milestones.[25] Klein Woolthuis argues that contracts that tend more toward a commitment contract reflect more trusting relationships, whereas contracts that include more safeguarding arrangements reflect lower trust relationships.[26]

Having completed the formation phase, the second phase and fourth step is to operate the partnership to achieve its objective. Kelly, Schaan, and Joncas state that no matter how much attention is paid to the strategic and structural design aspects of

the partnership, the actual "take-off" is likely to be a challenging experience for most actors.[27] The staff involved will most likely find themselves in unfamiliar territory in which they have no clear frame of reference. This situation is likely to be complicated by cultural differences, communication barriers, lingering suspicions about partner motives, and latent opposition in the partner organizations.

The third phase of the model is the evolution of the partnership. In theories on cooperative arrangements, the evolution phase distinguishes between termination and modification of the partnership.[28] However, to prevent the military from a long-term involvement in the crisis (e.g., long-term dependence on military resources by the local population, government, or humanitarian organizations), partnerships have to be terminated after completing the operation phase and tasks and responsibilities have to be transferred.[29] If both partners want to continue the relationship, a new agreement can be developed. As Whitman questions, "What happens if the military leaves?" step five of the model consists of the transfer of tasks and responsibilities.[30]

The final step of the model is the evaluation of the partnership. An evaluation can determine the performance of the partnership and can facilitate the justification of finances to donor organizations, the communication between organizations, the process of lessons learned, and the accountability of the activities.[31]

Figure 1 presents the model. In the presentation, a distinction is made between inputs and outcomes, which are indicated with a circle, and processes, which are indicated with a square.

Methodology of the Empirical Review

To review the model in practice, multiple case study research is applied to eight partnerships between civilian actors and NL PRT. The emphasis of the case study strategy on the overall picture (rather than a single element) and the inclusion of contextual conditions[32] make it an appropriate strategy for this research. As such, Newman and Robey state that a process model can provide a theoretical structure for case study research, enabling case studies to support the objectives of normal science, including prediction and generalization.[33] Additionally, case study research is able to deal with a full variety of methods (both quantitative and qualitative) and evidence such as documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations.[34] A data collection protocol was designed to guide the researcher in carrying out the case studies, organize the data collection, and ensure that the case studies and their results were verifiable.

The following partnerships (case studies), which took place between February 2005 and July 2005, have been studied in detail:

1. poultry production with Afghan authorities and the international NGO Dutch Committee of Afghanistan (DCA),
2. police training courses with the highway and provincial police corps of Baghlan province,

3. the construction of microhydropower plants with the local authorities and a local constructor,
4. literacy training with Child Fund Afghanistan (CFA),
5. provision of radio communication equipment to the district governors of Baghlan province,
6. removal of explosives and ammunition with the international NGO Halo Trust,
7. various heart and minds (H&M) projects (e.g., construction of river works, mosques, and wells; distribution of goods) with local constructors and authorities,
8. school, road, and bridge construction with Aga Kahn Foundation (AKF).

To increase validity, both methodological and data source triangulation were employed. A general literature study was done and three interviews were held with redeployed personnel of NL PRT. In June and July 2005, a four-week visit was paid to Baghlan, Afghanistan. Semi-structured interviews were held with twenty-five persons of NL PRT, including the mission team commanders, personnel of the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) branch and the political advisor (POLAD). Most of these persons were questioned multiple times. Regarding the partnership on poultry production, a participatory meeting with personnel of NL PRT and local farmers was attended. Next, the researcher took part in six missions of the mission teams, where many activities were directly observed, including various H&M projects (e.g., construction of mosques, construction of river works, and distribution of medical supplies) and the removal of explosives and ammunition. The visit also included over sixty meetings with local constructors, local authorities, police commanders, humanitarian organizations (e.g., local women's organizations, Halo Trust, Kunduz River Basin Program), small entrepreneurs, refugees, and local villagers. In addition to the interviews and direct observations, many documents were studied, including inter alia, daily and weekly CIMIC reports, project information, meeting minutes, internal memoranda, and liaison reports.

Members of the CIMIC branch checked the results, and personnel of the Dutch Defense Operation Centre reviewed the case study report to verify the findings of the case study. In September 2005, the researcher attended a conference on PRTs in Afghanistan. The outcomes of this conference were in accordance with the findings of this case study.

The results of the case study are elaborated on in the sections below. Each section deals with one step of the cooperation process.

Step One: The Decision to Cooperate

The Decision to Cooperate of NL PRT

The main force of NL PRT consisted of approximately 130 persons. As part of ISAF expansion stage one,[35] its mission was to "to assist and facilitate local

Figure 1
Process-Based Partnership Model

authorities to create a safe and secure environment in order to enable the government, international and nongovernmental organizations (IOs/NGOs) to carry out reconstruction activities."[36] The main capacity of NL PRT to carry out this mission consisted of three mission teams. Each team was composed of a commander (major), a deputy commander (lieutenant), four men force protection, an interpreter, and a medic. Depending on the type of mission, a team was complemented by personnel of psychological operations (psy-ops), intelligence (intel), CIMIC, or police liaison.

The mission teams had a great variety of tasks. The first was to stay in contact with and assist the local authorities, such as governors, mullahs (religious leaders), and maliks (village eldest). Second, the mission teams were to get a clear overview of the external situation in Baghlan province. This included finding out about the needs of the local population and which actor was doing what and where. It also included collecting intelligence and showing the presence of the force in the province.

To execute these tasks, each mission team was assigned to one of the fourteen districts of Baghlan province. Most missions lasted one day, but two-day or sometimes three-day missions were made to more remote areas. A mission frequently incorporated a visit to the district governor and the head of police, where daily business was discussed, which covered the general situation in the district (e.g., flooding, refugees), the safety situation, and the upcoming provincial elections to be held in September 2005. Apart from these key persons, the mission teams also visited small villages or towns to obtain a general inventory of the needs of the local population and show the presence of NL PRT.

Many assessments were made by the mission teams to inventory the needs of the districts, though they were frequently unstructured, ill prepared up front, and without a clear format. In addition, many of the questions were not open, but hinted at specified answers. Although NATO provided detailed guidelines for area assessments,[37] including village assessments,[38] NL PRT made no use of these formats. This was mainly because personnel were unaware of these. Personnel of NL PRT did sometimes criticize this process of needs inventory. After visiting the same kebab restaurant twice in one morning, a corporal of the force protection raised his doubts about the usefulness of these visits. The mission team commander, however, countered that this was showing the presence of NL PRT.

In addition to its own assessment capacity, NL PRT made use of some documents of the German PRT (GE PRT), which was responsible for Baghlan province until September 2004. Apart from these, hardly any use was made of resources from other organizations, such as United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) or the World Bank. This contributed to the unfamiliarity of NL PRT with larger frameworks and projects on international, national, and provincial levels.

Apart from gathering information on the external situation, structuring and processing this data turned out to be a considerable problem. The mission teams and the different branches gathered large amounts of information each day. The information was accessible through the "Mission Tasker and Findings" of the mission teams. These reports included the findings of the mission of one of the teams in detail, and resulted in many files, sorted by date and district, in which the findings were presented. This made it impossible to quickly get an overview of a specific need in an area.

As a result, several database systems were developed and used by personnel of NL PRT. Because of the individual development they were often inaccessible to others, making it very difficult to transfer information. Moreover, NL PRT had several

parallel databases, one for CIMIC, one for intel, and one for psy-ops, resulting in duplication of effort and lack of integration between the branches.

As no uniform structure was in place, personnel of NL PRT started to interpret the information through different and often personal standards. This again contributed to the uselessness of the information gathered for NL PRT and for other actors in Baghlan province. This led to a disorganized situation in which there was a great lack of situational awareness, giving undue weight to the most recent information.

The Dutch interdepartmental conference CIMIC[39] allocated five hundred thousand euros to carry out several longer-term reconstruction projects. The strong call by local authorities for visible results of the presence of NL PRT strongly contributed to this. In this regard, NL PRT was often compared to its predecessor, GE PRT, which spent millions of dollars on assistance activities in Baghlan province.

During the third rotation, functional specialists (reserve personnel with specific civil expertise) were added to NL PRT to manage several longer-term reconstruction projects. These consisted of the increase of poultry production through primary schools, the construction of microhydropower plants, civil administration training, and the provision of radio communication equipment for the district governors.

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated an additional €4.5 million to these finances. Through a Facilitating Fund for Reconstruction (FFR), the POLAD of NL PRT was delegated to spend this fund. FFR was primarily meant to facilitate the operation of NL PRT, but expenditures were to be approved according to guidelines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This created tension, as these guidelines were based on development issues, rather than military considerations (e.g., before approval, all expenditures went through lengthy processes to ensure accountability and long-term sustainability).

Despite the considerable amount of data collected on the external environment and allocation of funds to several projects, NL PRT had little insight into other actors operating in Baghlan province. NL PRT made lists of the most important persons in each district (e.g., police commanders, maliks, and mullahs). As these persons frequently changed and the mission teams were unable to reach all areas, it was difficult to keep these lists updated. NL PRT did not know which construction companies were operating in Baghlan province. No overview was available that included the capacity, reputation, portfolio, or earlier experiences regarding these companies, and no unit prices concerning wood or ground works were available within NL PRT.

In June 2005, ten months after NL PRT's actual deployment, no uniform overview of humanitarian organizations was available. Several different lists of organizations were made, but often these did not include capacities, points of contacts, objectives, activities, focus areas, or local NGOs. Because of this lack of awareness, the functional specialists charged with the longer-term reconstruction projects, the CIMIC branch, the mission teams, and the POLAD all made an analysis of available actors, which led to great duplication of efforts and a waste of resources. In recent

years, for example, AKF had constructed approximately three hundred microhydropower plants in rural areas in Afghanistan. Within a year after completion, half were no longer functioning properly. When NL PRT set up a project for similar constructions in Baghlan province, it was unaware of these negative experiences.

This lack of awareness was partly because of the absence of NL PRT in most coordination structures. The POLAD often attended the monthly general coordination meeting of organizations operating in Baglan province. Apart from that, hardly anyone from NL PRT participated in the monthly sectoral coordination meetings on inter alia, education, agriculture or water, sanitation, and infrastructure. Moreover, no CIMIC branch personnel functioned as liaison with humanitarian organizations. This resulted in the ignorance of NL PRT with activities of NGOs in the province and national organizations such as the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR; coordinating organization of international NGOs), Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (coordinating organization of Afghan NGOs), and UNAMA.

The role of the POLAD was often confusing to military personnel. Positioned next to the commander in the organic structure of NL PRT, the POLAD was responsible for political advice and FFR expenditures. During the first eight months of the deployment of NL PRT, however, the POLAD also fulfilled most responsibilities regarding the coordination and cooperation with humanitarian organizations. While the mission teams identified the needs of the local population, the POLAD initiated coordination and cooperation with humanitarian organizations in the area. As a civilian, the POLAD was perceived as more neutral and independent than military personnel of NL PRT, which clearly facilitated interactions with humanitarian organizations. The extensive POLAD's network was considered useful for follow-up of the needs. Moreover, the POLAD had much expertise on developing issues.

As a result, the CIMIC branch, normally considered an interface between NL PRT and the civilian actors in Baghlan province, had a very limited network of civil contacts. When a new POLAD was assigned to NL PRT in March 2005, she kept to her assignment as political advisor of NL PRT more strictly and focused less on coordination and cooperation with humanitarian organizations, with regard to assistance activities. Until July 2005, however, this was not clear to some of the (deputy) commanders of the mission teams. In their meetings with the local authorities they promised to pass their requests on to the appropriate humanitarian organizations. In the daily debriefing meetings of NL PRT these (deputy) commanders mentioned the requests of the local authorities and assumed that the POLAD would pass these through to the humanitarian organizations. As the POLAD was not officially responsible for this, she often did not pass these on, which led to a lack of follow-up and many unfulfilled expectations by the local authorities.

Based on these internal and external characteristics there were several motives for NL PRT to cooperate with the civilian actors:

- NL PRT had very limited implementing capacity; for example, Baghlan province was littered with explosives and ammunition. As NL PRT had only one advisor on

explosive ordnance disposal (EOD advisor), and regulations stated that a minimum of two specialized persons were required for the removal of these items, cooperation was inevitable.

- Civilian actors (e.g., Halo Trust, AKF, DCA) could provide NL PRT with knowledge of and expertise about the local situation, customs, and humanitarian assistance. For example, Halo Trust provided NL PRT with information on the safety situation with regard to explosives and ammunition.
- Cooperation with the local population was essential, since tasks and responsibilities were often transferred to them after completion of the assistance activities. To increase sustainability, it was necessary to involve the local population in the partnership. This was particularly visible in the partnerships with DCA, AKF, and CFA.
- Cooperation with local construction companies would increase the local capacity and stimulate the local economy.

Since the Netherlands was the lead nation of the PRT in Baghlan province, NL PRT received national guidelines for the execution of its task. The main task of NL PRT was to facilitate the Security Sector Reform, the Bonn Process, the expansion of the presence and influence of the government of Afghanistan, and the reconstruction process within means and capabilities. CIMIC and the execution of different kind of projects should support the mission, increase the support within the local population, and contribute to the safety of the personnel. This was to be done through (1) liaison with local authorities and IOs/NGOs, (2) judgment, initiation, and execution of H&M projects and longer-term reconstruction projects, and (3) the facilitation of FFR projects. To decide which H&M projects were undertaken, the CIMIC branch of NL PRT developed a set of compensatory and noncompensatory criteria (see Table 1).

Many of these criteria are very vague. For example, what exactly are "positive consequences," and consequences for whom? When is something considered a "high need," and through whose standards? When is a project "unique"? The criterion "projects should be divided over the entire province" even contradicts many military CIMIC guidelines, since assistance activities were to be directed toward certain groups to influence their perception toward NL PRT, rather than equally spread over Baghlan province.

A focus on mosques was considered very effective in general. NL PRT believed contributing to these facilities would win the hearts and minds of the many religious people of Afghanistan. However, because the criteria of Table 1 were open to many interpretations, many people were led by personal emotions, often referred to as the feel-good trap. A striking example was the military transport of one local family from Baghlan to the central military hospital in Kabul to examine the serious disease of their two children. This activity did not apply to most of the criteria (e.g., in the interest of community, high number of beneficiaries), but was based primarily on personal emotions.

With respect to the long-term reconstruction projects, priorities were set in February 2005. A note from the Dutch Chief of Staff formulated three priority areas:[40] (1) civil administration, (2) employment creation, and (3) civil infrastructure.

Table 1
Criteria for Hearts & Minds Projects

Compensatory Criteria	Noncompensatory Criteria
It is in the interest of the community	Different ethnicities
It should have a high number of beneficiaries	Arrangements through NGOs
The persons with requests should have a reasonable, thought-through plan	Careful division through the province of Baghlan
Quick to realize	
Relatively low costs (no long-term maintenance, etc.)	
It should have positive consequences	
Project should be unique	
High need	
The project should be visible	
One should have attempted to access all other official ways. Preferably with documentation (controllable)	
Projects should be divided over the entire province	

Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization.
Source: Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (NL PRT), *Richtlijnen voor projecten in het kader van Hearts & Minds projecten* [Guidelines for projects within the framework of Hearts & Minds projects] (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

The Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense agreed on the execution of seven projects. However, most projects were not embedded in larger civil programs (e.g., National Priority Programs) and did not contain clear objectives. With regard to the construction of the microhydropower plants, different objectives were set in different documents. The objectives were: (1) improvement of safety, (2) improvement of development, and (3) improvement of small-to-medium enterprises. Apart from the variety of objectives, one can question their validity. As far as safety improvements, NL PRT believed that electrical light would increase the perception of safety in villages and communities. This is very doubtful, since the project did not focus on street lighting and there was not a high crime rate in these communities during evenings and nights. As far as the second objective, electrical light would increase the possibility of education of children on the one hand, but on the other, it would provide access to television. However, there were no television networks or opportunities for satellite television in the target communities. Moreover, because the network frequency of the power plants was not stable, it was not possible to connect televisions or computers.

Most decisions with regard to FFR were made by the POLAD. To minimize control efforts, only projects with a relatively large budget were executed. The priority setting of these projects was unclear. Decisions were based on the same priority

areas as in the longer-term reconstruction projects (i.e., civil administration, employment creation, and civil infrastructure). Again, it was fairly simple to gather any project within these priority areas, and decisions were thus based entirely on personal opinions. This is illustrated by the fact that the first POLAD of NL PRT was emphatically against education, while the second POLAD emphasized it. All activities within the framework of FFR were long term, focused on the development of Baghlan, and were to be authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition to the H&M projects, the longer-term reconstruction projects, and the FFR activities, several other activities were performed in cooperation with civilian actors. Training of the police trainers directly contributed to the assistance of the government of Afghanistan and Germany as lead nation of the police sector reform. The need for police training was expressed by the trainer to trainee ratio. While this was 1:5 for the Afghan National Army (ANA) it was 1:358 for the Afghan National Police (ANP).[41] The objectives of this partnership were to train policemen on the streets in basic skills and replace their metal truncheons with EU-certified ones. Through the use of a metal truncheon and excessive use of violence, current actions of the police caused many injuries of the local population and resulted in contempt and fear of the police.

Cooperation with Halo Trust focused on ammunition and explosives removal, thereby directly contributing to a safe and secure environment. This partnership also contributed to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, as it focused on the collection of weapons and ammunitions from, inter alia, warlords in Baghlan province.

The Decision of Civilian Actors to Cooperate

The government of Afghanistan ran thirteen National Priority Programs which were the cornerstone of the reconstruction in Afghanistan.[42] These programs focused on a variety of issues, including transport (i.e., National Transport Program), security, and governance (Afghanistan Stabilization Program) and energy (National Irrigation and Power Program). A ministry led each program, and the total budget for the funding year 1383 (March 2004 to March 2005) was approximately US$2 billion.

Despite these national programs and budgets, relatively few international humanitarian organizations were active in Baghlan province. This was mainly because of two reasons. Although Baghlan was one of the safest and most stable provinces in Afghanistan, many international organizations perceived it as too dangerous to operate in. Second, the province was relatively well developed, compared to other areas. However, these reasons are paradoxical, since less developed regions in Afghanistan are often less stable and not necessarily a more attractive alternative for many organizations.

The international organizations active in Baghlan included AKF, Acted, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, CFA, UNICEF, UNHCR, and Halo Trust. Many had

very limited capacity, often completely absorbed by the programs they were carrying out. In most organizations, the largest share of personnel consisted of Afghan employees who not only directly contributed to local communities through employment creation and skills development but also increased the local network and knowledge on local customs and needs. Many of these organizations (e.g., AKF, Halo Trust) had broad experience with assistance activities in Afghanistan.

Monthly coordination meetings took place to coordinate and manage efforts of the assistance community in the province. These consisted of one general coordination meeting, to be attended by all UN agencies, the international organizations, and a focal point from the government. Next, sectoral meetings focused on specific areas, including agriculture, human rights, and education. Frequently, these coordination meetings were either postponed or not considered useful; because of limited capacity and complete absorption with the organization's own activities, only a few organizations were present.[43]

With regard to cooperation with NL PRT, at an operational level, the international organizations generally regarded humanitarian principles as strict guidelines. Their attitude was recorded in a policy brief of ACBAR,[44] in which it was stated that if PRTs work in close physical proximity to NGOs, communities would no longer distinguish between military- and civilian-implemented assistance. The blurring of roles may have a significant negative impact on the relationship of NGOs with the communities they serve. They also may pose security risks if civilian humanitarians are perceived as collaborating with an unwanted military force and channeling intelligence to it.

At a tactical level, these principles were also considered as important, though often a more pragmatic approach was taken and several opportunities were identified with respect to cooperation with NL PRT:

- Large assessment capacity of NL PRT; Halo Trust in particular made frequent use of the information on ammunition and explosives as inquired by the mission teams.
- Financial means within NL PRT; the three main sources of funding were the FFR (€4.5 million), the longer-term reconstruction projects (€500,000), and H&M projects (€50,000 per rotation). These funds were the main reason for AKF, CFA, and DCA to cooperate with NL PRT.
- Technical knowledge of NL PRT; the knowledge of several specialists from NL PRT was frequently used in the partnership with humanitarian organizations. This included the knowledge of the EOD advisor in the partnerships with Halo Trust and the knowledge of the CIMIC functional specialist in the partnership with DCA on poultry production.
- Direct or indirect security provided by NL PRT troops; examples included the development of the Disaster Response Committee for Baghlan Province and extra patrolling.

Apart from the international organizations, several local NGOs were active in Baghlan province. It was, however, very difficult to analyze the capacities and

capabilities of these organizations. This was complicated by the fact that many local constructors claimed to be an NGO to avoid paying tax. Many of these organizations lacked experience and knowledge and were unable to write project proposals according to the requirements some personnel of NL PRT used.[45]

In addition to the international and local organizations, a large share of the civilian actors in Baghlan province were from the local population. The coping capacity of local communities played an important role in the reconstruction process, as they frequently contributed to the assistance activities. This capacity primarily consisted of labor and local resources, including small financial means. Involving the local population was very important to ensure sustainability. This could increase clarity about the exact needs of the local population and their sense of ownership, as well as embed the activities in the social structures.

For humanitarian organizations, the decision to cooperate with NL PRT was made in various ways. Because of previous cooperation with ISAF troops, cooperation with NL PRT was initiated through the provincial coordinator of Halo Trust. No clear targets were set by Halo Trust, other than to maximize the removal of ammunition and explosives in Baghlan.

Most other humanitarian organizations that cooperated with NL PRT often did set more detailed objectives and targets. For example, the general objective of CFA was "to create an environment of hope and respect for children in need in which they have opportunities to achieve their full potential, and provides children, families and communities with practical tools for positive change."[46] With respect to the cooperation with NL PRT, this was translated into a detailed project plan to support literacy training in the province.[47]

DCA's objectives were "to protect the remaining livestock and increase livestock production, in particular through training, extension, and the delivery of animal health services at village level."[48] Because DCA was not present in Baghlan province, NL PRT communicated with the head office in the Netherlands and decisions about whether to cooperate were made at the head office.

Several humanitarian organizations set conditions for cooperation with NL PRT. These conditions were normally derived from the Oslo Guidelines[49] or the code of conduct of the ICRC.[50] In most cases, this implied that all assistance activities were to be carried out according to humanitarian principles. It also included conditions on the use of force protection by NL PRT troops and wearing military dress.

Local constructors and authorities normally focused on maximizing the profits. With respect to local constructors, these profits were purely financial. For local authorities, these consisted of personal benefits and general profits for the local population. If NL PRT or the humanitarian organizations did not consult the local population, they were very often not involved in the decisions by the local authorities. This increased the level of self-enrichment of the authorities. Sometimes multiple local representatives were involved as a response.

Step Two: Partner Selection

NL PRT personnel involved in assistance activities in cooperation with civilian actors often carried out the search and selection of appropriate partners individually. These included functional specialists, personnel of the CIMIC branch, the POLAD, the minister and the military police. Since little assistance came from the staff of NL PRT (e.g., CIMIC branch), there was a great duplication of effort and many people ran into the same problems in the selection process.

Based on the lists of organizations operating in Baghlan province, potential partner organizations were identified and visited. Some personnel ran into potential partner organizations accidentally on a mission. Others had an extensive personal network they used in the search for a partner (e.g., functional specialist on poultry production). With regard to the FFR projects, the POLAD made use of general coordination meetings, contacts of ACBAR, the network of the Dutch embassy, and his or her own personal network. However, as it was difficult and time consuming for each individual to get a clear overview of potential partner organizations, frequently organizations were overlooked or discovered in a later stage of the assistance activities.

To determine whether a humanitarian organization was an appropriate partner, different people from NL PRT often implicitly used several criteria. The following task-related criteria were used:

- Complementary resources—the resources of humanitarian organizations (e.g., capacity, knowledge, and expertise) were to be complementary to the resources of NL PRT.
- Added value for NL PRT (based on time, quality, costs, and service)—in the framework of FFR, partnerships with a relatively high budget were favored, as this would minimize the amount of control. Large organizations were preferred because they were able to carry out the activities. To ensure the quality of FFR projects, NL PRT only cooperated with organizations approved by ACBAR. These were only international humanitarian organizations (not local parties, since they were not approved by ACBAR). To remove ammunition and explosives, NL PRT only cooperated with Halo Trust because this organization was considered to work very safely. Local organizations involved in the removal were not considered as partners as several accidents had occurred involving these organizations.
- Compatible strategies and objectives—the humanitarian organizations and NL PRT essentially had different mandates. Through the execution of assistance activities, humanitarian organizations contributed to the development of Baghlan province and were complementary to the mandate of NL PRT. Noncompatible strategies and objectives between NL PRT and humanitarian organizations included the time schedule (short-term focus of NL PRT versus long-term focus of humanitarian organizations) and target groups (the target groups of NL PRT were sometimes belligerent groups with regard to CIMIC).

In addition several criteria were identified in relation to the partner:

- Nationality—Afghan organizations were preferred, as they could contribute to the capacity building of Afghanistan.
- Personal fit—the functional specialist and the director of DCA were long-term acquaintances, which increased their personal bond.
- Prior experiences with and reputation of the partner—the functional specialist of NL PRT was familiar with the work and projects of DCA. Previous cooperation of several members of NL PRT with Halo Trust in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, Halo Trust had a reputation of working very safely.
- Compatible cultures—despite the different organization cultures, the fact that both the director of DCA and personnel of NL PRT were Dutch was valued as important.
- Network—both AKF and CFA had a large network. Cooperation was preferred as they provided easy access with other organizations.
- Flexibility—the flexibility of Halo Trust was considered very important.

Regarding most construction activities, only two local constructors were part of the selection process of NL PRT. Both companies were known through their construction activities at the NL PRT compound. If NL PRT needed construction capacity, one of these companies was directly approached and contracted to carry out the activities (e.g., dam construction, school construction). For the construction of the microhydroplants, one of the longer-term reconstruction projects of NL PRT, another constructor, Razak, was selected. The selection of a constructor was based on:

- Added value for NL PRT (based on time, quality, costs, and service)—as very few constructors were approached, there was little competition, leading to relatively very high prices.
- Complementary resources—the construction companies had capacity (e.g., personnel, machines, technical knowledge) at their disposal.
- Personal fit—personnel of NL PRT trusted the two general constructors and Razak to a large extent.
- Prior experiences with and reputation of partner—assigned by Habitat, District governors and private firms, Razak had produced several of these microhydropower plants. These plants were generally plants of 20 kW, while the plants for NL PRT were 50 kW. The two general constructors had done many activities on the compound of NL PRT, and were therefore known by NL PRT.

By involving only a few constructors in the selection process, NL PRT did not create significant competition. As a result, NL PRT often paid relatively high prices for construction activities. For example, while personnel of the CIMIC branch during the second rotation were satisfied with the arrangements of bulldozers for US$50 per hour, a local interpreter of NL PRT arranged the same bulldozer within ten minutes for only US$20 per hour. In addition to increased competition, involving more

constructors encourages more efficient work and spreads the benefits through the population.[51]

At the time of investigation, NL PRT was preparing a list of local construction companies and tendering was to be done according to Dutch procedures. However, at the moment, nobody knew what this exactly implied, as little knowledge of tendering processes was available within NL PRT.

NL PRT did often not pay much attention to the selection of the local actors. Having determined the assistance activities, NL PRT did not identify the stakeholders of its assistance activities. Frequently, only some local authorities (e.g., the district governor, mullah) were consulted before the activities were initiated. No structured stakeholder identification and analysis (e.g., through meta-analysis) was done. In the case of school reconstruction, the stakeholders could have included the district governor, head of the school, the teachers, and the parents of schoolchildren. To increase commitment and a sense of ownership, it is very important to involve these stakeholders at an early stage. This was quite apparent in the construction of the microhydropower plants. Since very few potential sites were identified by NL PRT, the Afghan authorities were often "taken for granted." When the district governors indicated that they would like a power plant, this was easily approved. The demand for electricity to the communities was often not taken into account in the selection. An exception to this was the district of Déhe-Salah. The target community in this district already had a small generator which was paid for by the shopkeepers.[52] However, making use of a meta-plan analysis or other participatory techniques could have provided insights into the local electricity demand (e.g., quantity, purposes). As a result, communities did not feel responsible after the construction and did not want to contribute to the cable network to connect the power plants to their communities.

Exceptions to this approach were the partnership with DCA regarding poultry production and the partnerships within the framework of FFR. In the partnership on literacy training, CFA selected target communities through careful assessment of the vulnerability level of the community, the level of resources available, and local knowledge and information from other agencies, most notably UNHCR and UNAMA.[53]

The local civil actors themselves did not use explicit criteria in the selection of a partner, other than the amount and quality of the assistance. Many of them urged NL PRT to contribute to the development of Baghlan province.

The presence and appearance of NL PRT made it easy for humanitarian organizations to identify it as a potential partner. In relation to the tasks to be carried out, humanitarian organizations used three selection criteria: complementary resources (e.g., security, finances, and assessment capacity), added value (e.g., increase of scale and scope of humanitarian organization), and compatible strategies and objectives. With respect to this last criterion, the fact that ISAF (and thus NL PRT) had a UN mandate made cooperation much easier. Second, contrary to the units of Operation Enduring Freedom, which had to carry out direct combat activities, NL

PRT was tasked to assist the Afghan government and UNAMA. This positively influenced the attitude of many humanitarian organizations toward NL PRT.[54] Third, the strategies and objectives of NL PRT to create a safe and secure environment (e.g., removal of ammunition and explosives with Halo Trust), were compatible to those of most NGOs. Strategies and objectives of NL PRT to carry out assistance activities were often less compatible and not complementary to humanitarian organizations. As a result, several humanitarian organizations saw NL PRT as a competitor. However, cooperation was considered if humanitarian organizations could directly benefit from the involvement of NL PRT (e.g., through funding). These partnerships still often contained noncompatible strategies and objectives, such as the duration of the activities (i.e., short term versus long term) or the target groups.

In relation to the partner itself, the representatives of the humanitarian organizations used several additional criteria:

- Humanitarian principles—most humanitarian organizations wished to be perceived as neutral and independent. Cooperation with NL PRT could possibly threaten this.
- Network of partners—NL PRT was embedded in the ISAF structure.
- Personal fit—personnel of NL PRT were well received by the supervisors of Halo Trust and DCA.
- Compatible cultures—despite the different organization cultures, the fact that both the director of DCA and NL PRT personnel were Dutch was valued as important. This was also the case in the relationship between NL PRT and the Dutch manager of the Kunduz River Basin Program.
- Prior experiences with and reputation of the partner—DCA was familiar with the reputation of the functional specialist of NL PRT, rather than with NL PRT. Several members of NL PRT had cooperated with Halo Trust in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- Risk of partner becoming a competitor—as NL PRT was active with assistance activities, humanitarian organizations sometimes perceived NL PRT as a competitor.
- Flexibility—NL PRT was seen as very flexible by many organizations.
- Use of force—personnel of NL PRT did not use a high degree of force.

Step Three: Partnership Design

In most partnerships between NL PRT and humanitarian organizations, (e.g., DCA, AKF, and CFA) much attention was paid to partnership design. Detailed project plans were made, frequently through logical framework analyses.[55] These contained an overview of the implementation of the partnership, including objectives, rights and duties of the actors, objective verifiable indicators, sources of verification, and preparation for termination of the partnership. As many tasks and responsibilities were transferred to the communities after completion, preparing the partnership for termination directly related to the involvement of these communities. In the partnership with AKF, "a significant amount of community mobilization will be required

before starting these projects and during the implementation of the projects. Extensive discussion will be held with local communities regarding these projects. Local community bodies elected by consensus will be set up for each of these projects to be involved in planning, implementing, and taking care of future operations and maintenance of these projects. To manage these social mobilization tasks AKF has budgeted for two Social Organizers during the first year of the project and in the second year there will be one person to carry out this task."[56] Regarding the literacy classes in the partnership with CFA, "the community is responsible for providing a location where the literacy classes take place, for identifying the teachers and for providing community support for the literacy program."[57]

The project plans, including logical framework analyses, formed the basis for the contracts signed by NL PRT and the humanitarian organizations. For the contracts in FFR partnerships a format of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used.[58] At the time of investigation, the DCA poultry production contract was going to be included in a larger agreement between NL PRT and DCA and was also based on this format.

In the partnership between NL PRT and Halo Trust, no written contract or MoU was signed. Working agreements were verbal and based on trust. They included the definition of rights and duties (e.g., NL PRT did not pay for the activities of Halo Trust, as these activities were labeled as humanitarian) and details of the implementation (e.g., planning). These agreements also dealt with the activities of each actor in the partnership, for example, which actor would share its information when. The main reason that personnel did not value a written contract was that few resources were allocated up front and there was a strategic fit between the two organizations. In other partnerships, NL PRT and the humanitarian organizations had far more non-complementary objectives, such as targets groups and terms of the partnership.

In partnerships in which no international humanitarian organizations were involved (e.g., construction of microhydropower plants, police training, most H&M projects, radio communication equipment) little attention was paid to the partnership design. In the design phase of the police training, the police commanders of the highway and provincial police in Baghlan were rarely consulted by NL PRT. As a result, NL PRT planned to use a Dutch textual reader on police training, translated into Dari. However, soon after the contract was signed between the commander of NL PRT and the commanders of the highway and provincial police,[59] it appeared that half of the trainees were illiterate. To properly train the policemen, it was necessary that the trainees were able to read and write. As this would be a lengthy process, the reader was completely adjusted and tailor-made to the level of the trainees, thereby degrading the level of the training course. Involving and consulting the local police in the partnership design could have prevented this.

A contract was prepared between NL PRT and district governors of Banu, Dehe-Salah and Pole-Hesar for the partnership on microhydropower plants.[60] These were the districts in which the first three power plants were built. The contract included a

description of the district governors' obligations (e.g., construction of the transformation house), the planning of the activities, and dispute resolution mechanisms. The district governor of Pole-Hesar did not sign this contract because he believed he could not fulfill the obligations of the contract. If he had signed and in a later stage could not fulfill the conditions he would lose his credibility.[61] Despite the refusal of the governor, NL PRT decided to start the implementation in Pole-Hesar.

In many H&M projects, contracts were concluded with the local representatives (e.g., mullah, shora) and the local constructors. These varied from small notes to more detailed contracts. However, many representatives did not value these written contracts, but attached much more value to the verbal agreements made with NL PRT personnel. Second, the contracts were often only made in English, making them unreadable for most local representatives. In several H&M projects, local communities were obliged to contribute finances or manpower (e.g., river works in Karte Etefaq), which increased the sense of ownership by the local communities.

NL PRT made use of standard contracts with respect to local constructors.[62] After completion, this was translated in Dari and included installments of the contract, a description of the project, price, payment, taxes, and duties.[63] However, these contracts were often very unclear about construction specifications. In the contract on microhydropower plants the local constructor was obliged to construct "a good working hydro station." What exactly is a good working hydro station, and by whose standards? As these issues were not defined, it was difficult for NL PRT to enforce the contract. In addition, no warranties were included related to unforeseen costs or future maintenance.

In many partnership designs, disputes about the legal possession of land took place. Because Baghlan province did not have a land register, it was difficult to settle ownership disputes. Before beginning, NL PRT wanted to clarify the legitimate owner of the land. If this was not possible, local representatives gave permission for construction.

In all partnerships, the approach of NL PRT was to maximize use of local personnel, local constructors, local standards, and local resources. This contributed to the creation of local employment, skills development, stimulation of the local economy, and sustainability. As one exception, NL PRT applied Dutch standards regarding the employment of underage workers (under eighteen years). This demonstrated the dual position in which NL PRT was often situated. While it was allowed to employ personnel over sixteen years old in Baghlan, and often under sixteen, Dutch law prohibited hiring personnel under the age of eighteen.

Step Four: Partnership Implementation

The actors were involved in several ways in the implementation of the assistance activities. The first cluster of activities consisted of coordination and information

sharing between NL PRT and civilian actors. At different levels, there was extensive liaison between NL PRT and the local authorities of Baghlan province. The mission teams generally liaised with the district governors and village eldest, personnel of the military police with the highway and provincial police, the commander of NL PRT and the POLAD with the provincial governor, and the commander of the force protection of NL PRT with the Afghan National Army (ANA). Through liaison, actors coordinated and shared information regarding the security situation or the progress of assistance activities.

Coordination and information sharing between NL PRT and humanitarian organizations was limited. Sometimes personnel of NL PRT consulted humanitarian organizations for specific information related to projects (e.g., consultation of the Food and Agriculture Organization on instruction material for poultry production). Humanitarian organizations approached NL PRT concerning safety information. However, these activities were often incidental and no continuous sharing took place for several reasons. First, most humanitarian organizations were totally occupied by their own projects and did not need the assessment capacity of NL PRT. Second, many organizations believed that NL PRT information was biased and not useful for humanitarian purposes. Third, if humanitarian organizations requested information, it was often not accessible because of the lack of structure in the assessments of NL PRT, the classification of many reports, and the use of Dutch as the main language. Fourth, since NL PRT did not have civil-military liaison officers and was often absent at the coordination meetings of Baghlan province, there was no platform to exchange and share information on fixed times with fixed persons. This led to a lack of coordination of activities between NL PRT and the humanitarian organizations. As a result, NL PRT was often not aware of the activities or plans of humanitarian organizations in Baghlan province and did not use the knowledge and experience of these organizations. For example, to prevent the quarter Karte Etefaq from flooding, NL PRT had contracted a local constructor to build a dam. However, within weeks, this dam was devastated by the strong current. Although this was larger than the annual floods, up-front coordination with humanitarian organizations specializing in water management (e.g., Kunduz River Basin Program) could have prevented this work from being done.

The second cluster of activities consisted of assistance activities of NL PRT in cooperation with humanitarian organizations. Several of these partnerships were within the framework of FFR. At the time of investigation, these had only progressed to the partnership design and none had begun implementation. As agreed in the partnership designs, most activities would be performed by humanitarian organizations. Within two years, AKF would construct several schools, bridges, a road, and a water pipe scheme. In Pul-e-Khumri (PeK), CFA would do nine months of literacy training for five hundred young men and women. Partnerships with Acted on the construction of wells and DCA on agriculture were also in progress. Both AKF and Acted were reluctant to have NL PRT personnel monitor the progress. They believed being

associated with NL PRT compromised the neutral and independent positions of their organizations. NL PRT did not agree, because it wanted to demonstrate its involvement. At the time of investigation, it was not clear how this would be resolved.

Ammunition and weapons were localized in the partnership with Halo Trust through the local contacts of Halo Trust and the mission teams of NL PRT. Next, reconnaissance was done to determine the exact amount and type of ammunition or weapons. Normally a Halo Trust team then removed the ammunition or weapons, sometimes accompanied by the EOD advisor of NL PRT. It was often transported to barracks near the compound of NL PRT, where it was temporarily stored. Halo Trust and NL PRT then destroyed the ammunition, weapons, or explosives.

At the time of investigation, several other activities in cooperation with humanitarian organizations were prepared, but not yet implemented. A contract was to be signed between NL PRT and DCA on poultry production. During the third rotation of NL PRT, a Disaster Response Committee was developed. In an emergency such as an earthquake this committee was responsible for an orderly course of the evacuation of all organizations. NL PRT was the focal point for the international community, while the Afghan Red Crescent Society was the focal point for the national community.

The third cluster of activities consisted of direct assistance activities of NL PRT to the local population and authorities without the involvement of humanitarian organizations. At first, several of the longer-term reconstruction projects were part of this cluster, including the construction of microhydropower plants and the provision of radio communication equipment to district governors.

In the construction of the microhydropower plants, a local constructor built the hydrostation, consisting of a blade wheel, generator, transformer, connections, and distribution station. NL PRT paid the local constructor in several installments. However, 80 percent of the payments were made without having physically checked the power plants. This was caused by, among other reasons, floods that made the road inaccessible. According to the functional specialist (electrical engineer) of the CIMIC branch of NL PRT it was likely that the plants did only produce a fraction (10-15 kW) of the agreed 50 kW. This could be ascribed to the construction made by constructor Razak or the fact that no sufficient amount of water would be available in dry periods to produce the requested power. Having already paid a vast amount of money, it was very difficult for NL PRT to reclaim some of this. Moreover, it was agreed that the district governors constructed and paid for the transformation house, electrical wires, transmission, and the canalizing of the water. By late July 2005, practically no activities for which they were responsible were finalized. In meetings with NL PRT, the district governors urged additional support regarding the cable network and connection points to the electrical system. This applied to both the district governors who had signed the contract and the district governor of Pole-Hesar, who had not.

In the project on radio and communication equipment, the communications and information systems branch of NL PRT was responsible for the selection and

purchase of materials. Through consultation with the CIMIC branch, high-tech communication equipment was purchased in the Netherlands. Purchasing locally was considered to be too time-consuming or less desirable. However, for long periods, NL PRT failed to recognize other programs, intending to improve communication between local authorities, such as the program of the World Bank,[64] the police sector, and private initiatives in the Nahrin district (where a mobile network was developed). Ensuring compatibility with these developments was important to facilitate communication between multiple actors. Additionally, procurement was done locally in these programs. If NL PRT was aware of these programs early, it could have joined in this procurement process. At the time of investigation, the equipment had just been ordered. Having purchased the equipment, the Communication and Information Systems branch would train personnel of the district governors to use it. However, as all manuals were in Dutch and English, this would be a lengthy and difficult process. Although a warranty was included with the equipment, NL PRT would still be involved if the equipment had defects to return it to the Netherlands for maintenance.

The military police of NL PRT trained the highway and provincial police of Baghlan province. The commanders of both corps selected the candidates for the training courses. Approximately fifty policemen were selected, most of whom came from PeK and Baghlan city. Two three-week training courses were held by NL PRT, focusing on arrest and self-defense techniques. Both courses were completed with a ceremony attended by the police commanders, the commander of NL PRT, and media. As agreed in the contract, the trainees were to hand in their metal truncheons after completion of the course. Out of the fifty trainees, however, only one policeman actually handed in his truncheon, while the others did not, so they could continue to oppress the local population. No actions were taken by NL PRT to enforce this, but all trainees received their certificates.

NL PRT carried out more than one hundred H&M projects in the first ten months of its operation, from the reconstruction of wells, dams, bridges, and mosques, to the provision of educational material, carpets, and fuel, to the shelter of vulnerable women. The budgets for these projects varied from approximately €100 to €20,000. Local constructors or local villagers were employed for most construction activities and the CIMIC branch of NL PRT regularly monitored the progress. To deal with conflicts during implementation, NL PRT normally paid local constructors and authorities in installments. The first two payments included 25 percent of the contract sum. The remaining 50 percent was paid after completion.

Through several units of NL PRT, many goods (e.g., footballs, ISAF newspapers, frisbees, fuel) were distributed to the local population of Baghlan to influence the perception and facilitate the work of NL PRT. Many of these goods were resold, however. After NL PRT had distributed toys and footballs to schoolchildren, personnel later saw the same items being sold at the local market. Moreover, it created envy between the beneficiaries, as there were no criteria as to who received the goods.

Step Five: The Transfer of Tasks and Responsibilities

In activities regarding coordination and information sharing (cluster one), the transfer of tasks and responsibilities was not regarded as important, mainly because these activities were continuous and ongoing as long as NL PRT operated in the area. In most other activities (clusters two and three) the transfer of tasks and responsibilities was seen as an important step in the cooperation process. Although several partnerships in cooperation with humanitarian organizations (e.g., AKF, DCA, CFA) had not progressed to this point, measures were often taken in the partnership design to ensure a smooth transfer. These included the involvement of and embeddedness in the community and the arrangement of future operations and maintenance, as well as the definition of clear objectives, including indicators that enabled the actors to exactly determine when the implementation of the activities was completed and tasks and responsibilities were to be transferred. In the partnership with Halo Trust, little attention was paid to the transfer because the local community was not directly involved and Halo Trust did not depend on the means and capabilities of NL PRT.

Regarding cluster three (partnerships without involvement of humanitarian organizations), several partnerships had progressed until the transfer of tasks and responsibilities were entirely completed. At the time of investigation, three microhydropower plants were completed and still to be checked by NL PRT. However, the obligations of the district governors (e.g., transformation house, electrical wires) were not at all fulfilled. They argued that the communities were not able to finance many of the obligations to which they agreed. Second, on completion of a power plant, it was often not clear how the electricity was to be divided into the community. In the district of Banu the governor intended to divide the electricity into five sectors: his own office, the clinic, and the houses and streets of three local representatives.[65] Third, future operations and maintenance were the responsibility of the district governors. The governor of Dehe-Salah reported that an electrical engineer of the community would do this. In the two other districts, this remained unclear.

In the partnership on police training, trainees completed the courses in three weeks. After the course, a trainee would continue his normal activities and start to work as an instructor for local policemen in the districts of Baghlan province.[66] However, after two months, nearly none of the trained instructors functioned as such for several reasons. Because the upcoming elections required so much manpower, they did not have time to start working as instructors for the local policemen. Second, most trainees originated from the two main cities in Baghlan province (PeK and Baghlan city) and were direct assistants to the police commanders. As the main goal of NL PRT was to train the trainers and let them train other policemen in their districts, this would not have any result in most districts of Baghlan province. Third, the police instructors had no means (e.g., instruction material) available to train the local policemen.

If in the future, the instructors would start training local policemen, NL PRT agreed to monitor the progress and intervene when necessary. NL PRT military

police would also attend the exams to ensure that the right procedures were being followed. This would contribute to a long-term involvement of and dependency on NL PRT.

As NL PRT only had €50,000 per rotation for H&M projects, many of these were small and did not require the transfer of many tasks and responsibilities to the local population (e.g., the provision of blankets to a police post, the donation of education material, or the refurnishing of a school). If a project concerned the distribution of goods like fuel or clothes, the beneficiaries became dependent and frequently requested more support. These activities were not a permanent solution to the local needs. In construction projects, the remaining sum was normally paid to the constructor or community after completing the activities. Tasks and responsibilities regarding future maintenance and operations were then transferred to the community. With local constructors, no maintenance agreement or assurance was made to ensure the quality of their work. If the construction concerned a mosque or a well, very few problems occurred after the handing over to the local representatives. If it concerned other constructions, problems occurred regularly. After the construction of the radio and television mast in PeK, it was taken into use by the local television broadcasting company. However, as very limited maintenance was done, the mast seriously malfunctioned six months later. Similarly, projects such as schools and clinics had several requirements to be fully operational, including sufficient equipment and personnel. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that the international community, including NL PRT, paid its local employees at least five times the local wages. As a result, many educated and notable people came to work for the humanitarian organizations and NL PRT (e.g., as an interpreter).

Step Six: Partnership Evaluation

Most respondents stressed the importance of evaluation, but inadequate attention was paid to it in many partnerships. Internal meetings, like the daily debriefing meeting of NL PRT, often functioned as evaluation. In partnerships containing large financial contributions (e.g., DCA, AKF, CFA), arrangements were often made up front to do an evaluation after completing the activities. If a logical framework analysis was used, verifiable indicators were often included to determine to what extent the objectives were met.

An evaluation was planned as part of most longer-term reconstruction projects. After the completion of the construction of three microhydropower plants, the project was to be evaluated. Based on the outcome, NL PRT would decide whether or not to proceed with the construction of an additional fifteen to twenty power plants. It was unclear how this project was to be evaluated. As the project set long-term objectives (i.e., improvement of safety, development, and small-to-medium enterprises) it was difficult to evaluate on the short term to decide whether to continue. H&M projects,

which involved construction activities, were completed through an on-site inspection. The police training courses were not formally evaluated, but several of the findings were included in a project proposal to extend the training courses.[67]

Some personnel of NL PRT expressed their criticism of activities. However, most investigated partnerships were regarded as successful by both NL PRT and the civilian actors. This is in accordance with the "altruistic self-interest principle" of Seiple,[68] who views civil-military cooperation as a pragmatic strategy whenever partners consider themselves interdependent in reaching their objectives.[69] Civilian actors and their military counterparts will look favorably on cooperation as long as they expect cooperation to serve their best interest.

The costs of most partnerships were low. In most construction activities, local constructors and personnel were employed. Information sharing and coordination were seen as low cost activities, with usually high benefits (e.g., duplication of effort). The longer-term reconstruction activities were regarded as relatively expensive, as several functional specialists were deployed to manage the projects. Although many of these only stayed in the area for a short period, they were costly, considering the €500,000 cost of these projects. In this respect, Siegel stresses the fact that the yearly price of a U.S. soldier in Afghanistan, when both direct and indirect expenses are included, is approximately US$215,000, while humanitarians usually cost one-tenth of this.[70]

Conclusions

In their research, Vogelaar and Kramer defined the concept of uncertainty,[71] thereby referring to the fact that problems soldiers confront during a peace support operation cannot be predicted. Large uncertainty arises because the nature of the tasks during these operations can be far from "soldier-like." Through structuring the civil-military cooperation process and by identifying many problems in this process, the process-based partnership model contributes to reducing this uncertainty for both the military and the wide range of civilian actors. Table 2 presents the main characteristics of the analyzed civil-military partnerships between NL PRT and civilian actors in Baghlan province.

Several conclusions are drawn from the application of the model to the cooperation between NL PRT and civilian actors in Baghlan province. First, there are a lack of unambiguous and useful military guidelines regarding civil-military cooperation. At strategic and operational levels, there was often no clear priority setting, demarcation of the activities, and formulation of end-states, making it difficult to determine when the objectives of the military force were met and redeployment could begin. The NATO CIMIC doctrine (AJP-09) is unsuitable if facilitation of rehabilitation is one of the main tasks of a multinational force, as this doctrine primarily focuses on CIMIC as a force multiplier.

Table 2
Main Characteristics of Partnerships

Partnerships	Step 1: Decision to Cooperate (Motive NL PRT)	Step 2: Partner Selection	Step 3: Partnership Design	Step 4: Partnership Implementation (Main Activities)	Step 5: Transfer of Tasks and Responsibilities	Step 6: Partnership Evaluation
Construction of microhydropower plants	Limited implementing capacity of NL PRT; increase local capacity	Contractor selection is based on added value for NL PRT, complementary resources, personal fit, and prior reputation. District governors are considered a given partner of the cooperation	Detailed written contracts between NL PRT and the contractor and between NL PRT and two (out of three) district governors	Assessment: NL PRT Construction power plant: Constructor Construction and financing transformation house, electrical wires and transmission: District governors and local population Financing power plants: NL PRT	Microhydropower plants were constructed, but responsibilities of the district governors were by far not fulfilled. It was not clear how the electricity was to be divided into the community	No evaluation
Police training courses	Contribution to SSR program	Police forces are considered a given partner of the cooperation	Detailed written contract between NL PRT and the police commanders	Preparing trainings program: NL PRT Selection trainees: Police commanders Training: NL PRT Delivery of truncheons: Trainees Financing: NL PRT	Little follow-up to train the trainers program since graduated trainees were not granted time to function as instructor and were not provided with sufficient means to do so	No evaluation

Poultry production	Limited implementing capacity of NL PRT; knowledge of DCA; increase of sustainability	Humanitarian organization (DCA) and local actors (farmers and heads of schools) are selected on task- and partner-related criteria	Detailed written contract between NL PRT, DCA, farmers and heads of school	Not yet started at time of investigation	Not yet started at time of investigation	Not yet started at time of investigation
Provision of communication equipment	Support to the Afghan government	District governors are considered a given partner of the cooperation	No agreement	Selection and purchase of materials: NL PRT Education and training of personnel district governors with equipment: NL PRT	Not yet started at time of investigation	Not yet started at time of investigation
Literacy training	Limited implementing capacity of NL PRT; knowledge of CFA; increase of sustainability	Humanitarian organization (CFA) and local actors (communities) are selected on task- and partner-related criteria	Detailed written contract between NL PRT, CFA and communities	Not yet started at time of investigation	Not yet started at time of investigation	Not yet started at time of investigation

(continued)

201

Table 2 (continued)

Partnerships	Step 1: Decision to Cooperate (Motive NL PRT)	Step 2: Partner Selection	Step 3: Partnership Design	Step 4: Partnership Implementation (Main Activities)	Step 5: Transfer of Tasks and Responsibilities	Step 6: Partnership Evaluation
Removal of explosives and ammunition	Limited implementing capacity of NL PRT; knowledge of Halo Trust	Halo Trust is selected based on task- and partner-related criteria	Superficial oral agreement between NL PRT and Halo Trust	Localization of ammunition or weapons: NL PRT and Halo Trust Reconnaissance: NL PRT and Halo Trust Removal of ammunition and explosives: Halo Trust and NL PRT Storage of ammunition and explosives: NL PRT and Halo Trust Destruction of ammunition and weapons: NL PRT and Halo Trust	The transfer of tasks and responsibilities was not regarded as important	No evaluation

Project	Objectives	Contractor selection	Contracts	Assessment	Follow-up	Evaluation
Hearts and minds (H&M) projects	Increase the support within the local population toward NL PRT	Contractor selection is based on added value for NL PRT, complementary resources, personal fit, and prior reputation and experience	Written contracts between NL PRT, the constructors, and the local representatives, varying from small notes to detailed contracts	Assessment: NL PRT and local authorities Financial contribution: NL PRT Construction activities: local constructor or local employees	After the final payments the projects were transferred to the local communities. However, often little attention was paid to follow-up	No evaluation
School, road, and bridge construction	Limited implementing capacity of NL PRT; knowledge of AKF; increase of sustainability; increase local capacity	Humanitarian organization (AKF) is selected on task- and partner-related criteria. Contractor selection is based on added value for NL PRT, personal fit, complementary resources, and prior reputation and experience	Detailed written contract between NL PRT, AKF and communities	Not yet started at time of investigation	Not yet started at time of investigation	Not yet started at time of investigation

Note: NL PRT = Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team; SSR = Security Sector Reform; DCA = Dutch Committee of Afghanistan; CFA = Child Fund Afghanistan; AKF = Aga Kahn Foundation.

203

Second, although the military force often put large effort into this, they remained unaware of other actors operating in the area and of civil programs of main actors such as UN organizations. In several cases, this was because the military force did not participate in coordination meetings, did not adequately transfer contacts with civilian actors to subsequent rotations, were unable to make the information accessible, or simply were not interested in civil programs.

Third, cooperation at the local level was frequently supply-based rather than demand-driven. Activities were selected and prioritized based on the capacity of the military force or humanitarian organization, rather than the needs of the local beneficiaries. Following this approach, in many partnerships little attention was paid to the involvement of the local population, which resulted in decreased sustainability, a lack of cohesion with social structures, a lack of ownership, and mismatches between the assistance activities and the actual needs.

Fourth, many military personnel involved in civil-military cooperation had little experience with and training in the subject. They lacked knowledge and expertise regarding development issues, military guidelines, and project-based activities, including tendering procedures.

In conclusion, the process-based partnership model seems to be effective in describing and explaining civil-military partnerships at a local level. However, to use the model as a framework for future operations, it is important to apply it to different operational settings of civil-military cooperation, such as different areas in Afghanistan. This increases insight into the differences and similarities of actors' approaches toward civil-military cooperation and contributes to an improved understanding of the successes and failures of this special form of cooperation.

Notes

1. A complex emergency is characterized as a humanitarian disaster that is due to a political or ethnic conflict and that causes massive population movements and a shortage of food and health care, and in which political authority and public services have deteriorated or completely collapsed.

2. A. D. L. Vogelaar and E. H. Kramer, "Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Operations," *Armed Forces & Society*, 30, 3 (Spring 2004): 409-31.

3. S. Gordon, "Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, document posted July 13, 2001, http://jha.ac/articles/a068.htm.

4. C. J. Currey, *A New Model for Military/Nongovernmental Relations in Post-conflict Operations* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003).

5. C. Gourlay, "Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions," *Disarmament Forum*, 3 (2000): 33-44.

6. C. Dandeker and J. Gow, "The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success," *Armed Forces & Society*, 23, 3 (Spring 1997): 327-48. See also L. Miller, "Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of Preventive Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia," *Armed Forces & Society*, 23, 3 (Spring 1997): 415-49; Vogelaar and Kramer, "Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Operations"; and T. Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Peace Support Operations during the 1990s* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2005).

7. Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*.

8. D. Peabody, "The Challenges of Doing Good Work: The Development of Canadian Forces CIMIC Capability and NGOs" (paper presented at CDAI Conference, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, ON, October 28-29, 2005). See also Currey, *A New Model*.

9. Gourlay, "Partners Apart."

10. M. T. I. Bollen and R. Beeres, "On the Conditions for CIMIC during Humanitarian Operations," in *NL Arms: Civil-Military Cooperation: A marriage of Reason*, ed. M. T. I. Bollen, R. V. Janssens, H. F. M. Kirkels and J. L. M. Soeters (Breda, Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Military Academy, 2002), 19-30.

11. W. H. Hoffmann and R. Schlosser, "Success Factors of Strategic Alliances in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises – An Empirical Survey," *Long Range Planning*, 34, 3 (2001): 357-81. See also T. K. Das and B. S. Teng, "Partner Analysis and Alliance Performance," *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, 19, 3 (2003): 279-308; R. Sammi, L. N. van Wassenhove and S. Bhattacharya, "An Innovative Public-Private Partnership: New Approach to Development," *World Development*, 30, 6 (2002): 991-1008.

12. S. J. H. Rietjens, *Co-operative Arrangements for Civil-Military Co-operation* (Enschede, Netherlands: University of Twente, 2003). See also S. J. H. Rietjens, "A Management Perspective on Co-operation Between Military and Civilian Actors in Response to the Kosovo Crisis" (paper presented at the Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, Netherlands, September 9-11, 2004); S. Mevissen, *Civiel-militaire samenwerking bij vluchtelingenhulp* [Civil-military cooperation during refugee assistance] (Enschede, Netherlands: University of Twente, 2005).

13. P. Lorange and J. Roos, *Strategic Alliances: Formation, Implementation and Evolution*. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992).

14. R. M. Kanter, "Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances," *Harvard Business Review*, 72, 4 (1994): 96-108.

15. T. K. Das and B. Teng, "Sustaining Strategic Alliances: Options and Guidelines," *Journal of General Management*, 22, 4 (1997): 49-64.

16. M. Y. Yoshino and U. S. Rangan, *Strategic Alliances: An Entrepreneurial Approach to Globalization* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1995).

17. S. E. Huyzer, W. Luimes, M. G. M. Spitholt, W. J. Slagter, A. H. van Wijk, D. J. van der Leest and D. Croese, *Strategische samenwerking* [Strategic cooperation] (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Samsom, 1990).

18. J. A. Pearce and R. B. Robinson, *Strategic Management: Formulation, Implementation and Control* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003).

19. Gordon, "Understanding the Priorities." See also D. Faulkner, *International Strategic Alliances: Co-operating to Compete* (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1995).

20. M. E. Porter and M. B. Fuller, "Coalitions and Global Strategy," in *Competition in Global Industries*, ed. M. E. Porter (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986), 315-43.

21. J. M. Geringer, "Strategic Determinants of Partner Selection Criteria in International Joint Ventures," *Journal of Business Studies*, 22, 1 (1991): 41-62.

22. Geringer, "Strategic Determinants."

23. L. D. Lewis, *Partnerships for Profit* (New York: The Free Press, 1990).

24. J. Child and D. Faulkner, *Strategies of Cooperation: Managing Alliances, Networks, and Joint Ventures* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998).

25. Das and Teng, "Sustaining Strategic Alliances." See also Hoffmann and Schlosser, "Success Factors of Strategic Alliances"; A. Demurenko and A. Nikitin, "Concepts in International Peacekeeping," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* 6, 1 (1997): 111-26.

26. R. J. A. Klein Woolthuis, *Sleeping with the Enemy: Trust, Dependence and Contracts in Interorganisational Relationships* (Enschede, Netherlands: University of Twente, 1999).

27. M. J. Kelly, J. L. Schaan and H. Joncas, "Managing Alliance Relationships: Key Challenges in the Early Stages of Collaboration," *R&D Management* 32, 1 (2002): 11-22.

28. A. Mulyowahyudi, *Managing International Strategic Alliances: Multiple Case Studies in the Indonesian Steel Industry* (Enschede, Netherlands: University of Twente, 2001).

29. NATO, *AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine*, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf (accessed April 10, 2004).

30. J. Whitman, "A Cautionary Note on Humanitarian Intervention," *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, document posted September 1995, http://jha.ac/articles/a001.htm.

31. A. Pijnappel, *CIMIC projectevaluaties* [CIMIC project evaluations]. (Breda, Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Military Academy, 2004). See also F. Rubin, *A Basic Guide to Evaluation for Development Workers* (Oxford, UK: Oxfam, 1995).

32. R. K. Yin, *Case Study Research, Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994).

33. M. Newman and D. Robey, "A Social Process Model of User-Analyst Relationships," *MIS Quarterly* 16, 2 (1992): 249-66.

34. C. Cassel and G. Symon, *Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research* (London: Sage Publications, 1994).

35. The NATO expansion plan, established after the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, divided Afghanistan into four zones: north, west, east and south. In principle, ISAF was to deploy PRTs in a counterclockwise fashion, beginning in the north (i.e., expansion stage one).

36. A. A. H. De Bok and Y. Stassen, *Briefing PRT tbv bezoek VKC Buza* (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

37. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), *Cimic area assessment* (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters ISAF, 2004).

38. ISAF, *Guideline for village assessment* (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters ISAF, 2004).

39. This is a conference between the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Foreign Aid on CIMIC.

40. Dutch Ministry of Defense, *Nota Cimic extra prt* [White paper on PRT] (The Hague, Netherlands: Ministery of Defense, 2005).

41. ISAF, *Ministry of Interior Affairs & Afghan National Police* (Kabul, Afghanistan: ISAF, 2005).

42. The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan's National Priority Programs Overview Documentation* (Kabul, Afghanistan: The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, 2004).

43. NL PRT, *Verslag General Coordination Meeting NGOs: 28 maart 2005* [Report of General Coordination Meeting NGOs: March 28, 2005] (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

44. ACBAR, *ACBAR policy brief: NGO Position Paper Concerning the Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (Kabul, Afghanistan: ACBAR, 2003).

45. A. Van Apeldoorn, *Persoonlijke correspondentie A. van Apeldoorn met leden Tweede Kamer* [Personal correspondence of A. Van Apeldoorn with members of parliament] (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

46. Child Fund Afghanistan (CFA), *Project Outline for the Support of Literacy Trainings in Baghlan Province* (Pul-e-Khormi, Afghanistan: CFA, 2005).

47. CFA, *Project Outline*.

48. Dutch Committee of Afghanistan, Web site, http://www.dca-vet.nl/DCA/indexenglish.html (accessed August 30, 2005).

49. United Nations, *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief* (Geneva: United Nations, 1994).

50. International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, *Code of Conduct* (Geneva: International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 1994).

51. J. Kremers, *Het aanbesteden van CIMIC projecten* [The tendering process of CIMIC projects] (Breda, Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Military Academy, 2003).

52. NL PRT, *Cimic verslag tijdens 2-daagse missie 188 naar Andarab (01/02 april 05)* [CIMIC report during two-day mission 188 Andarab (April 1 and 2, 2005)]. (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

53. CFA, *Project Outline*.

54. Save the Children, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan* (London: Save the Children, 2004).

55. Aga Kahn Foundation (AKF), *Consolidated Project Proposal to the Dutch Embassy/PRT* (Pul-e-Khormi, Afghanistan: AKF, 2005). See also NL PRT, *Contract* (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

56. AKF, *Consolidated Project Proposal*.

57. CFA, *Project Outline*.

58. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *En Specimen contribution agreement (EUR 500,000 or over)* (The Hague, Netherlands: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

59. NL PRT, *Protocol* (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

60. NL PRT, *Contractnr 2005/11-2005/12-2005/13* (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

61. NL PRT, *Cimic verslag tijdens 2-daagse missie 188 naar Andarab*.

62. NL PRT, *Contract*.

63. NL PRT, *Contract*.

64. World Bank, *Memorandum and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit of SDR 15.7 million (US$22 million equivalent) to the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan for an Emergency Communication Development Project*. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005).

65. NL PRT, *Cimic verslag tijdens 2-daagse missie 248 naar Andarab (01/02 juni 05)* [CIMIC report during two-day mission 248 Andarab (June 1 and 2, 2005)] (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

66. NL PRT, *Projectvoorstel Training basisvaardigheden Afghan National Police* [Project proposal for basic training of the Afghan National Police] (Pul-e-Khumri, Afghanistan: NL PRT, 2005).

67. Dutch Ministry of Defense, *Nota politietraining provincie Baghlan* [White paper on police training in Baghlan province] (The Hague, Netherlands: Ministry of Defense, 2005).

68. C. Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping Institute Centre for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 1996).

69. S. J. H. Rietjens, M. T. I. Bollen, and J. T. Voordijk, "Assessing Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Support Operations," in *Euroma Conference 2005: Operations and Global Competitiveness*, ed. K. Demeter (Budapest, Hungary: Corvinus University of Budapest, 2005), 669-76.

70. A. Siegel, "Civil-Military Marriage Counseling: Can this Union Be Saved?" *Special Warfare* 15, 4 (December 2002): 28-34.

71. Vogelaar and Kramer, "Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Operations."

Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens is assistant professor at the Netherlands Defense Academy. He completed his PhD on civil-military cooperation during peace support operations in March 2006. As part of this research, Sebastiaan paid a one-month visit to the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan during the summer of 2005. Sebastiaan has various international publications on civil-military cooperation, cultural differences, performance assessment, and decision methodology. *Address for correspondence:* Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens, Netherlands Defense Academy, P.O. Box 90.002, 4800 PA, Breda, Netherlands; e-mail: sjh.rietjens.01@nlda.nl.